

# CURRENT History

A MONTHLY MAGAZINE  
OF WORLD AFFAIRS

MARCH 1965

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# CURRENT History

FOUNDED IN 1914 BY

*The New York Times*

PUBLISHED BY

*Current History, Inc.*

EDITOR, 1943-1955:

*D. G. Redmond*

MARCH, 1965

VOLUME 48

NUMBER 283

Publisher:

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Published monthly by Current History, Inc. Publication Office: 1822 Ludlow St., Phila., Pa. 19103. Editorial Office: 156 Wolfpit Ave., Norwalk, Conn. 06851. Second Class Postage paid at Phila., Pa., and additional mailing office. Indexed in *The Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature*. Individual copies may be secured by writing to the publication office. No responsibility is assumed for the return of unsolicited manuscripts. Copyright, © 1965, by Current History, Inc.

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# CURRENT History

MARCH, 1965

VOL. 48, NO. 283

*In this issue, seven specialists analyze recent changes in the domestic policies of the nations of East Europe and in their attitudes toward the Soviet Union and the Western world. As these articles point out, there has been considerable change within the Soviet bloc. There have also been some revisions of United States policies. Our introductory article describes the course of United States policy, but warns that "While the change in the United States attitude toward Eastern Europe has been rather striking . . . its present policy is essentially static and short-run."*

## U. S. Policy in East Europe

By ANDRZEJ KORBONSKI

*Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of California at Los Angeles*

THE conduct of United States foreign relations with Eastern Europe<sup>1</sup> in the period 1941–1956 has been ably discussed in detail elsewhere.<sup>2</sup> It can be stated with some accuracy that the United States did not involve itself in the area until after it was too late to affect the course of events there to any real extent. This does not mean that Eastern Europe was "sold out" by President Franklin Roosevelt, assisted by Soviet spies in the state department. It means that early in this period, as during the years between World War I and World War II, this country was not interested in Eastern Europe

politically, economically or militarily. Thus the conquest of Eastern Europe by the Communists met little resistance on the part of the United States.

The pressure exerted after the war by the Soviet Union in the Near East, the Balkans and in Germany, including Berlin, was responsible for the dramatic change in the United States attitude toward the Communist world. A policy of containment, based on two formidable pillars, the Marshall Plan and NATO, was able to stop Soviet progress beyond the demarcation lines drawn up as the result of World War II. While this policy of containment prevented a Soviet takeover of Western Europe, it came too late to prevent an iron curtain from being drawn around Eastern Europe. It could not have been otherwise, since the new Western policy was designed to contain the Soviet Union, not to force it to abandon its recent gains, nor to "liberate" Eastern Europe.

In the meantime, Eastern Europe, together with China, began to loom prominently on

<sup>1</sup> Except where stated the following countries are considered as belonging to Eastern Europe: Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland and Rumania.

<sup>2</sup> See Z. Brzezinski, "U.S. Foreign Policy in East-Central Europe—A Study in Contradiction," *Journal of International Affairs*, vol. XI, No. 1, 1957; J. Campbell, "East Europe, Germany and the West," in "The Satellites in Eastern Europe." *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, May, 1958; Z. Brzezinski and W. Griffith, "Peaceful Engagement in Eastern Europe," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 39, No. 4, July, 1961.

the United States political scene. The Democratic administration was accused in the course of the 1952 presidential campaign of "selling out" these areas to the Communists, and the Republicans, guided by their future secretary of state, John Foster Dulles, proclaimed a doctrine of liberation. Viewed from a distance of more than ten years, it appears that this particular doctrine had a chiefly opportunistic motivation.

During this period, a rather serious mistake was committed by United States foreign policy planners. Despite the example of Yugoslavia, which proved that the Communist world was not so monolithic as the textbooks on communism would have had us believe, the United States treated the Soviet Union and her satellites as a single entity. Since it was assumed that the East European countries were simply small replicas of the Soviet Union, studying the Soviet scene seemed to make similar research on the nations of Eastern Europe unnecessary. In consequence, practically no research in the field of East European politics and economics had been conducted since the end of World War II. What work did appear was the product of East European émigrés who could hardly be expected to provide unbiased pictures of their own countries. United States policy makers were becoming more and more ignorant of Eastern Europe although they foolishly believed that the opposite was true, because knowledge of the Soviet Union was showing significant gains.

This tendency to lump East Europe with the Soviet Union brought negative results, especially in the crucial months of October and November, 1956. The United States was so accustomed to ignoring developments in Eastern Europe in favor of those in the Soviet Union that it was totally unprepared for the Hungarian revolution and the bloodless upheaval in Poland. This is not to imply that had the United States been aware of the growing crisis in these two countries following Nikita Khrushchev's "secret speech" criticizing Stalin, it would have been able to fulfill the promises embodied in the doctrine of liberation. On the other hand, the process

of liberalization might conceivably have been speeded up not only in Poland and Hungary but also in the remaining countries of Eastern Europe through some judicious moves in the field of economic and cultural relations, and most importantly, by quietly shelving the doctrine of liberation.

There is little doubt that this would have strengthened the hand of the revisionists throughout Eastern Europe. The Stalinists tended to argue that since the West was committed to the destruction of Communist regimes, their only salvation lay in the Soviet Union which was willing to defend them. Once the local regimes no longer felt so threatened by the West, they might have eased domestic pressures and, more important, established new links with the West with relative impunity.

However, instead of enunciating a more enlightened policy, the United States remained publicly committed to liberation and the Hungarian revolution ran its course. When an offer of economic aid was made to Poland, the timing and the manner of the offer were poorly chosen, a clumsy effort at reappraisal of an area belatedly recognized as being in flux.

If this brief review shows the absence of an informed and consistent policy with regard to Eastern Europe, it should also make one thing clear, namely, that no single factor was responsible. Eastern Europe was not the only area neglected by United States policy makers; one could say the same thing about Latin America or southeast Asia. Part of the blame could be assigned to a preoccupation with Western Europe, part to an ignorance of communism. Americans knew little about the various nations inhabiting Eastern Europe, even less about their history and traditions. It took the bloody Hungarian revolt to shake the United States out of its complacency and to initiate a new chapter in its relations with Eastern Europe.

First of all, for all practical purposes, the old doctrine of liberation has been discarded. We seem to act now on the assumption that, at least in the short run, the Communist regimes are immovable if not immutable. This

means that the United States would not be willing to start a war for their overthrow, nor would we condone such an act by our allies. It also means that the United States no longer seriously believes in the possibility of any violent overthrow of the Communist regimes by the people themselves. Present policy seems to say that since the Communists are there to stay, the local regimes should first be made more and more independent of the Soviet Union; second, their rule should be made as palatable to the people as possible; and third, closer contacts with the West should be encouraged.<sup>3</sup>

The first objective is self-explanatory. It is in the interest of the United States to contribute toward the further loosening of the ties linking Communist-ruled countries brought about by the Sino-Soviet conflict—a conflict not seemingly abated by the recent changes in the Kremlin. In the words of Secretary of State Dean Rusk, ". . . it is our policy to do what we can to encourage evolution in the Communist world toward national independence and open societies."<sup>4</sup>

As to the second objective, I used the word "palatable" rather than "democratic" on purpose. There is no point insisting on "democracy" in Eastern Europe if it is assumed that the Communists will be in power there for some time to come. The

<sup>3</sup> "It is not necessary to think of liberation as the result of some cataclysmic clash of nations; one can begin to think of liberation through change and through reappearance of historic ties which lie deeply in the hearts of the peoples concerned." Address by Secretary of State Dean Rusk to the Detroit Economic Club, September 14, 1964, *Department of State Bulletin*, No. 1319, October 5, 1964, p. 465.

<sup>4</sup> "Why We Treat Different Communist Countries Differently?" *ibid.*, No. 1290, March 16, 1964, pp. 393-394.

<sup>5</sup> See the statements by Secretary Rusk before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, March 13, 1964, and by Undersecretary Averell Harriman before the Subcommittee on Europe of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, March 10, 1964. *Ibid.*, No. 1292, March 30, 1964.

<sup>6</sup> For a recent example, see President Lyndon Johnson's State of the Union Message. See *The New York Times*, January 5, 1965, and page 176 of this issue of *Current History*.

<sup>7</sup> For a good account of the difficulties connected with possible expansion of trade, see Luther Hodges, "United States Policy on East-West Trade," in "East-West Trade," American Management Association *Management Bulletin*, No. 51, 1964.

United States no longer insists on the establishment of a democratic system of government as prerequisite for United States aid elsewhere in the world.

Judging by recent official statements, the United States is nowadays committed to the improvement of economic relations with Eastern Europe.<sup>5</sup> I refer specifically to the question of economic aid and foreign trade. To date, United States economic aid in Eastern Europe has been restricted to Yugoslavia and Poland, with the former receiving not only economic but also (until recently) military aid. There is no doubt that United States aid to Yugoslavia played a crucial role in that country's resistance to Stalin's Russia. Obviously, the Yugoslav example was behind the offer of our aid to Poland. While the effects of the aid to Poland are not so dramatic as those in Yugoslavia's case, it can hardly be said that the Soviet Union rather than the Polish people have benefited from it. Despite the fact that the aid is not widely publicized, the Poles seem to be well informed about its existence. Its presence not only underlines the failures of the Communist regime, but also emphasizes the fact that the United States is not indifferent to the fate of the country; and, last but not least, United States aid helps Poland to be less dependent on the Soviet Union for food and other supplies. The last point is worth remembering particularly now, when economic ties are probably the most important among the various ties linking the Soviet Union with the rest of Eastern Europe. There is also little doubt that our willingness to continue aid to Poland, even when the process of liberalization there shows signs of slowing down, can impress favorably other countries in Eastern Europe.

Insofar as trade is concerned, the United States is on record as favoring expanded trade with Eastern Europe.<sup>6</sup> Nevertheless, the question of enlarging the volume of trade is rather complicated.<sup>7</sup> First of all, Americans are restricted in their dealings with the Communists by a number of legal provisions which limit freedom of action. The Communist countries are usually interested in obtaining

goods which are on the "prohibited" lists. Furthermore, with two exceptions (Yugoslavia and Poland), the East European countries do not enjoy most-favored-nation treatment, which makes it difficult for them to compete in our market. There is also the question of payment, including the problem of medium- and long-term credits which the Communists want as a precondition of increased trade. To add to this, there is actually little that Eastern Europe can offer in the way of trade, and what it can offer is, for the most part, well below the standards demanded by United States consumers.

As concerns the third objective, closer contact between East and West, a very important trend is the establishment and expansion of cultural and educational contacts. Initially, personal exchanges of students, university professors and other persons were conducted only with Yugoslavia and Poland, but in recent years similar agreements have been negotiated with other countries. As contrasted with trade and aid, there seems to be little argument as to the mutual benefits accruing from these contacts. This writer, at least, believes strongly that nothing serves better to offset Communist influence than a year of study and travel in the United States. Here East European exchange students can see both the bright and dark sides of our life. This lack of secrecy, combined with our own general awareness that our system is far from perfect, impresses them incomparably more than the Soviet system, most of which is off limits for them and which is still glorified by the Soviet Union as the best system in the world.

There is still another aspect of cultural relations. After years of Stalinism, the East Europeans are starved for news from the West. They still consider themselves to be part of

<sup>8</sup> See President Johnson's Address to the Nation, October 18, 1964. *Department of State Bulletin*, No. 1323, November 2, 1964, p. 611.

<sup>9</sup> See, for example, *International Communism (Revolt in the Satellites)*, Committee on Un-American Activities, House of Representatives, 84th Congress, 2nd Session (Washington, D.C., 1957). Cf. *Report on Hearings on Captive European Nations*, Subcommittee on Europe, Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, 88th Congress, 1st Session (Washington, D.C., 1963), pp. 1-3.

Europe and, as long as Americans send books, artists, writers, ballet and orchestras, they know that they are not forgotten. For Americans, any such exchange means that our knowledge of Eastern Europe is expanding.

These three elements—aid, trade and cultural exchange—form the "bridges" to which President Lyndon Johnson referred in October, 1964, when he officially stated that the United States hoped to establish new contacts with Eastern Europe, regardless of changes in the Soviet leadership.<sup>8</sup> These bridges have the great virtue of being realistic, consistent, easily understood and flexible. The Administration's policy is realistic since it takes into account the balance of power in Eastern Europe. It is consistent since, for the last eight years, United States policy makers have pursued these three objectives despite vigorous opposition from various quarters at home. There cannot be any misunderstanding as to United States intentions, as was the case in the doctrine of liberation. And finally, perhaps its greatest virtue is its flexibility. The policies of both containment and liberation were of necessity rather rigid, whereas this policy of "peaceful involvement" leaves considerable freedom of action.

One might assume that the policy sketched above would not encounter any significant opposition at home. This, however, is not the case. The main opposition comes from the Congress, where any Administration measure that represents a departure from past practice, particularly when such a measure is directed at a Communist country, is apt to meet considerable suspicion. While today additional witnesses are called from the universities and the business world to provide expert advice, congressional committees still tend to rely on the testimony of exiled East Europeans whose understanding of developments in their former homelands leaves much to be desired and whose *raison d'être* is based on their uncompromising attitude toward communism.<sup>9</sup> Consequently, recent Administration measures in the field of commercial relations with the Communist countries have had a rather rough ride in Congress, even

though the Administration has emerged victorious.<sup>10</sup>

Another source of opposition is a group of various right-wing and extremist organizations which have emerged in considerable strength in recent years.<sup>11</sup>

Beyond this, the new look in United States policy toward Eastern Europe does not generate any appreciable opposition. While there may be differences of opinion as to how to treat individual countries or what measures to apply, the overall consensus seems to be that the current policy is best in the present circumstances. Still, in order to be effective, a foreign policy must be dynamic and it must search for and explore additional approaches. The present United States policy is essentially static. In other words, it could not only be made more effective but activity could also be expanded into fields other than aid, trade and cultural exchange.

With regard to aid, there is no reason today why United States aid should be restricted to Poland and Yugoslavia. If the yardstick used in this particular case is the fact that both these countries have exhibited a greater degree of independence from the Soviet Union than the rest, or that their regimes have been more liberal than those of other countries, then this no longer is true. Rumania at present seems to be much more independent

<sup>10</sup> For example, the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 terminated President John F. Kennedy's authority to grant Poland and Yugoslavia the most-favored-nation treatment. This authority was given back to the President in the Foreign Assistance Act of 1963.

<sup>11</sup> A good example of extremist activity is the mass boycott of Polish hams and other products imported from Eastern Europe, organized in some states by right-wing groups.

<sup>12</sup> Rumania's growing independence has been officially recognized by Washington. A high-level Rumanian delegation spent two weeks in the summer of 1964 discussing trade and other matters. The text of the joint communiqué issued after the talks can be found in the *Department of State Bulletin*, No. 1303, June 15, 1964. According to recent reports, 2 U.S. firms will construct plants in Rumania in the near future. This will represent the first entry of private American capital into Eastern Europe since World War II. *The New York Times*, January 5, 1965.

<sup>13</sup> See D. Zagoria, "The Sino-Soviet Conflict and the West," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 41, No. 1, October, 1962, pp. 180-181.

<sup>14</sup> G. Kennan, *On Dealing with the Communist World* (New York and Evanston: Harper, 1964), pp. 21-36.

than Poland, while the Hungarian regime leads in the process of liberalization, with the Czechs following close behind.<sup>12</sup> With the exception of Albania and possibly Bulgaria and East Germany, the countries in Eastern Europe exhibit roughly the same degree of liberalization and independence, and as such should be considered as potential recipients of our aid.

Perhaps the United States could even offer aid to Albania. There is little doubt that Albania needs aid and might be tempted to accept it even at the risk of jeopardizing her position in the Communist world. The ensuing confusion in the already complex mechanism of international communism could be of considerable benefit to us at a relatively small cost.<sup>13</sup>

The problem of trade is both simple and complicated.<sup>14</sup> At the outset it must be remembered that trade is a two-way affair and that no trade will take place unless both sides gain. Thus, as long as Eastern Europe has little or nothing to offer the United States, there is little chance to expand trade. Nevertheless, we did conduct trade with the area in the interwar period and, to a limited extent, after World War II. This can only mean that there may be some commodities that would interest American importers. If this is the case, then we should grant most-favored-nation treatment to the East European countries.

The problem of United States exports to Eastern Europe is much more complicated. Here, as noted, Americans are restricted from shipping certain strategic commodities to Eastern Europe. The original list, agreed upon in consultation with our allies in the so-called COCOM (coordinating committee) is getting shorter and shorter, and it seems today that the original agreement to limit sales to the Communist world is not always honored by our West European partners. It is easier every day for East European countries to obtain nearly all goods in Western Europe, which is even prepared to grant credits to Communist countries to enable them to pay.

The situation has reached a point where

the original restrictions have lost their *raison d'être* while at the same time American businessmen are losing out to the West Europeans. Perhaps the time has come to scrap the original embargo or at least to amend it, leaving only those commodities that would directly contribute to strengthening the military potential of the Bloc.

Two other factors are worth mentioning in this connection. First of all, an increase in trade, credits or even aid, does not imply approval of the Communist regimes. West Germany, which can hardly be called an ally of Eastern Europe, is expanding her trade with the area year by year without even having diplomatic relations with the countries involved.<sup>15</sup> Secondly, United States restrictions, which went into effect around 1948, did not prevent Eastern Europe from developing a fairly impressive industrial base, although the restrictions did slow it down temporarily. There is no reason to think that continuing United States restrictions would inhibit the growth of industrial power of Eastern Europe at this stage when there is not only less need for some commodities but, in addition, when these commodities can be freely purchased from West Germany, France and Britain.<sup>16</sup>

There is also considerable scope for expanding cultural exchanges. Here again, Poland and Yugoslavia have led the way and the experience has proved to be beneficial for both sides. Today, the exchange of students and professors should be expanded to cover all countries in Eastern Europe, and the numbers involved should be raised.<sup>17</sup> The occasional conflicts over selection of candidates should not be allowed to discourage the effort, and social scientists who thus far have often been barred by the Communists should be included. Counterpart funds,

which are likely to grow if aid is to be expanded, should be better used. USIS (United States Information Service) offices throughout Eastern Europe should be reestablished and United States publications more widely distributed. These measures, none of which represents a drastic departure from the present policy, amount mainly to achieving a higher level of performance.

What about other aspects of United States foreign policy affecting Eastern Europe? One that immediately comes to mind concerns the problem of disengagement in Central Europe which, of course, is an integral part of the broader question of European security and overall settlement of outstanding issues between East and West. The entire problem of disengagement is a ticklish one and only some general comments follow.

By agreeing to some form of disengagement, be it a nuclear-free zone, a nonaggression treaty between the NATO and Warsaw Pact countries, or some other type of East-West agreement, the United States would go a long way toward reducing Soviet influence in Eastern Europe. Were some agreement to be reached, there would seem no longer to be any reason for the stationing of Soviet troops and missiles in various East European countries. This would not mean that the withdrawal of the Soviet forces would be followed immediately by the collapse of Communist regimes, since the latter appear to be firmly entrenched. It might mean, however, that these regimes would be freer to approach the West. Eventually, one could possibly visualize at best some sort of Finnish or Austrian solution and, at least, a Yugoslav pattern which would certainly be preferable to the present situation.

It seems clear, however, that United States

*(Continued on page 181)*

<sup>15</sup> Interestingly, at the same time West Germany seems to object to recent attempts by American firms to sell licenses and equipment to East Germany. *The New York Times*, December 24, 1964.

<sup>16</sup> For an excellent account of the whole problem of trade with Eastern Europe, see "East-West Trade," American Management Association *Management Bulletin*, No. 51, 1964.

<sup>17</sup> The recent signing of the Fulbright student exchange agreement with Yugoslavia is a step in this direction.

Andrzej Korbonski, author of *Politics of Socialist Agriculture in Poland: 1945-1960* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1965), did research on Soviet bloc economies at Columbia from 1956 to 1963. He is now at work on two new books on East European politics and economics.

*This specialist points out that "While the increasing diversity of the bloc, and a growing measure of autonomy in internal affairs, has in most Communist countries of Eastern Europe favored what, for want of a better term, is called liberalization, Ulbricht's regime, for reasons of its own, has had to resist the new wave of de-Stalinization set off by the twenty-second Soviet party congress of 1961."*

## East Germany: Stable or Immobile?

By HANS ROGGER

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**A**MONG the speculations current at the time of Nikita Khrushchev's fall as Soviet premier and first party secretary, there were suggestions that his readiness to come to terms with the West over East Germany had been one of the reasons for his dismissal. There is no reliable evidence that any surrender of the Soviet position in the Communist half of Germany, any diminution of full backing for its government, had, in fact, been part of Khrushchev's intentions. The very mention of such a possibility does, however, point up Soviet sensitivity to any threatened change in the status of the German Democratic Republic (G.D.R.) as well as the important role that country plays in Russian foreign policy and internal party politics.

Once before, shortly after Stalin's death in 1953, another prominent Soviet leader, Lavrenti Beria, was dismissed from his functions and indeed executed because (along with other misdeeds) he was said to have envisioned the abandonment of Soviet control over East Germany as part of an accommodation with the Western powers. Again, it is difficult to tell whether the head of the secret police, a man much feared by his colleagues for the power he had amassed in Stalin's day, was really at variance with them to the degree suggested; but it is clear that the new and less stringent course which he proposed for East Germany backfired and

that he was made the scapegoat for policies not favored by himself alone.

As often happens when a repressive regime holds out promises of relaxation, the new course initiated by the government of the late Premier Otto Grotewohl of the G.D.R. in early June, 1953—a course designed to ease the political and economic pressures to which the population had been subjected—not only failed to appease deep-seated grievances but stimulated and brought into the open long-repressed demands for political liberalization and economic improvements. What began on June 16 as spontaneous workers' demonstrations for a reduction in work norms, turned the next day, in East Berlin and many other cities, into a full-fledged revolt which could be put down only with the aid of Russian troops. The regime of Grotewohl and Ulbricht, of the so-called Socialist Unity party (S.E.D.), had strikingly displayed its unpopularity, its weakness and its incompetence. It had also forced the Soviet Union, perhaps against its will, to demonstrate what was again to be made clear in Hungary three years later—that the U.S.S.R. would not view with equanimity the disintegration of its system of client states, least of all in response to a popular rising.

The events of June, 1953, and the Soviet response have largely defined the nature of the relationship between the U.S.S.R. and the

G.D.R. This implies a mutual, nearly symbiotic dependence which neither side can in the foreseeable future be expected to abandon, and makes unreal any projects for the genuine reunification of Germany on terms acceptable to both East and West. West German demilitarization and her exit from NATO, in exchange for free elections in all of Germany, has long since ceased to be (if it ever was) a credible basis for German unity. It is for this reason that the East Germans have suggested the surrogate formula of confederation, with the unequal partners to such an agreement enjoying equal rights and weight. "There are two German states—the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic," the Soviet Foreign Minister said as recently as December 7, 1964, adding that one had to proceed "from this obvious [read: unalterable] fact. . . ."<sup>1</sup>

The lesson learned in 1953 in East Berlin (as well as in Hungary and Poland in 1956) has also indicated to the East German Communists the limits of political liberalization and toleration of intellectual dissent they feel they can afford. It is this which makes the German "Workers' and Peasants' State," despite certain economic advances, one of the least attractive of the Communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe—least affected by the thaw, least open to the winds of doctrinal and artistic change that have been blowing across the whole area, though with variable force and effect, ever since Khrushchev's first de-Stalinization speech at the twentieth congress of the Communist party of the Soviet Union in February, 1956.

## TWO SYMBOLS

There are two symbols for the air of sluggish stability which has prevailed in most areas of East German life since June, 1953, and even more since August, 1961: Walter Ulbricht and the Berlin Wall, and they make the

contrast with what is going on in other parts of Eastern Europe depressingly obvious.

Ulbricht, who has dominated his party for at least 14 years, has enjoyed an extraordinary political longevity. Celebrating his seventieth birthday in 1960, almost simultaneously with the fifteenth anniversary of the state which he governs with single-minded determination as first secretary of the central committee of the S.E.D. (since July, 1953) and Chairman of the Council of State (since 1960), he has survived numerous challenges to his authority (both from without and within his party) to emerge as the sturdiest survivor of the Stalinist era. He is one of the oldest of the European Communist leaders and his rise to supreme power has been steady and slow, never endangered by unwonted displays of independence (after the manner of Gomulka or Tito), nor carried forward by popular liking or national sentiment (like Kadar). Ulbricht was always a "Moscow man" (he spent most of the years of Nazi rule in the Soviet Union) who knew that he could not maintain himself in power without Soviet support.

Yet he was no mere puppet, and the Russians needed him as badly as he needed them. There was no readily available alternative leadership to that of Ulbricht on which the Soviet leaders (especially after Hungary) would have been willing to gamble in so exposed and threatened an outpost of their sphere of interest. The benefits in popularity to be gained from demoting Ulbricht were too uncertain and the risks too great against the background of the continued counterattraction of West German prosperity and the availability of the escape hatch to West Berlin. Starting in 1949, this most concrete form of protest against Ulbricht and his regime was taken by nearly three million people,<sup>2</sup> before it was closed in August, 1961. Thus East Germany was the only country in the world besides Ireland where population was actually declining.<sup>3</sup>

The Wall is unquestionably one of the twentieth century's ugliest structures, aesthetically as well as politically and morally. It expresses in brick and barbed wire the re-

<sup>1</sup> Andrei Gromyko at the United Nations. *The New York Times*, December 8, 1964.

<sup>2</sup> West German sources estimate a total emigration from the area of the G.D.R. of 3.7 million persons in the years since 1945: *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, October 25, 1962.

<sup>3</sup> Norman J. G. Pounds, *Divided Germany and Berlin* (Princeton: Van Nostrand, 1962), p. 111.

gime's continuing distrust of its own people. Whatever those who are responsible for its erection may say—whether they claim that the wall was made necessary by West Berliners with their solid currency emptying Eastern shelves of scarce consumer goods or insist that this was the only way of keeping out “spies and saboteurs” (Ulbricht)—the fact is that the “protective wall,” “the wall of peace,” is designed to keep East Germans in. Before it went up, there was not only a constant drain of manpower, skills and youth,<sup>4</sup> but the realization that so long as there was a way of escaping from the exactions and controls of the system, it would never win the obedience, or at least the passive acceptance, of the 17 million Germans over whom it rules. Escape was the only, and most painful (to the country's rulers) way of voting against the regime, and it was not made more tolerable by the fact that the regime received the customary 96 to 99.95 per cent of the ballots cast in elections.

The Wall does more, however, than mark the ultimate in deprivation of freedom of movement, as understood in less regimented societies, and the flagrant violation of the G.D.R.'s own constitution (Article 10, paragraph 3), which grants to every citizen the right of emigration. It also measures the distance by which East Germany lags behind other Communist states in the process of relaxing controls and employing concessions, rather than coercion, to try to win the nation's loyalty. The considerable numbers of Hungarians and Czechs, and the lesser numbers of Poles and even Russians, who are now allowed to travel, not merely in the countries of the Bloc but also in Western Europe, provide a strong contrast to East Germany, whose citizens cannot, as of May, 1963, so much as contact a foreign embassy (including those of

<sup>4</sup> After 1953, 19,000 engineers and technicians and 18,000 teachers fled to West Germany. Defections among the People's Police reached 18,000 in the years from 1954 to 1961. Fifty-four per cent of all the refugees were under 25. See note 2 above and Bernard Newman, *Behind the Berlin Wall* (London: Robert Hale, Ltd., 1964), p. 53.

<sup>5</sup> Melvin Croan, “Of Walls and Utopias,” *Survey* (April, 1964), p. 53 and “The Tourist Trade,” *East Europe* (November, 1964), pp. 22–26.

the Soviet Union or Poland) without official permission.

With travel to the East . . . now as tightly controlled as travel elsewhere, a sanctioned leave of absence from the G.D.R. stands out more clearly than ever before for what it was always intended to be: an integral and carefully manipulated component of the regime's elaborate system of rewards to socially productive and ideologically reliable elements of the population.<sup>5</sup>

Thus, only one of four writers invited to a conference in Sweden last summer was allowed to attend. Nor is the situation with regard to outside tourists, who are now wooed, very much better. The biggest breach that has been made in the wall are the permits granted to West Berliners on compassionate grounds to visit relatives or friends in the Eastern sector of their divided city at stated times, such as Christmas, and the much smaller number of East Germans over 65 allowed to visit in (or emigrate to) West Germany and West Berlin. These humanitarian acts also have their pragmatic and political sides; above all, there is a measure of recognition for the G.D.R. involved in the negotiations for passes.

The isolation of the East German citizen is reinforced by still other means that are no longer practiced or quite so prominent elsewhere. The Soviet Union (as well as Hungary and Rumania) has given up interfering with the broadcasts of the Voice of America; East Germany still maintains a large number of jamming stations to make reception from the West difficult. It has for some time stopped the export of provincial newspapers, for they supply the trained foreign observer with valuable insights into the system's failings which can be reported back, while negotiations for an exchange of newspapers in both sides of Germany have broken down. Readers in the G.D.R. are still waiting for a German edition of Alexander Solzhenitsyn's concentration camp novel, *One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich*, which was published in the U.S.S.R. on the authority of no less a personage than Khrushchev himself. Nor have they yet had access to the memoirs of that harbinger of the Soviet literary thaw, Ilya Ehrenburg. And Evgeni Evtushenko's young admirers, who, in 1963, asked for a wider

selection of his poetry than had been made available to them, are presumably still waiting to have their curiosity satisfied, or to see the unorthodox films made by their Polish comrades.

"What has long been possible in other socialist countries should also prevail in the G.D.R.," Professor Robert Havemann, director of the Physico-Chemical Institute at Humboldt University, suggested earlier this year,<sup>6</sup> but such a demand for greater freedom of inquiry and information can still lead to dismissal from one's post, even if it involves no basic questioning of accepted doctrine. There are still many political prisoners—12,600 according to one estimate<sup>7</sup>—and although there was a declaration of amnesty in 1964 (as there had been in 1960 and 1962), how many of the 10,000 to be released have been political offenders is not known. In 1960, the number was 2,800 out of 16,000.<sup>8</sup>

Thus, while the increasing diversity of the Bloc, and a growing measure of autonomy in internal affairs, has in most Communist countries of Eastern Europe favored what, for want of a better term, is called liberalization, Ulbricht's regime, for reasons of its own, has had to resist the new wave of de-Stalinization set off by the twenty-second Soviet party congress of 1961. Even the greater sense of security created by the building of the Wall, which has at last convinced people that they have little choice but to settle down to work and make the best of a bad bargain, has not reassured the leaders of the G.D.R. to a point where a genuine loosening of the rigorous and jealous supervision of all spheres of life has become likely. Yet constraint is one of the least effective modes of governing, and if the system is to avoid stagnation, it will have to vary the proportion of coercion and incentives in favor of the latter.

<sup>6</sup> "Professor Havemann's Views," *East Europe* (April, 1964), pp. 21–22.

<sup>7</sup> *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, May 26, 1964.

<sup>8</sup> *East Europe* reported in May, 1964 (p. 39) that in exchange for West German deliveries of butter, coffee, sugar and citrus fruits, 800 political prisoners had been freed and allowed to leave the country. Similar agreements may follow.

<sup>9</sup> R. V. Burks, "The Thaw," *Encounter* (August, 1964), p. 26.

It is well, in this connection, to remember that the thaw in other parts of the Communist world was not the result of a change of heart or belief on the part of its rulers, but a pragmatic recognition that the glacial rigidity of Stalinist control was defeating the goals of power and prosperity and alienating those who alone could make the realization of these goals possible—workers, technicians, engineers and scientists. The massive effort required for the building of an industrial basis for socialism lent itself to massive and rather crude forms of direction and driving. But that stage is past and more varied and sophisticated methods must be found.

As long as all goods were in short supply and anything manufactured found buyers, the Marxist-Leninist system of "command industry" worked. But once the scarcity was relative, and the consumer began to enjoy some freedom of choice, the command system produced warehouses full of unsold goods amidst persistent shortages. To put the matter in doctrinal terms, Marxism-Leninism possesses no equivalent of a "micro-economic theory."<sup>9</sup>

This observation has relevance beyond the sphere of economic theory, for it is difficult, if not impossible, in a complex and interdependent society to expect creativity and innovation in one area of intellectual endeavor (in this case economic theory) while excluding it totally from others. This has recently come to be realized even in East Germany, and while it implies no abandonment of dogma or direction by the ruling party, it does mean that some measure of questioning and modernization must be tolerated. It is significant that it was a scientist, Professor Havemann, who was led to ask for greater intellectual freedom; that he initiated his criticism in 1962 with a complaint that the economy was drifting towards "chaos and destruction"; and that despite his expulsion from the Party he continues to do important work and was elected a member of the Academy of Sciences.

Similarly, while Kafka, Proust and Joyce continue to be proscribed, participants in a discussion on the state of higher learning in the G.D.R. were quoted in the East Berlin paper *Sonntag* as saying that ideological dissidence could never be remedied by suspicion and decree, that it could be defeated only in

open debate by better arguments. And the editor's preface to the discussion noted that such debate required some familiarity with the opponent's arguments and freer access to the heretofore forbidden "poison shelves" (*Giftschränke*) in the libraries. There is as yet no real sign of basic change in the regime's anxious and petty tutelage over its intellectuals, certainly not in the arts—if it came in Russia with de-Stalinization it will have to await Ulbricht's demise in Germany—but there has at least been a more objective, factual reporting of "alien" points of view, if only for purposes of refutation.

The degree to which fact and reality can be allowed to challenge or modify doctrinal certainty and rigidity depends on a number of factors, and in this respect East Germany is probably in a less favorable position than its neighbors to the East. As already noted, Ulbricht has been in firm control of his party for a long time. If it is riven by factions and disagreement, as may well be the case, he is still their supreme arbiter. Participants in intra-party debates will not seek support outside the S.E.D. as happened in the Soviet Union, where artists and intellectuals benefited from conflicts between hard-line Stalinists and their opponents. Nor has Ulbricht found it necessary, as have some Soviet politicians, to ask for assistance in the ideological struggle against the Chinese. And although he wants diplomatic recognition for his state, he is little concerned over his "image" abroad. He cannot utilize the wellsprings of nationalism that in Hungary, Poland and Rumania created both the necessity for and the possibility of greater latitude, for it would lead to conflict with his Russian sponsors and Eastern neighbors without the certainty of comparable benefits at home.

The Russians may, in an impersonal, historical way, be at fault for creating the situation in which the citizens of the G.D.R. now find themselves; but it is the leaders of the S.E.D. who are immediate targets of discontent. Neither Ulbricht, nor any of his lieutenants (like his probable successor Erich Honecker, central committee secretary for organization and security or Willi Stoph, the

prime minister) ever were or could be German Gomulkas, Kadars or even Gheorgiu-Dejs. Those who might have been—like Herrnstadt and Zaisser in 1953 or Schirdewan and Wollweber in 1958—were removed long before they could fulfill or disappoint the expectations held of them. Ulbricht's control of the apparatus of party and state has, if anything, become even more firm in recent years and the new Soviet leaders are even less likely than was Khrushchev to welcome changes in his domain.

### ECONOMIC SUCCESSES

The upshot of these limitations on the regime's freedom of action—among which the West German thorn in its side must still be counted—is that the only area in which, for the time being, significant changes or concessions can occur is that of economic organization and incentives. It is in the economy, i.e., its industrial sector, that the G.D.R.'s most notable successes have been scored and in that area also lies its great importance to the Soviet Union and to the other states of the Bloc. Possessing the most highly developed and sophisticated industrial economy of the Communist world outside of the Soviet Union—a fact which Ulbricht tried to impress upon Russian audiences in the course of a Soviet visit last year—this is where improvements can most readily be made and concessions most safely granted.

That was the course pursued in 1953, when price reductions, wage increases and credits to the private sector of the economy were able to satisfy the most immediate grievances of the population. At the same time, there was not any abandonment of the emphasis on heavy industry, nor corresponding indulgence in the political and cultural sphere. The churches, the family, the universities were brought into line and deprived of such influence and importance as they still possessed in the years between 1953 and 1956. With the industrial sector of the economy in better shape than in 1953, this is once more the prescription that is being followed.

East Germany's road to industrial power and eminence in the Communist sphere has

been neither steady nor smooth. Not all its troubles can, however, be blamed on the system. The area that is now occupied by the G.D.R. lacked the heavy industry base of West Germany and the most important energy sources required for its construction. Before the division of Germany, the territory accounted for 49 percent of German machine construction, but had only 3 percent of its metallurgical industry. In trying to create a new iron and steel industry, East German planners had to face the fact that neither hard coal nor high-grade iron ore were available in substantial quantities. Nor did the Soviet zone of Germany include a single major seaport or shipbuilding center; it was not even a notably successful supplier of agricultural surpluses. To these problems was added the factor of postwar dismantling in which the region, though possessing only one-third of total German resources, was forced to supply over three-fourths of all German reparations (mainly to the Russians). Thus it is not hard to see why East German recovery lagged far behind that of the Federal Republic where United States aid more than made up for the reparations taken in the first postwar years.

The doctrinal bias in favor of economic self-sufficiency and forced-draft industrialization with its grandiose and often unrealistic projects did its share in delaying recovery to prewar levels, as did political repression and the exodus of valuable labor. At the time of the 1953 rising, the living standard was 50 per cent below that of West Germany and although it had been reduced to somewhere between 30 and 40 per cent by 1957, rationing was not abolished until 1958. It still exists, of course, under different names, such as "shoppers' lists," for certain articles of common consumption (meat, butter, and so on) but there is now general agreement among recent visitors that East Germans are

better clad than they have ever been since 1945 and that they are reasonably well fed. They have not overtaken the West Germans, of course, in the consumption of foodstuffs and durable goods, as Ulbricht boasted they would by 1962, but they no longer suffer serious privations and are beginning to think about such items as motorcycles and television sets. By any of the commonly accepted measurements of development, East Germany, with a yearly per capita income of \$800, must be counted among the more prosperous states, certainly compared to China (\$70), Albania (\$200), Bulgaria or Rumania (\$400).<sup>10</sup>

As a supplier of industrial goods, and desperately short of a large variety of raw materials, East Germany has been one of the strongest advocates of the economic integration of Eastern Europe and, indeed, one of its foremost beneficiaries. Although East Germany carries on an extensive foreign trade with some 50 countries throughout the world (including development aid to Africa), three-fourths of it is with states of the Communist world, while only 9.1 per cent of its trade was with West Germany in 1961.

The Communist portion of Germany is Russia's single most important trading partner, supplying the U.S.S.R. with chemical products, machine tools, precision instruments, ships and a host of other valuable items. More than one-fourth of the Soviet Union's trade with other Communist countries was with East Germany in 1961 which, in turn, received from members of COMECON all but 5 per cent of her imports of hard coal. In December, 1963, the German terminus of the so-called Friendship Pipeline, carrying crude oil from the Volga to several member countries of COMECON, was opened, increasing still further German dependence on imports from the Soviet Union (nearly 50 per cent of the total in 1961).<sup>11</sup> This dependence extends also to agricultural products, especially after the forcible collectivization of agriculture in 1960, but since agriculture has been the perennial Achilles heel of all Communist economies, the goal of self-sufficiency is still maintained.

For all the help that the East German

<sup>10</sup> *The Economist* (April 26, 1958), pp. 323-324; A. J. Heidenheimer, *The Governments of Germany* (New York: Crowell, 1961), p. 48; J. M. Montias, "Two Worlds or Three?", *Ventures* (Magazine of the Yale Graduate School: Fall, 1964), p. 35.

<sup>11</sup> SBZ von A bis Z (Bonn, 1963), p. 51 and Andrzej Korbonski, *COMECON; International Conciliation*, no. 549 (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, September, 1964).

economy may be getting from its Communist trading partners now or in the future, the main sources of increased efficiency and productivity must remain improved management and increased labor productivity. Towards these goals, the sixth S.E.D. congress of January, 1963, finally took a number of steps designed to introduce a greater measure of rationality into industrial organization, placing a greater reliance than had heretofore been admissible on appeals to the material interests of managers and workers. This has meant, at one level, that some of the decisions heretofore made centrally will be left to the jointly managed associations of enterprises in which most of industry is grouped, with only overall targets set by planners, and probable introduction of interest rates on capital.

At another level; that of the workers, it has brought promises of wage incentives, bonuses, and the like. Whereas the S.E.D. program of 1963 was still vague about "future developments" in living conditions, some more concrete steps were taken by September of that year to increase various industrial and social benefits. Bonuses of at least 10 per cent are provided to workers on night shifts; an additional four days of vacation are to be the reward for "exemplary performance" in certain industries; there has been a five mark increase in monthly social security payments, and maternity leave has been raised from 11 to 14 weeks. Finally, by 1970, there is to be a five-day week. Whether these measures will have the desired effect of maintaining a high rate of growth and stimulating productivity remains to be seen. But they indicate the economic direction in which the East Germans, like the rest of Eastern Europe, have found it necessary to go. And it is the only direction which bears any prospect of success.

The bonds of interest and necessity that tie Ulbricht's Germany to the U.S.S.R. and the other states of Eastern Europe have, if anything, been tightened during 1964. The 20-year treaty of friendship and mutual assistance concluded between the G.D.R. and the U.S.S.R. in June of 1964 would bring the countries of the Warsaw Pact to the assistance of East Germany in case of attack, and al-

though it describes no change in the substance of East Germany's position in the Soviet bloc (previously defined by the U.S.S.R.-G.D.R. state treaty of 1955, which recognized the "sovereign status" of East Germany) it gave emphatic recognition to East Germany's economic, strategic and political importance. In the course of the year, Ulbricht visited Hungary, Poland, Bulgaria and even Yugoslavia—that citadel of the "revisionism" which he abhors—cautioning his hosts against the political risks of West German economic penetration and, presumably, reminding them that his regime stands for stability in Eastern Europe. Certainly the Poles (and Czechs) are mindful of the fact that, unlike the leaders of the Federal Republic, Ulbricht has recognized the Oder-Neisse Line as Germany's final boundary with Poland, and they share his distrust of a united Germany which might challenge the territorial changes effected after World War II. The extraordinarily complicated series of negotiations, agreements and guarantees needed to bring about German reunification would require vastly greater changes in the Soviet sphere, and especially in East Germany, than have so far taken place. They are not likely to take place while Ulbricht remains in command and retains the reluctant acceptance he has found among his own people and his allies.

But change, we have had to learn in the last decade, and especially in Eastern Europe, can undo even the most confident predictions and overtake even the most stable regimes.

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*Pointing out that "No one really won in the United Nations battle over Hungary," this specialist calls attention to the fact that "the policies of the regime have become more liberal." As he sees it, "Hungary would no doubt have a decidedly different face today had the Revolution of 1956 been successful, yet in many ways the demand for more liberal policies expressed by the insurgents of that time has been fulfilled."*

## Kadar's Hungary

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**S**PEAKING at the dedication of the George C. Marshall Research Library in Lexington, Virginia, on May 23, 1964, President Lyndon B. Johnson stated:

Today we work to carry out the vision of the Marshall Plan. First, to strengthen the ability of every European people to select and shape its own society. Second, to bring every European nation closer to its neighbors in the relationship of peace. . . . We will continue to build bridges across the gulf which has divided us from Eastern Europe. They will be bridges of increased trade, of ideas, of visitors and of humanitarian aid.<sup>1</sup>

The President foresaw that the establishment of new relationships would "not be achieved by sudden settlement or by dramatic deed." However, progress had already been made; the nations of Europe were asserting their own identity. There was no longer a single Iron Curtain, but many, each differing "in strength and thickness, in the light that can pass through it and the hopes that can prosper behind it."

There are many strands of cable and varied materials which go into building bridges and work has been started on both sides of the chasm. This has been true in regard to the establishment of new relationships between Hungary and the West. The ruthless suppression of the Hungarian revolution of October, 1956, swept aside the tenuous ties

that had been established between Hungary and the non-Communist world. The Russian armed intervention and the installation of the Kadar government involved a deep-seated domestic and foreign crisis for Hungary. The new Hungarian command had not only to get the disrupted economy of the nation moving again and win the support of the people, but was forced to reestablish the position of the state in the society of nations. Solutions of the domestic and foreign problems were closely related and proceeded slowly. The problems have not all been solved, but Hungary has on the whole made tremendous advances in the years since 1956.

### HUNGARY BEFORE THE UNITED NATIONS

After the bloody suppression of the revolution by armed Soviet might, and the subsequent flight of thousands of refugees from Hungary, the assembly of the United Nations in November, 1956, passed a number of resolutions of condemnation. These were directed toward three objectives: (1) obtaining the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungary; (2) free elections in Hungary under United Nations supervision; and (3) the observance of fundamental rights and freedoms by the Hungarian authorities.

The United States was largely responsible for having the Hungarian Question placed on the agenda of the Assembly in subsequent

<sup>1</sup> *The New York Times*, May 24, 1964.

years. It was also United States leadership which subsequently kept the Credentials Committee from approving the credentials of the Hungarian delegates. This meant that the Hungarian representatives were permitted to participate in the business of the United Nations but without official approval, a rather galling arrangement.

The Hungarian government refused to permit any United Nations observers to enter the country. Nonetheless, on January 10, 1957, the Assembly established a special Committee on Hungary instructed to investigate and observe in Hungary and elsewhere the course of events in that country. The Committee reported the following September and the Assembly passed a resolution condemning the acts of the Hungarian and Soviet governments; called upon these governments to desist in further repressive measures against the Hungarian people; and requested the president of the eleventh session of the General Assembly, Prince Wan Waithayakon "to act as the Assembly's representative on the Hungarian problem and to take such steps as he deemed appropriate to achieve the objectives of the United Nations."<sup>2</sup> In December, 1958, the Assembly appointed Sir Leslie Munroe its special representative on Hungary. The Hungarian authorities steadfastly refused to permit United Nations officials to enter Hungary, but nevertheless annual reports were submitted to the Assembly. Over the bitter protest of the Hungarian, Soviet and other kindred delegations the reports were accepted and annually resolutions varying only slightly in wording were passed calling on the Hungarian and Soviet governments to fulfill United Nations policy as laid

<sup>2</sup> Samir N. Anabtawi, "The Afro-Asian States and the Hungarian Question," *International Organization* XVIII (1963), No. 4, pp. 872-900, p. 893.

<sup>3</sup> *Annual Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization 16 June 1962-15 June 1963. Official Records*, 18th Session, Sup. No. 1 (A/5501), p. 46. For resolutions see Sup. No. 17 (A/5217), p. 11; *Department of State Bulletin* XLVIII (Jan. 14, 1963), No. 1229, pp. 74-76.

<sup>4</sup> "Secretary-General Asked to Take Any Helpful Initiative on Question of Hungary," *United Nations Review* X (Jan. 1963), No. 1, p. 42.

<sup>5</sup> *Department of State Bulletin* XLIX, (July 1, 1963), No. 1253, p. 32.

down in the 1956-1957 Assembly resolutions.

In his report of September, 1962, the special representative on Hungary noted that "despite certain developments which had brought the situation in Hungary more into line with General Assembly resolutions on the observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms, no basic change had taken place since 1956, as none of the resolutions calling for the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Hungary had been implemented."<sup>3</sup> The Hungarian Question was again placed on the agenda, but when it was considered the following December, a resolution submitted by the United States requesting "the Secretary General to take any initiative that he deemed helpful in relation to the Hungarian question" was adopted.

This meant there was no further need for a special representative. The Hungarian delegation, although objecting to the resolution, was quick to note "that the question of Hungary would finally be eliminated from the agenda of the Assembly." The representative of the United States on the contrary maintained the action was "the farthest thing from a liquidation because we shall remember, as all those who have spoken in the past six years have remembered the lessons learned from Hungary."<sup>4</sup>

On June 5, 1963, the United States, taking note of the recent amnesty granted to persons in Hungary arrested in connection with the events in 1956, and of reports that a number of steps had been taken in Hungary to improve the lot of the people, and in view of the forthcoming visit in July of the Secretary-General of the United Nations to Hungary, revised its position on the credentials of the Hungarian delegation to the United Nations.<sup>5</sup> As a result, the Credentials Committee unanimously approved a report to the General Assembly finding the credentials of all representatives to be in order. With this vote, Hungary's position at the United Nations, under a cloud since the revolution of 1956, was restored to normal.

The visit that Secretary-General U Thant paid to Hungary July 1 to 3, 1963, was generally interpreted as marking the end of the

long period of tension between the world organization and the government of Premier Janos Kadar. It might also be noted that the Kadar government at this particular time (June 29) made a friendly gesture to the United States by unexpectedly lifting travel restrictions on its diplomatic personnel stationed in Budapest, except for a few closed areas. Previously, all United States diplomats who wished to travel more than 25 miles from Budapest were obliged to submit their itinerary to the foreign ministry at least two days in advance.

### LIBERALIZATION IN HUNGARY

No one really won in the United Nations battle over Hungary. Russian troops (estimates vary between 40,000 and 80,000) remain in Hungary and act both as a support for and a restriction on the government. On the other hand, the policies of the regime have become more liberal as was noted in the United Nations debates and by President Johnson in his "building bridges" remarks. Hungary would no doubt have a decidedly different face today had the Revolution of 1956 been successful, yet in many ways the demand for more liberal policies expressed by the insurgents of that time has been fulfilled. To lend concreteness to this brief survey, some of the aspects of this liberalization should be noted.

First of all, there is less police terror and close surveillance of the population. There is more freedom of discussion and writers are under fewer restrictions. This is not to say that all censorship has ended or that fear of midnight visits of the secret police has entirely vanished. A new criminal code was enacted in 1961, which "with its more liberal tone is an immutable sign of retreat and relaxation."<sup>6</sup> Life imprisonment has been abolished and capital punishment has been greatly restricted. The code, however, still makes a crime of many deeds that are considered detrimental to the socialist state, actions which are not considered a crime

under most of today's Western legal systems.

Thus, in December, 1964, the Budapest radio announced the arrest of nine men for "justified suspicion of having prepared a plot" and five other persons were sent to jail for "conspiracy against the state and organizing an illegal party." Among them was Dr. Ferenc Matheovicz, one of the leaders of the outlawed Democratic Peoples' party, who was charged with planning to restore the Habsburg dynasty. Yet in spite of such arrests, the people in general enjoy more legal protection today than at any time since the Communist take-over. The courts have been strengthened; justice is less arbitrary than formerly, and from day to day it is administered according to the established legal codes.

The general amnesty announced on March 21, 1963, and effective the following April 4, was one of the most spectacular manifestations of the new legal order. It applied to political prisoners and to nonpolitical criminals convicted of minor crimes. It did not extend to those convicted of murder, arson, destruction of public property, treason, flight from the republic and espionage. This exception, of course, could put many convicted of participation in the 1956 rebellion outside the amnesty. The amnesty did not cover ancillary punishments such as loss of civil rights, confiscation of property, denial of the right to pursue a certain profession or to live in a particular place.

No official statement of the number freed has ever been made, and estimates vary from around 3,000 to 10,000. It would appear that the amnesty was fairly liberally carried out, more liberally than the Western press anticipated. On July 2, 1963, Kadar stated to U Thant that since the recent amnesty no one was in jail because of his political convictions. In August, 1964, the government relaxed restrictions on the property of Hungarians who fled the country "illegally" between April, 1945, and March, 1963. This enabled refugees to realize some money on property left behind.

A logical extension of the amnesty was the announcement on August 4, 1963, that people

<sup>6</sup> Tibor Arthur Marazoli, "Criminal Law in Communist Hungary," *Slavic Review*, XXIII (March, 1964), p. 99.

who had fled before the amnesty was declared would be granted visas to visit the country. This was in accord with a general easing of travel restrictions both for Hungarians to travel abroad and for foreigners to visit Hungary. The result of this new policy was manifest in the figures issued for the first seven months of 1964. During that time 692,183 Hungarians took holidays abroad, and 679,390 foreigners visited Hungary. The latter figure compares with 584,688 visitors for the same period in 1963.

Hungary today is making a real bid for tourists. Under a government order effective October 1, 1964, visas valid for a period up to 21 days are to be issued within 24 hours of application at a Hungarian consulate. Application for extension may be made on arrival. Tourists traveling by car may apply for visas at the frontier; if traveling by river or air, on arrival at Budapest. To accommodate the expected influx of tourists in the future the government is planning to build more hotels and open more campsites. Most of the tourists come from Western Europe and the United States.

Increased tourist and travel contacts with Western Europe are paralleled by growing trade connections with Western Europe. In 1952, Hungary had only 21 trade agreements with non-Soviet bloc countries; by 1963, trade agreements had increased to around 40. Not only had the number of such ties with non-Soviet states grown, but the agreements called for an increased amount of trade, as for instance the trade treaty with France, renewed in June, 1963, which planned for an increase of 40 per cent in trade. It would be a mistake to assume, however, that the West is taking a significantly larger share of Hungary's trade. The increase reflects the growth in Hungary's total foreign trade, but the Soviet bloc continues to absorb approximately 70 per cent of it.

Hungary's economy and foreign trade are basically integrated with those of the other Soviet bloc countries by the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON). Soviet Russia remains Hungary's chief trading partner, supplying much needed raw ma-

terial and industrial equipment, and taking in return diesel locomotives, rolling stock, ships, buses, trucks, scientific instruments and other finished products. West Germany, Austria, the United Kingdom, Italy, France, Switzerland, in that general order, account for most of Hungary's trade with the West. The Hungarians are doing their best to expand this trade as a means of achieving a more independent trade position within the COMECON framework.

The Kadar regime has been successful in expanding Hungary's industry. Not so aggressive as Rumania in pushing its national economy outside of COMECON plans, Hungary has nevertheless tried to establish a somewhat balanced economy. Although heavy industry still receives prime consideration in economic planning, more consumer goods are being produced, and the standard of living has risen notably as these products have become available.

Supplies of food in general are satisfactory, and the shops are well-stocked. The breakup of the large estates at the end of World War II brought a general disorganization of agricultural production. Through the nationalization of some of the large holdings the government established a number of state farms. Many of these are devoted to scientific research, development of new agricultural techniques, and improvement in the quality of seeds and livestock; others are given over to mass production of various farm products. The acreage cultivated by these state farms has remained relatively constant. Of the rest of the large estates, most of the land was originally parceled out to individuals. About 1949, serious efforts were begun to collectivize these small farms, efforts which met with stiff resistance.

Only 24.6 per cent of the arable land had been collectivized by July, 1953, when the policy was relaxed. During the next few years, the amount of collectivized acreage vacillated, with the dominant trend downward. The 1956 revolution brought the dissolution of many collectives, and total collective acreage declined to a mere 8.5 per cent of the arable land. The Kadar government

attacked this problem slowly but with increasing success. By the end of 1958, the collectivized area amounted to 13.5 per cent, by March, 1959, to 36.1 per cent, by June, 1961, to 78.6 per cent, by June, 1962, to 79.6 per cent. Since 14 per cent of the arable land is devoted to state farms, and 2.8 per cent to what are classed as auxiliary farms run by some of the big industrial and commercial enterprises, this leaves only 3.6 per cent of the arable land for individual farms. Much of this latter acreage is used for vineyards, orchards and other specialized production.

Kadar succeeded in his collectivization policy where the previous regimes failed. Formerly, there had been too much organization from above; the peasants were unduly coerced into joining collectives; there was little control of the collective by the members; and the government followed a compulsory delivery system. Under the new collectivization plan, while there has been governmental pressure (and allurements), the collectives appear to be more in the hands of the farmers themselves.

Farmers who join a collective farm retain title to their land and it is inheritable. Each member receives a nominal rent, varying according to the quantity and quality of the land contributed. In addition, each member receives a division of profits according to the number of "work-day" units contributed. What constitutes a "work-day" is decided by the members of the collective and depends upon various factors, among them the difficulty of the task or the skill required. Thus a tractor operator will earn more work-day units in a ten hour day than the old man who herds the sheep. Each member of a cooperative farm also retains, or is given, a private

plot, the size of which is determined by the cooperative within the limits set by the national law.

The average size of the private plot is the maximum permitted, i.e., one cadastral hold (1.42 acres). This plot is tilled in part with the aid of community-owned farm implements paid for by the cooperative. Members retain simple farming equipment and may raise 1 cow, 1-2 young cattle, 1-2 sows with litters, 3-4 fattening pigs, 5 sheep, and unlimited poultry, rabbits, and colonies of bees. In 1961, these private plots contributed 55.7 per cent of the cattle, 64.5 per cent of the hogs, and 93.6 per cent of the poultry sold on the Hungarian market. Instead of trying to eliminate these vestiges of individual farming practice, the government has so far considered them an integral and vital part of the collective farm system.

Along with a more intelligent administration on the part of government authorities and a wiser purchase and pricing policy, what has contributed most to the success of the present collectivization drive is the extension of social security to the members of the cooperative farms. As individual peasants they did not share in social security; as members of a cooperative they do. Medical care is free; medicines are dispensed more cheaply; and members are insured for old age.

Part of the insurance premiums are paid by the members, and the rest collectively by the cooperative. The state also contributes to the costs of the health and accident insurance, whereas old-age insurance is based on the mutual self-assistance principle of the farming societies. The solution of social insurance considerably increased their [collective farms] attractive force in the eyes of the peasants. For in addition to the advantages enjoyed at present it offers something that individual farming can in no way guarantee: a secure peasant future, a better living for the family and the descendants, and a peaceful old age.<sup>7</sup>

All this is not to say that Hungary's farm problems have been all solved, or that the peasantry is content with its present status. Much modernization remains to be done especially in providing more mechanization, introducing good accounting procedures, and extending and improving incentive practices.

<sup>7</sup> Rezső Nyers, *The Cooperative Movement in Hungary* (Budapest: Pannonia Press, 1963), pp. 159-160. Chapter V, "Collective Farming Societies," pp. 152-209 provides an excellent presentation of the operation of collective farms in Hungary. The percentage figures on collectivization are taken from this volume, p. 63, and from *Hungary's Society and Economy 1958-1962* (Budapest: Central Statistical Office, 1963), p. 33; Zoltan Michael Szaz. "Die gegenwärtige Politische Lage in Ungarn," *Osteuropa* XIV (1964), p. 443.

Yet the fact remains that Kadar, unlike former Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev, must be given a positive mark on his agricultural policy.

In an address before a factory audience in 1963, Kadar summed up his policy in the slogan, "He who is not against us, is with us," which was a reversal of the traditional formula. The implementation of this policy has permeated all aspects of Hungarian public life. Experts are appointed to key posts without giving primary consideration to their ideological orthodoxy. Merit without reference to party membership receives more recognition today than formerly. Admission to universities no longer depends on proletarian origins; sons and daughters of former intelligentsia, industrialists and businessmen are admitted freely. The Kadar regime has extended educational facilities, and free compulsory education is provided for all children aged 6 to 16.

Further evidence of the success and extent of Kadar's liberalization program are the better relations which have been established with the Roman Catholic church. As a result of protracted negotiations, which had been given a new turn when Franz Cardinal König of Austria visited Budapest in April, 1963 (at the direct behest of Pope John XXIII), an agreement was signed with the Vatican on September 15, 1964.<sup>8</sup> The full text has not been published, but according to press reports the Hungarian government recognized papal appointment to vacancies of five new Hungarian bishops and the elevation (originally made by John XXIII) of Bishop Endre Hamvas to archbishop. The Hungarian episcopate also resumed administration of the papal Hungarian Institute in Rome.

Of more significance for the church were the provisions in regard to the freedom of bishops, priests, and members of religious orders to exercise their functions; freedom for the bishops to communicate with the Holy See; and certain assurances with regard to

teaching of religion in churches and schools. Just what this latter involved was not clear, for religious instruction in the schools had never been completely abolished. The Hungarian government had never ceased giving subsidies to the churches, and press accounts did not state what provision was made in regard to these.

The accord gave no indication of the resumption of diplomatic relations between Hungary and the Vatican, nor did it make any provision with regard to Cardinal Mindszenty, who sought refuge in the United States legation in November, 1956. There have been numerous reports that the Hungarian government would be prepared to permit the Cardinal to go to Rome and take up residence there. The Cardinal, however, has refused to take this way out, insisting on freedom to reside in Hungary and to carry on his duties as archbishop. The significance of the Vatican-Hungarian agreement will depend on what it leads to, for certainly more important than any specific terms is the fact that after 20 years of discord the antagonists have reached a point where an agreement of any kind could be signed.

The post-World War II history of Hungary has shown several marked stages—the first (1945–1953), one of enforced communism along Stalinist lines; the second, the New Course, begun haltingly in 1953, which tended to bring a bit more freedom to the people. When the desires of the people outran the concessions of the leaders, the revolution of October, 1956, exploded, having as its basic aim to do away with communism altogether. To save communism, Kadar, newly installed as head of state, called in the willing Russians with their tanks. From 1957, well into 1958, he followed a typically authoritarian, dictatorial policy in order to insure his position not only against the insurgents but also against the old Stalinists under whom he had been imprisoned and tortured. Slowly, he launched a policy of winning the Hungarian people over to his regime with a program of liberalization, some aspects of which have been indicated above. Today, he seems to have widespread popular support.

<sup>8</sup> *The New York Times*, Sept. 16, 17, 1964; *New Hungary*, No. 107 (Oct. 1964), p. 2.

## COMMUNISM STILL

Throughout the years Kadar has never wavered from his attachment to Russia and to communism. He was Khrushchev's friend, and welcomed the more liberal policies that followed the latter's denunciation of Stalin's autocratic rule. Kadar was not averse to building a Hungarian path to communism along the general road designed by Moscow. The peasants of the collective farms, the workers in factories, the members of the trade unions, all have been permitted to share more in management, but Hungary still remains in practice a one-party totalitarian Communist state. Freedom for political parties and freedom of election as understood in the West do not exist. The Communist party, whose membership sank to an all-time low right after the 1956 revolution, has again been built up to number around 500,000. It remains Hungary's dominant directing force.

The Hungarians, always nationalistically-minded, have favored this transition from a Russian to a Hungarian brand of Communism. Relations with Yugoslavia have improved and there is no doubt that Titoism with all its nationalistic implications has a certain attraction for Hungary. But Kadar has not allowed himself to become involved in a dispute with Rumania over its treatment of the large Magyar minority within its borders. The question of Transylvania still troubles many Hungarians, but if there is to be any change in favor of Hungary it seems clear that it will have to be with and not against Russia's wishes. In Soviet Russia's

ideological dispute with China, Kadar has always supported Russia.

Khrushchev enjoyed a certain popularity in Hungary and his visit there in April, 1964, went off well. His removal aroused consternation in Budapest as it did elsewhere. On October 23, 1964, the central committee of the Hungarian Socialist Worker's party (Communist party) adopted a resolution which expressed its realization

. . . that N. S. Khrushchev—who deserved considerable credit for exposing the personality cult alien to socialism, for working out the historic line of the Soviet Union's Communist Party's 20th and 22nd Congresses and for his role in the struggle for peace and international security—could no longer cope in practical work with those tasks that confronted him in his high post. Regrettably, there were mistakes in his methods of leadership which later increased as a result of his advanced age and deteriorating state of health.

The statement went on to express confidence in the new leaders of Russia and pledged the Hungarian party steadfastly to pursue

. . . its hitherto adopted policy in the spirit of the ideas of the 20th Congress and of the Documents of the jointly accepted Moscow Declarations of 1957 and 1960, for the realization of peaceful coexistence, for peace and social progress.<sup>9</sup>

In short, the statement as a whole was an affirmation of Khrushchev's policies and an expression of hope that they would be continued. At least for the present, there is no inclination in Budapest to turn from Moscow to Peking or elsewhere, despite a growing independence which comes from more and better bridges, whether these lead to other Cominunist states or to the capitalist world.<sup>10</sup>

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<sup>9</sup> News Release, Hungarian Legation in Washington.

<sup>10</sup> Attention is called to recent general informative articles on Hungary: U. S. Department of Commerce, "Basic Data on the Economy of Hungary," *Overseas Business Reports* OBR 64-37 (April, 1964); Joseph Wechsberg, "Letter from Budapest," *The New Yorker*, May 14, 1964, pp. 121 ff.; David Holden, "Hungary: Renaissance after Revolt," *The Saturday Evening Post*, April 25, 1964, pp. 38 ff.; Abraham Rothberg, "Hungary Seven Years after the Revolt," *Contemporary Review* (Aug.-Sept., 1963), pp. 80-85, 128-132; "Hungary in the Shallows," *The Economist* (Sept., 1963), pp. 1106-1110; David Binder, "10,000,000 Hungarians Can't Be Wrong," *The New York Times Magazine*, Dec. 27, 1964, pp. 6 ff.; George Bailey, "Trouble Over Transylvania," *The Reporter*, Nov. 19, 1964, pp. 25 ff.

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*"During the past decade and a half," this specialist points out, "Yugoslavia has experienced a startling transformation. From a Stalinist prototype of 'socialism' it has moved toward the establishment of institutions and procedures committed to democratic processes."*

## Yugoslavia's Opening Society

By ALVIN Z. RUBINSTEIN

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A JOURNEY through Yugoslavia affords the Western observer a unique opportunity to travel freely in a Communist state. This is the only Communist country where unregulated travel, extensive contact with citizens from different walks of life, and open discussion of controversial subjects are possible. The contrasting mood and manner of the people in Yugoslavia and in the Soviet Union reflect a fundamental difference in the approach of these two Communist governments to their people, to the development of a Communist society, and to the world. Yugoslav society has a tolerance of dissent in art and literature; and there is a freedom to emigrate and to communicate with foreigners which is unknown anywhere in the Soviet bloc.

At present, the country is comprised of six republics: Bosnia and Hercegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and Slovenia. By virtue of their size and population, Croatia and Serbia are the most important. Croatia, for centuries a part of the Austro-Hungarian empire, is Latin in culture, Austro-German in temperament, and Roman Catholic in religion. Serbia, which was long dominated by the Turks, is more Balkan in atmosphere; the Serbs are volatile in temperament and Greek Orthodox in religion. As recently as the second World War, the two cultures and nationalities were engaged in bitter, internece war, and relations among the various nationalities were poor. One of

the impressive achievements of the Tito regime has been the amelioration of these ancient feuds and the implementation of a constructive nationality policy which is the present regime's greatest contribution to the development of a stable and united Yugoslavia.

Despite some economic setbacks and difficulties, in recent years Yugoslavia has continued to move toward a growing measure of decentralization and liberalization of its economic, social, cultural and political life. There have been periodic reversals and reimpositions of Party control, but the trend has been toward an ever-broadening sphere of relaxation. Yugoslavia will continue in the foreseeable future to be a one-party state in which ultimate political authority rests with the League of Yugoslav Communists (L.Y.C.), and the goal remains the creation of a Communist society. But beyond this, intriguing and important developments have recently occurred in the realms of government and Party affairs that seem to indicate a broadening of citizen responsibility and initiative in local affairs, a strengthening of constitutional guarantees for the individual against the state, and a diminution of direct Party controls over the society. Only time can tell how integral a part of the political process these innovations will become, but it may be of interest to speculate on their significance.

On April 7, 1963, the Yugoslav federal assembly (parliament) adopted the new con-

stitution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Out of the crucible of more than four years of intra-Party discussion and disagreement emerged one of the longest (257 articles) and most complex constitutions in the world. The provisions reflected the desire of the leaders to continue toward greater decentralization and democratization, within an institutional framework which would safeguard the leading position of the Communist party and its role as "the fundamental initiator of political activity necessary to protect and to promote the achievements of the Socialist Revolution."

Implicit in the constitution was a change in the role of the state in a socialist society. The constitution encouraged the expansion of local self-government and the reduction of the functions of the state to a minimal level. The framers sought to strengthen self-government among the working and production organizations, and to introduce effective checks on the power of the federal government. Their efforts to make this goal a reality involved a major struggle between entrenched interests in the Government and Party and those who insisted that these institutions must be adapted more extensively to the changing character of Yugoslav society.

Behind the goals of a more viable, responsive governmental system lay basic dissatisfaction with the shortcomings that had cropped up under the previous constitution and had interfered with the development of social democracy: the federal executive council (the highest executive body) was too powerful; the federal assembly was a rubber stamp organ and lacked vitality; the bureaucracy had swollen in size and influence and dampened local initiative; the position of the workers' councils and the operation of the individual enterprises required stronger constitutional guarantees.

Of particular interest to Westerners are the new institutional changes, especially those which restrict the legislative and executive branches, while strengthening the judiciary. The power of the federal assembly is to be controlled through diffusion of authority and limitation on terms in office. The assembly

is unusual in that it consists of five chambers, each with 120 deputies who are elected by indirect suffrage (Articles 166-167). Though all the chambers are nominally coequal, the federal chamber, or upper house, is most important because it has the responsibility for electing the members of the influential federal executive council; for determining basic policy pertaining to international relations, national defense and general internal affairs; and for electing and removing the members of the constitutional court. Each of the other chambers has responsibility for a specific area: economics, education and culture, social welfare and health, and general organizational-political-administrative affairs, including the passing of the federal budget. (Unlike other Communist countries, Yugoslavia permits the various republics and communes to draw up supplementary budgets and levy local taxes.)

Members of the chambers are elected from the functioning institutions of society, such as trade unions, educational institutions, workers' councils, and communal assemblies; they will tend therefore, the Yugoslavs reason, to be workers and technocrats, rather than politicians. Under this system of differentiation and specialization, the federal deputy is expected to reflect and represent the direct interests of the group that elected him, thus bringing the operations of the federal assembly into closer contact with those of the local units of government.

Another innovation calls for limiting the tenure of office of assembly members to two four-year terms. Because the federal executive council will be chosen from members of the upper chamber, its power is expected to diminish with the limited tenure of its members. However, this reduced stature of the council may be illusory, since the standing committees of the federal chambers still enjoy much quasi-legislative and executive power. By establishing a system of rotation in office, the regime hopes to stimulate greater public interest and to attract a higher quality of person to government service, particularly from the communes (the basic units of government).

Yugoslav jurists believe that the eight-year ceiling on federal office will substantially weaken the attractiveness of politics as a career, thus reducing the likelihood that "careerists" (a derogatory description for those who seek employ in the Government or Party in order to acquire personal power and privilege) will dominate the Government. They acknowledge that this could result in a strengthening of the Party in relation to the Government, but justify this in terms of a need to ensure the Party's preeminent position in a decentralizing society during the transition period to social democracy; an increase in local autonomy and a weakening of the federal government's power make unifying and centralizing instruments necessary in the event of a threatening imbalance in the society.

The possibility is not admitted that the Party may be deliberately seeking to weaken the governmental sector not merely out of a desire for greater administrative efficiency, but because it has of late become concerned with the mushrooming power of the technocrats who run the economy. Top Party leaders are largely professional politicians, not managers or administrators; they are proud of the economic and social advances of the decentralized industrial sector, but are disturbed by some of the innovative ideas of the new generation of technocrats, both in the Government and in the Party. In this sense, one can discern the outlines of a struggle for dominance within the Communist party between the old-line generation of Party leaders who made and stabilized the revolution and the professionals who staff the Party apparatus, on the one hand and, on the other, the emerging generation of managers, trade union leaders, and intellectuals who have different ideas about how best to extend the benefits of the revolution.

### THE SUCCESSION PROBLEM

One crucial question, rarely raised or discussed, concerns the matter of Tito's successor. During the past decade, Tito has acquired the stature of a benevolent national patriarch, a symbol of national unity who is

above the hurly-burly of daily politics. He devotes his time almost exclusively to top-level policy. Much of his time is spent on the island of Brioni, meeting with visiting dignitaries and resolving internal disputes, or traveling abroad. He enjoys wide popularity and his position and person are unassailable. He has no rival. A measure of the general affection and esteem in which Tito is held can be seen in the minimal security precautions taken for him on his travels through the country, a noticeable contrast with the situation a decade ago.

All Yugoslavs also know that as long as Tito lives, the complex, traditionally divisive nationality question will remain quiescent, improving slowly but surely, thereby enhancing Yugoslavia's chances of a continuation of the present stability and domestic tranquility. But Tito is 72 years old. His successor and, more important, the political wisdom of that successor, remain very big question marks for the future of Yugoslav society.

The new constitution contains an important change in the office of the presidency which, however, is specifically not applied to Marshal Tito. The president is elected by the federal assembly "for a term of four years and may be re-elected for one further consecutive term" (Article 220). Tito, however, is president for life. Whether the constitutional power of the president, which is considerable, will be diminished as a consequence of limiting his tenure in office appears doubtful, particularly if, as seems likely, he will couple leadership of the Communist party with government office. The vice-presidency could become an important position, but this will depend on the vice-president's role in the Party and on how the constitution is interpreted. (Article 223 states that "During absence of the President of the Republic, his powers shall be exercised by the Vice-President of the Republic.") The constitution does not provide any more explicit information concerning the succession problem. The chairman or "prime minister" of the federal executive council is also invested with important powers and must be regarded as a possible rival for the presidency.

The president's powers are extensive: he is head of the government and commander-in-chief of the armed forces; he appoints a prime minister who presides over the federal executive council; he nominates members of the constitutional court of Yugoslavia; and he is empowered to promulgate laws by decree and veto decrees of the council. When confronted with critical problems, the president may call upon the council of the federation, which can be likened in function to the privy council in Great Britain. Composed of key members of the federal executive council, of state officers of the republics, and of officials of the social-political and other organizations of public life, the council of the federation does not have any legislative or executive powers; it is to discuss and advise. Though the president is not bound by its recommendations, he is likely to be much influenced by its views.

### THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT

Another major innovation is the establishment of a constitutional court. The court, consisting of a president and ten judges elected for a term of eight years by the federal assembly, shall decide any question of constitutionality or legality that has been raised concerning a regulation or law that conflicts with the constitution of Yugoslavia, the federal law, the republican constitutions, or republican law.

The constitutional court is responsible for protecting the rights of the communes and workers' councils against encroachment by the republic or federal governments. It is also charged with upholding individual liberties and acting as a watchdog against arbitrary government actions. Finally, the court is to keep itself informed of pending legislation and "shall offer to the Federal Assembly its opinions and proposals to pass laws and to undertake other measures to secure constitutionality and legality . . ." (Article 242). Thus, the Court has the authority to raise constitutional issues of its own accord, an initiative not accorded the courts in other Communist (or Western, for that matter) countries.

Once the court has determined that a law or statute does not conform to the constitution, the federal or republic assembly (as appropriate) "shall bring the law into conformity with the Constitution not later than six months from the date of publication of the decision of the Constitutional Court." If the appropriate assembly fails to act, the law that conflicts with the constitution "shall cease to be valid." This is the first time that a Communist country has granted to its highest court the authority to declare acts of the legislature unconstitutional. Furthermore, the Yugoslavs have not only written into the constitution the right of judicial review, but have apparently provided for a degree of judicial legislating by the court. Article 250 states:

If in proceedings on a point of constitutionality and legality the Constitutional Court of Yugoslavia finds that the law or other provision in question is not at variance with the Constitution of Yugoslavia or with federal law, it may for purposes of enforcement of the provision establish the interpretation which conforms to the Constitution or federal law.

There have been many cases in recent decades of Communist countries with constitutions that are impressively democratic in form but clearly powerless to forestall "gross violations of socialist legality" and the entrenchment of arbitrary, unchecked, despotic one-man rule. No constitution was more "democratic" in its provisions and safeguards than the one adopted by the Soviet Union in 1936, ironically on the very eve of the worst phase of the bloody purges that wracked Soviet society during the 1936-1938 period. The record of adherence by East European countries to constitutional provisions is also not encouraging and raises doubts about the significance of constitutions under Communist political systems.

In the Yugoslav situation, time alone can tell whether the judges who are elected by the federal assembly will be able to function as a judiciary independent of control by the legislative and executive branches of government and, perhaps more important, by the Communist party. A great deal will depend on the political courage and astuteness of the

judges, as well as on the permissible frontiers set by the Party. There is no doubt that the constitutional court is a unique institution for a Communist society. To weigh acts of government against the provisions of a written constitution is alien to classical Communist theory which regards a constitution as a legal document embodying the existing stage of development, and not as the supreme law of the land.

The constitution devotes considerable attention to strengthening the workers' councils and to furthering the current trend toward decentralization of all governmental institutions; it calls for greater public participation in the conduct of local affairs and implies self-imposed restrictions by the Party upon the use of force or arbitrary action as a means of reinforcing or securing its privileged position. Through continued decentralization, Party leaders hope to promote social democracy; yet they do not want democratization to erode the Party's guiding role in society. The line between the two is delicate and uncharted.

The constitution also provides an impressive bill of rights: it guarantees, among others, freedom of thought, freedom of religion, and freedom of the press, association, and assemblage, but qualifies all of them by noting that "These freedoms shall not be used by anyone to overthrow the foundations of the socialist democratic order determined by the Constitution, to endanger the peace . . . or the independence of the country, to disseminate national, racial, or religious hatred or intolerance, or to incite to crime, or in any manner that offends public decency." It contains new safeguards against arbitrary arrest and added guarantees for the protection of individual rights "in proceedings before court, administrative and other organs, institutions and organizations."

### THE PARTY AND THE STATE

The knottiest problem, on which the new constitution provides no information, centers on the future role of the Communist party and its relationship to the changed governmental institutions. Can the unifying and

central role of the Party in the political life of the country be maintained without either transforming the constitution into a sham document or undermining the effectiveness and morale of Party members? Aside from stating in the preamble that the Communist party will retain its preeminent political position in Yugoslav society, the constitution offers no clue as to how efforts to protect and extend the autonomy, initiative and responsibility of local units of self-government will be reconciled with the persisting and unchallenged tendency of the Party to keep a firm grip on the reins of power.

A revealing barometer of Party intent was the eighth congress of the League of Communists which was held in Belgrade in December, 1964. The congress was convened to redefine the "guiding" role that the Communist party is to play under the 1963 constitution. In essence, Yugoslav Communist leaders contend that it is possible for the L.Y.C. to lead society without governing it.

The complete documentation of the congress was not available at the time that this article was written; however, it may be of interest to mention the initial impressions of foreign observers. First, Tito retained his unquestioned authority in the Party. He was reelected secretary general of the L.Y.C. (the other three secretaries are Edvard Karidelj, Aleksandr Rankovic', and Veljko Vla-

*(Continued on page 179)*

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"While it remains true," says this authority on Polish affairs, "that the Poles today still enjoy a measure of personal and cultural liberty far greater than any other inhabitants of the Communist world, recently there have been signs of a repression in this area." This, plus evidence of a "tightening of policy in agriculture, education, military security, and economic planning," indicates that, "at a time when some liberalization is being permitted by certain other Communist regimes . . . Gomulka pushes toward greater conformity."

## Retrogression in Poland

By RICHARD F. STAAR  
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THE COMMUNIST LEADERSHIP in Poland has continued to lose popular support since 1959 when Party leader Wladyslaw Gomulka began to return to key positions individuals who had been removed as a result of their participation in earlier repressions under Stalinism. To complicate matters, a growing factional struggle within the Polish United Workers' Party (P.Z.P.R.—*Polska Zjednoczona Partia Robotnicza*) has developed between the moderates and the hard-liners. On the more general domestic scene, mismanagement in basic planning and its implementation has led to an industrial slowdown. Agriculture also remains a problem. In foreign affairs, the leaders in Warsaw have given their approval to Moscow's plan for integration of the East European economies through the Council for Economic Mutual Assistance (C.E.M.A.). Yet this integration probably will not come any closer following the January, 1965, meeting of the C.E.M.A. Council—due to Rumania's continued at-

tempts to gain more freedom of action for herself.

In domestic matters, there has been no such relaxation in point of view during the past few years in Poland.<sup>1</sup> Gomulka, who has been first secretary of the P.Z.P.R. since 1956, was held incommunicado for thirty months during the Stalinist period. Upon his return to power, Gomulka immediately disassociated himself from the worst features of this so-called cult of personality. The difficulty in utilizing this destalinization theme to achieve a limited objective is obvious. Even a former "victim of repressive measures,"<sup>2</sup> such as Gomulka himself, could not afford to allow all the implications of the damning statements about Stalin (particularly his role in establishing the satellites) to be followed to their logical conclusion. After all, it was this same Gomulka who had served as Communist party leader from 1943 until 1948 when Soviet influence in Poland became paramount.

In this connection, the memorandum written by Italian Communist party secretary Palmiro Togliatti just prior to his death at Yalta, and published posthumously,<sup>3</sup> rebuked the U.S.S.R. and other Communist-dominated countries for their resistance to abandoning the restrictions on democratic and personal freedom introduced by Stalin. This criticism

<sup>1</sup> See Richard F. Staar, "Profile of Poland," *Current History*, XLIV, No. 261 (May, 1963), pp. 257-264, for earlier data.

<sup>2</sup> Gomulka so described himself in a speech. See *Nowe Drogi* (New Paths), XVIII, No. 10 (October, 1964), p. 10.

<sup>3</sup> First published in the Italian communist journal *Rinascita* (September 5, 1964), then in *Pravda* (September 10, 1964) without any comment, and subsequently in most East European newspapers.

certainly applies to the regime in Warsaw. Reaction to the ouster of Khrushchev, the handling of economic difficulties, the campaign against Western cultural influence, the harassment of the Catholic church, the arrest of an American citizen, and the call for tougher domestic policies at the P.Z.P.R. congress can be evaluated only as retrogressive steps in comparison with what has been occurring in certain other East European countries.

### CHANGES IN MOSCOW

It would appear that the new Soviet leaders, confronted with the legacy of Khrushchev's political and economic problems, may content themselves with less control over the domestic affairs of the individual states in the so-called Soviet bloc. However, it is doubtful whether the Leonid Brezhnev-Aleksei Kosygin team envisages independence like that enjoyed in Yugoslavia for the countries within its sphere of influence. The change in Soviet-satellite relations may be characterized perhaps as a substitution of self-discipline within the satellite nations for the previous Bloc discipline from Moscow. The reaction to this new policy has not been uniform, with some regimes relaxing their grip on the populations concerned but others becoming more restrictive.

The regime in Warsaw must have been irritated by the sudden removal of Khrushchev, certainly partly because he had appeared in Poland as a most honored state visitor just shortly prior to his downfall. The initial published reaction indicated that the Polish

<sup>4</sup> *Pravda* (October 17, 1964).

<sup>5</sup> It is true that *Trybuna Ludu* has referred to a Jacob I. Brezhnev as chief of the Soviet engineers at the steel plant in Nowa Huta near Krakow but never indicated the relationship. At the end of September, 1964, this man received a high Polish decoration "for outstanding merit."

<sup>6</sup> Khrushchev did state that extension of the treaty for another twenty years had been agreed upon unanimously. See *Krasnaya Zvezda* (Red Star), Moscow (April 16, 1964). A Polish-Soviet communiqué was signed three days later.

<sup>7</sup> The most recent agreement totaled \$90.9 million for agricultural commodities. *Zycie Warszawiane* [Warsaw Life], Warsaw (February 4, 1964).

<sup>8</sup> This meeting was held on October 24, 1964, and included Yuri Andropov who is in charge of relations with Bloc Communist parties. "Poles Fall in Step with Soviet on Ouster of Khrushchev," *The New York Times* (November 8, 1964).

Communist leaders were indeed taken by surprise. *Trybuna Ludu* (People's Tribune) reprinted the entire original Soviet announcement,<sup>4</sup> including its indictment of the deposed Russian leader. However, that same day Gomulka praised Khrushchev in a speech mentioning specifically the latter's economic achievements in the U.S.S.R. and towards world peace.

As if to reassure himself that the personnel changes in the Kremlin would not necessarily be to his own disadvantage, Gomulka further stated that a number of Polish Communist leaders knew both Leonid I. Brezhnev and Aleksei N. Kosygin personally, adding:

Maybe not everybody is aware of it, although it has been mentioned in the press, that Comrade Brezhnev's brother—specialist in metallurgical engineering—has worked for a long time, and quite recently, at the Lenin foundry helping our experts, our working class, in assembling the plant and in the effective operation of that great combine.<sup>5</sup>

Gomulka's concern, of course, involves extension of the Soviet-Polish friendship treaty which is due to expire on April 21, 1965, after its 20-year time span. Khrushchev had promised that a new treaty would include a guarantee regarding the "once and for all laid down Polish-German boundary on the Oder and Lausitzer (Western) Neisse" rivers.<sup>6</sup> This and other questions, presumably also involving approval of Polish acceptance of American aid<sup>7</sup> by the new Kremlin team, were taken up at a meeting in the Bialowieza Forest of Bialystok province near the Soviet border.<sup>8</sup> This conference represented the first and only time in 1964 that Brezhnev and Kosygin left U.S.S.R. territory to explain the changes in Moscow.

Since the fall of Khrushchev, the press in Poland has omitted all references to the Soviet party's twenty-first congress (February, 1959) as a basis for policy, since to the P.Z.P.R. leadership this entire period from 1958 through 1960 represented a drive for uniformity within the Bloc. It is, thus, only the decisions that were announced at the twentieth (February, 1956) and the twenty-second (October, 1961) congresses in Moscow which represent the policies that Gomulka would

like to see continued by the new leaders in the Kremlin.<sup>9</sup>

### ECONOMIC PROBLEMS IN POLAND

In general, the Warsaw regime has supported East European integration through the Council for Economic Mutual Assistance C.E.M.A.—hoping to obtain badly needed investment capital this way. However, the difficulties inherent in this process, due to the different stages of development in which member states find themselves, have been admitted quite openly. For example, a Polish planning commission deputy chairman revealed<sup>10</sup> that the coordination of long-term plans was lagging, because the 1966–1970 Five-Year-Plan was not yet far enough advanced (a supranational C.E.M.A. planning organ has been opposed by Rumania.) In a previous interview with the Italian Communist daily newspaper, a Warsaw deputy premier (and C.E.M.A. representative) stated that C.E.M.A.'s activities were "unsatisfactory" due to problems that could not be solved at once, especially those "respecting the interests of all countries in C.E.M.A."<sup>11</sup> He further pointed out that lack of knowledge and experience had led to mistakes.

This same man proposed, in the monthly journal of the world Communist movement, that multilateral accounting and joint export efforts could be facilitated if the C.E.M.A. bank were to have its basic capital in gold and convertible currency, as well as a provision for the partial exchange of rubles into the

<sup>9</sup> See dispatch of the London *Times*, "Gomulka Backs Shift in Moscow," in *The New York Times* (October 29, 1964).

<sup>10</sup> Interview with Roman Fidelski in *Zycie Gospodarcze* (Economic Life), Warsaw (September 6, 1964).

<sup>11</sup> See Piotr Jaroszewicz in *Unità*, Rome (March 4, 1964).

<sup>12</sup> See "The Council for Mutual Economic Aid: An Instrument of Cooperation Between Socialist Countries," *World Marxist Review*, Toronto, VII, No. 3 (March, 1964), pp. 3–9.

<sup>13</sup> Much of this will be used to produce over 100 chemical plants, valued at 1.5 billion foreign exchange zlotys (\$375 million), which Poland has agreed to deliver between 1966 and 1970 to the Soviet Union. See *Zycie Warszawy* (February 26, 1964).

<sup>14</sup> See *Handel Zagraniczny* (Foreign Trade), Warsaw, No. 2 (February, 1964).

<sup>15</sup> *Polityka* (Politics), Warsaw (April 1, 1964).

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid.* (January 4, 1964).

latter.<sup>12</sup> At present, the so-called transferable rubles cannot be converted into any other than Bloc currencies. This Warsaw spokesman further attributed the slow progress of C.E.M.A. integration to national prejudice and the preference for the traditional patterns in the economy of each member state. He also implied recognition of Rumania's right to independent development and even opposition to Polish proposals for joint investments, specialization, and control of exports through C.E.M.A.

The objective involving hard currency represents an urgent need to finance a tremendous expansion of investment purchases from abroad, particularly for the chemical industry.<sup>13</sup> One of the difficulties is that identical equipment industries have been established in several of the Bloc countries. For example, when the last steam locomotives were exported by Poland to Communist China during 1960, there was no follow-up retooling nor shift to internal combustion or electric locomotives.<sup>14</sup> Warsaw, thus, lost export possibilities in this field and today remains behind the U.S.S.R., Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, and even Rumania in the area of modern traction units.

It is also interesting to note the existence of two types of Polish production, one for export and one for domestic consumption. In practice, this "has led to a division of production and inferior production for the national market."<sup>15</sup> To illustrate just one result, a substantial number of Poland's merchant vessels have collided at sea due to defective navigational equipment. In some instances this has occurred because the ships had refused to accept inferior electronic gear produced for Polish use and had then sailed without radar.<sup>16</sup>

Disagreements have appeared within the leadership of the P.Z.P.R. regarding domestic economic policies, and these have contributed to the development of factionalism (see Table II). In 1963, a Polish economist named Stefan Kurowski published a book entitled *The Historical Process of Economic Growth* in which he stated the heretical view that the Soviet Union had merely continued the pre-

TABLE I: AGRICULTURE IN POLAND, 1964\*

No.	Type	Units	Hectares (1 ha. = 2½ acres)	Percent
<i>Socialized sector:</i>				
1.	Production cooperatives (Collective farms)	1,300	225,000	1.0
2.	State agricultural enterprises (State farms)	6,500	2,500,000	12.0
<i>Private sector:</i>				
3.	Private entrepreneur farms	3,592,000	19,335,000	87.0
4.	Agricultural circles** (members own private farms)	30,000	125,000	...
		3,599,800	22,060,000	100.0

\* Sources: A. Bodnar, "Socialism in the Countryside," *Polityka* (May 30, 1964); *Zielony Sztandar* (Green Banner), Warsaw (November 1, 1964).

\*\* Note: Totals do not include agricultural circles, since land remains in private hands and only machinery is used collectively.

revolutionary trend in its economic development and that capitalism had shown at least the same tendency toward technical innovation as the socialist system. He was attacked by the weekly newspaper *Zycie Gospodarcze* which rejected his thesis, saying that it implied that "socialism is not in a position to achieve victory over capitalism unless it uses non-economic means—to put it in plain words, military means."<sup>17</sup>

However, more recently the Communist press in Poland has been recommending certain revisions within the economic planning process. One article concludes that the supply of commodities will never be at all satisfactory until changes have been introduced:

<sup>17</sup> See the discussion by Zbigniew Madej and Jozef Pajestka in *Nowe Drogi*, XVIII, No. 11 (November, 1964), pp. 67–98.

<sup>18</sup> *Zycie Warszawy* (February 20, 1964). Later the Council of Ministers Resolution No. 224 introduced three new principles: (1) economic cost accounting, (2) profitability; and (3) market analysis. *Zycie Gospodarcze* (August 23, 1964).

<sup>19</sup> See *Trybuna Ludu* (June 24, 1959). A recent prediction allows that by the year 1984, "not more than half the land under cultivation will go over to the socialized sector," *Polityka* (May 30, 1964.) The figure for farm investments is from *Trybuna Ludu* (November 4, 1964).

<sup>20</sup> From *Radio Warsaw* (November 5, 1964). However, plans are to increase trade with the Soviet bloc (from 62.2 to 64.9 percent) by 1965 and lower it (from 29.8 to 22 percent) with capitalist countries. Tadeusz Galinski (ed.), *Rocznik polityczny i gospodarczy* (Political and Economic Yearbook) (Warsaw: Panstwowe Wydawnictwo Ekonomiczne, 1964), p. 1083.

So as really to produce for the customer, we will have to reverse this system. Orders should be collected from the bottom, starting with an analysis of the market and ending with requisitions of raw materials for production.<sup>18</sup>

If current intentions are carried out successfully, economic achievements in 1965 will include an increase in real income and consumption with special emphasis on meat. A corollary to the latter is the need to secure enough fodder for agriculture. To achieve these goals, investments in farming are to be increased by 19 per cent. Although he did not urge collectivization in his speech to the congress of the United Peasant party, held at Warsaw on November 26–29, 1964, Gomulka has in the past, said that "the agricultural circle... should be a school in which the consciousness of the peasants will be ripened for collectivized agriculture" and that "it is not our intention to conceal this fact."<sup>19</sup> (See Table I.) Finally, the discussion on the draft budget has included stress on further intensification of exports,<sup>20</sup> with particular emphasis on industrial exports in order to obtain foreign exchange. This goal involves West Germany with which a long-term commercial agreement was signed in March, 1963.

## CULTURAL AFFAIRS

While it remains true that the Poles today still enjoy a measure of personal and cultural

liberty far greater than any other inhabitants of the Communist world, recently there have been signs of a repression in this area by the P.Z.P.R. leadership. At the thirteenth plenum of the central committee, Gomulka claimed that "for years [Poland] has been the target of massive and especially concentrated attacks by the imperialist forces." This "places on our [Communist] Party a special responsibility, so that our resistance to bourgeois ideology and propaganda be aggressive and effective."<sup>21</sup> The result of this plenary session was to establish a P.Z.P.R. commission with the task of "securing implementation of the Party line on ideology which results from resolutions by the congress and central committee plenums. This encompasses also control over implementation of the [P.Z.P.R.] line by respective government organs and state institutions."<sup>22</sup>

The increasing pressure to conform within the cultural area brought 34 of Poland's foremost intellectuals to sign a letter of protest on March 14, 1964, and to send it to Premier Jozef Cyrankiewicz. It outlined the situation:

Restrictions in the allocations of paper for printing books and periodicals, as well as the *tightening of the press censorship*, are creating a situation which is endangering the development of Polish national culture. The undersigned, recognizing that the existence of public opinion, the right to criticize, freedom of discussion, and access to reliable information are necessary factors

<sup>21</sup> W. Gomulka, "On Current Ideological Problems in Party Work," *XIII plenum KC PZPR* (Warsaw: *Ksiazka i Wiedza*, 1963), p. 15.

<sup>22</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 75-76.

<sup>23</sup> Quoted by Gaston de Cerezay, "Gomulka and the Intellectuals," *East Europe*, XIII, No. 12 (December, 1964), p. 25, who also lists the names of the 34. (Italics mine.)

<sup>24</sup> The appointment of Lucjan Motyka as minister of culture and the arts on December 12, 1964, may indicate a different approach to dissidents. See "Poland: One of Each," *The Economist*, CCXIII, No. 6330 (December 19, 1964), p. 1335, air edition.

<sup>25</sup> Note the attack on the Church hierarchy in the organ of the atheists and freethinkers, "The Misfortunes of the Cardinal," *Argumenty* (Arguments), Warsaw (November 1, 1964).

<sup>26</sup> Announced in the official gazette, *Monitor Polski* (Polish Monitor), Warsaw (June 18, 1964).

<sup>27</sup> From *Radio Warsaw* (November 9, 1964).

<sup>28</sup> For a more detailed discussion of cultural policies, see R. F. Staar, "Destalinization in Eastern Europe: The Polish Model," in Andrew Gyorgy (ed.), *Problems in World Communism* (Princeton, N.J.: D. Van Nostrand, 1965), to be published in May.

to progress, and being motivated by civic concern, demand that Polish cultural policy be changed to conform with the spirit of the rights guaranteed by the Polish Constitution and for the good of the nation.<sup>23</sup>

Several of the individuals who signed this protest had publication of their works halted, over one-third (14) of the total were banned from writing for the press or television, and some even lost their passports for travel abroad.<sup>24</sup> The only Catholic newspaper with a national circulation, *Tygodnik Powszechny* (Universal Weekly), published at Krakow, had its allocation of paper permanently cut down by 10,000 copies.<sup>25</sup>

In addition, the regime in Warsaw has applied some "persuasive" tactics by establishing an authors' fund which seems to be a direct result of the protest by the 34. The object of this fund<sup>26</sup> is to reward those writers whose works comply with the cultural policy of the P.Z.P.R. Additional payments, ranging from 100 up to 250 per cent of the honorarium from the state publishing house, are made to authors whose works are "of high ideological-artistic value." Moreover, special literary fellowships of 4,000 zlotys per month, for a maximum period of one year, are offered to writers who have been published previously. The granting of awards is left to the minister of culture and arts which indicates that those who refuse to toe the line cannot hope to benefit.

Finally, it should be mentioned that one of the signatories to the protest letter, Melchior Wankowicz, was convicted and sentenced to three years in prison for distributing "false and slanderous"<sup>27</sup> material against the regime, under a 1946 edict on offenses "likely to cause an essential loss to the interests of the Polish State." The sentence was reduced to 18 months under an amnesty passed three months before. This 72-year-old man, a naturalized American citizen, had returned to his native country in order to spend the last few years of his life there. His "crime" was to have written a speech, which did criticize restrictions on cultural life but which was never delivered before the Polish Writers' Union, and then to have mailed a copy to his daughter in the United States.<sup>28</sup>

**TABLE II: GROUPS IN THE P.Z.P.R. CENTRAL COMMITTEE\***  
 (after Third and Fourth congresses)

No.	Faction		Numerical Strength		
		1959	1964		Gain/Loss
1.	Gomulka Followers	25	57	+ 32	
2.	Pulawska Group	25	5	- 20	
3.	Former Socialists	11	8	- 3	
4.	Natolin Faction	10	0	- 10	
5.	Revisionists	6	2	- 4	
6.	Partisans	0	14	+ 14	
	Totals	77	86	+ 9	

\* Sources: *East Europe*, VIII, No. 5 (May, 1959), p. 13; and R. F. Staar, "Gomulka haelt die Stellung," *Hinter dem Eisernen Vorhang*, X, No. 9 (September, 1964), p. 12, Munich, Germany.

**TABLE III: P.Z.P.R. POLITICAL BUREAU\***  
 (January, 1965)

No.	Name	Date, First elected	Responsibility
<i>Full Members:</i>			
1.	Gomulka, Wladyslaw**	Nov., 1942	First Secretary, P.Z.P.R. (leader)
2.	Spsychalski, Marian	Aug., 1944	National Defense (minister)
3.	Ochab, Edward	Nov., 1948	Council of State (chairman)
4.	Cyrankiewicz, Jozef	Dec., 1948	Council of Ministers (premier)
5.	Rapacki, Adam	Dec., 1948	Foreign Affairs (minister)
6.	Jedrychowski, Stefan	July, 1956	Economic Planning (chairman)
7.	Gierek, Edward	July, 1956	Katowice Province (first secretary)
8.	Loga-Sowinski, Ignacy	Oct., 1956	Trade Unions (chairman)
9.	Kliszko, Zenon**	Mar., 1959	Ideology and Cadres (deputy leader)
10.	Szry, Eugeniusz	June, 1964	Economy (deputy premier)
11.	Waniolka, Franciszek	June, 1964	Economy (deputy premier)
12.	Strzelecki, Ryszard**	Nov., 1964	Justice, Police, Army
<i>Candidate Members:</i>			
1.	Jaroszewicz, Piotr	June, 1964	C.E.M.A. delegate (deputy premier)
2.	Jagielski, Mieczyslaw	June, 1964	Agriculture (minister)
3.	Jaszczuk, Boleslaw**	Nov., 1964	Heavy Industry

\* Sources: See Table 4 in *Current History*, XLIV, No. 261 (May, 1963), p. 263, for the Political Bureau in that year. For biographic data on the newcomers, see *Trybuna Ludu* (June 21, 1964) and *Slowo Powszechnie* (Universal Word), No. 281 (November 22, 1964).

\*\* Note: also members of the Secretariat.

### STABILITY WITHIN THE PARTY

As mentioned already, factional infighting has characterized the P.Z.P.R. for some time now. The so-called dogmatists (the Natolin group) were excoriated by Gomulka at the most recent Party congress, as "striving in essence toward a return to practices of the

<sup>29</sup> *Trybuna Ludu* (June 16, 1964) carries the entire speech in an enclosure.

<sup>30</sup> Radio Warsaw (November 24, 1964) discussed an article on the meat scandal which appeared in the newspaper *Sztandar Młodych* (Banner of Youth).

'personality cult' [i.e., Stalinist] period." He also attacked the revisionists, who "under cover of alleged innovation attempt to eliminate the deepest class sense of Marxism-Leninism,"<sup>29</sup> and claimed that the P.Z.P.R. was combatting both of these deviations.

Perhaps of more imminent danger to Party stability was "the attempt to issue and distribute anti-P.Z.P.R. libel," described by the Party secretary for the city of Warsaw (a man named Walenty Titkow, since removed because of a scandal over meat thefts).<sup>30</sup> He

was apparently referring to a 90-page pamphlet attacking Gomulka's errors and failures which had been distributed among P.Z.P.R. activists. The unofficial deputy leader, in his speech to the congress, mentioned the "pro-Chinese communists in Warsaw who had been caught circulating slanders against Party policies and leaders."<sup>31</sup>

The police held three of the men involved overnight, and all of them lost their positions. They have been identified as former Natolinists who back in 1956 had opposed Gomulka's return to power: Kazimierz Mijal (former communal economy minister), Stanislaw Lapot (an ex-deputy premier), and Wiktor Klosiewicz (formerly in charge of trade unions). Apparently these same three individuals and two others were tried subsequently in secret by the high court at Warsaw and received prison sentences from 18 to 30 months on charges of spreading "false and slanderous information."<sup>32</sup> It is also perhaps noteworthy that only European Communist parties were invited to send delegates to the P.Z.P.R. congress and, hence, no representatives appeared from Peking. Gomulka

<sup>31</sup> Zenon Kliszko in *IV Zjazd PZPR* (Fourth P.Z.P.R. Congress) (Warsaw: *Ksiazka i Wiedza*, 1964), pp. 251-252.

<sup>32</sup> See AP dispatch from Warsaw, "Five Said to Have Backed Peking Are Jailed by Poles," *The New York Times* (December 1, 1964).

<sup>33</sup> For previous talks on this subject at the Kremlin, see O. K. Osachek, "Chruschtschew und Gomulka zum Streit mit Peking," *Neue Zuercher Zeitung* (April 17, 1964).

<sup>34</sup> For a discussion on factionalism and names of leaders, see Jerzy Ptakowski, "Political Maneuvers in Warsaw," *East Europe*, XIII, No. 4 (April, 1964), pp. 9-14.

<sup>35</sup> He was the last wartime director of the underground's clandestine editorial office. See Marian Malinowski (ed.), *Polska Partia Robotnicza: Kronika* (Polish Workers' Party: Chronicle) (Warsaw: *Ksiazka i Wiedza*, 1962), p. 63.

<sup>36</sup> Report by Zenon Kliszko in *IV Zjazd PZPR*, p. 236.

<sup>37</sup> *Trybuna Ludu* (November 13, 1964) gave the membership as just over 1.5 million from a population of nearly 32 million.

<sup>38</sup> See A. Alster and J. Andrzejewski, "In the Matter of P.Z.P.R. Social Composition," *Nouvelles Droits*, V, No. 1 (January-February, 1951), p. 235.

<sup>39</sup> See "Correspondence Between Comintern Secretary General G. M. Dimitrov and Leadership of the Polish Workers' Party (1942-1943), *Novaya i Noveishaya Istorija*, [Modern and Current History], Moscow, No. 5 (September-October, 1964), pp. 109-125, which provides documentary evidence of the close control exercised by Moscow over the reborn Party.

strongly condemned the Chinese Communists in his six and one-half hour speech to the congress, thus giving support to Moscow.<sup>33</sup>

Although the pro-Chinese faction remains outside the central committee, that body can be broken down into several distinct groups (see Table II). During the five years between the last two congresses, Gomulka has been able to incorporate a solid two-thirds majority of his adherents into this organ. Natolinists have been eliminated. All other factions have decreased in their representation,<sup>34</sup> except for one very important category of individuals. This is the so-called Partisan group, members of which spent World War II inside of Poland and took part in the small People's Army (*Armia Ludowa*). The leader of this faction is thought to be Ryszard Strzelecki, who worked closely with Gomulka in the underground in Warsaw.<sup>35</sup> Another ranking member of this group was named interior minister on December 12, 1964.

As far as the present and potential stability of the P.Z.P.R. is concerned, it is worth mentioning that some 800,000 persons<sup>36</sup> were admitted into the Party's ranks between the last two congresses. This amounts to more than one-half of the total membership,<sup>37</sup> indicating the extent of the permanent purge which prevails. In effect, the Communist movement in Poland has had to rely primarily upon those among the 20,000 persons (12,000 in the underground and the remainder from the U.S.S.R.)<sup>38</sup> who had joined the Party either prior to its dissolution in 1938 by the Comintern or during the war after it had been reactivated.<sup>39</sup> Most of the others belong to

(Continued on page 179)

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Richard F. Staar, author of *Poland 1944-1962: The Sovietization of a Captive People* (Baton Rouge, La.: Louisiana State University Press, 1962), occupied the Chester W. Nimitz Chair of Social and Political Philosophy of the Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island, during the 1963-1964 academic year, on a leave-of-absence from Emory University. He is now at work on a new book to be entitled *Eastern Europe in Transition*.

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"... Rumania's 'quiet revolution' is not to be underestimated," warns this specialist, who points out that "Rumania has been able to achieve a large degree of independence from Moscow."

## Whither Rumania?

By WAYNE S. VUCINICH  
*Professor of History, Stanford University*

UNTIL only just recently, Rumania was one of Moscow's most ardent allies, but this relationship has since been significantly altered. Alarmed by Soviet ideological meandering and cognizant of the disintegration of the Communist monolith, which began with the expulsion of Yugoslavia from the Cominform in June, 1948,<sup>1</sup> Rumania began to assert its independence. This breaking down of centralized authority became of grave concern to the Kremlin, and Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev determined to re-integrate the world Communist movement under Soviet hegemony. He hoped to achieve his objective not by "Stalinist methods of control," but through Comecon (the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, set up in 1949) and the economic integration of the Communist bloc members.<sup>2</sup> Khrushchev hoped to make the Communist countries in Eastern Europe dependent on one another and on the Soviet Union.

As early as May, 1956, Comecon members discussed the question of interbloc economic integration. At the ninth Comecon council session (June, 1958) a permanent economic commission was established to coordinate the

economic plans of the individual countries. Finally, in 1959, Comecon elaborated the "specialization" plan, according to which the more developed countries would concentrate on building heavy industry while Rumania would emphasize raw materials and the extractive industries.

Rumanian leaders criticized the "specialization" plan, finding it unfair and in conflict with the country's sovereignty. They insisted on pursuing all-around industrial development "in traditional Communist fashion" and "adapting their trade policies to their own design rather than that of Comecon."<sup>3</sup> The Rumanians argued that the continued industrial growth of their country depended on the accelerated development of heavy industry, and pointed with pride to their country's recent industrial growth (at the rate of 15 per cent since 1961)<sup>4</sup> and the steady improvement of living standards. They rejected the whole idea of a division of labor based on "the present stage of economic development."

The Sino-Soviet rift gave Rumania "an unprecedented opportunity for maneuver." Confronted by Chinese attacks, the Soviet Union for a time adopted a conciliatory policy toward Rumania in order to secure its political support. The Rumanian party chief, Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, cleverly exploited the situation, knowing full well that Khrushchev could not afford a split with Rumania while feuding with China. Khrushchev promised Rumanian leaders credits and equipment for the six-year economic plan,<sup>5</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Jane Degas, "Changes in the Communist World," *The World Today*, December, 1964, pp. 509-516.

<sup>2</sup> J. B. Thompson, "Rumania's Struggle with Comecon," *East Europe*, July, 1964, pp. 2-9.

<sup>3</sup> Michael Gamarnikov, "Comecon Today," *East Europe*, March, 1964, pp. 3-9.

<sup>4</sup> J. F. Brown, "Rumania Steps Out of Line," *Survey*, October, 1963, p. 20.

<sup>5</sup> John Michael Montias, "Background and Origins of the Rumanian Dispute with Comecon," *Soviet Studies*, October, 1964, pp. 135-138.

which had been drawn up in June, 1960, on the assumption that the members of Comecon would supply needed credits and materials. On November 11, 1960, special agreements were concluded, according to which the Soviet Union promised to supply Rumania with iron ore and equipment needed in the construction of the important Galati steel mill.

The Soviet Union, however, did not abandon the idea of the economic integration of the Communist-bloc countries. One of the main topics at the twenty-second congress of the Communist party of the Soviet Union (October, 1961) was the "international Socialist division of labor." The "principles" concerning the division of labor were worked out at the fifteenth Comecon council session in December, 1961. While most members of the Bloc accepted the division of labor according to specialization of industry, the central committee of the Rumanian Workers' party insisted on specialization by branches of industry.

When for a time in 1962 the Sino-Soviet dispute subsided, Khrushchev launched a vigorous offensive against Rumania. At simultaneous meetings, in June, 1962, the Comecon "summit" and the sixteenth council session of Comecon, approved the creation of an executive committee (composed of deputy premiers) and the "Basic Principles of the International Socialist Division of Labor."<sup>6</sup> The Rumanians rejected the "Principles" forthwith. Khrushchev's quick visit to Bucharest to persuade the Rumanians to change their minds was a failure. In August, the Soviet leader elaborated his views on integration and criticized Rumania for refusing to cooperate.<sup>7</sup> Later, he gave further details on the "general scheme for inter-state specialization and coordination" in an article published in *Problems of Peace and Socialism* (Prague, September, 1962).

The creation of the executive committee was a victory for the proponents of full economic integration; its purpose was to serve

as "the political superstructure" for a centralized planning authority not yet established. Though the founding of the executive committee preserved the principle of unanimity, its real intention was to ensure the predominance of community over national interests. This was the crux of a bitter controversy at the seventeenth session of the Comecon council in Bucharest (December, 1962). As a result, the formal incorporation of the executive committee into the Comecon charter has not yet been accomplished, the functions of the Committee have not been delineated, and the supranational planning body has not been established.

Rumanian opposition killed the Comecon integration plan, at least in the way it was conceived. Instead, the principle of voluntarism came to prevail; that is, each state will accept as much integration as it finds compatible with and useful to its own national interests. The Rumanians did not threaten to defect from the Soviet bloc or to quit Comecon, nor did they wholly reject the idea of the Socialist division of labor. Needing the help and the markets of the Communist states, they wanted the adjustment of Comecon decisions to their country's needs. In March, 1963, the central committee of the Rumanian Workers' party announced that it would honor the principles of the Socialist division of labor, but only if the Moscow declaration of 1960 regarding mutual aid on the basis of equality and observance of national independence and sovereignty were respected.

For Rumania to assert its independence, it had to expand its economic relations with non-Communist states and to obtain from new sources what it needed for industrial development. Gradually Rumania succeeded in establishing normal economic intercourse with most of the Western and other non-Communist states. Relations with China were improved. China endorsed Rumania's stand on Comecon and Rumania refused to participate in the Soviet anti-Chinese and anti-Albanian campaigns. Rumania's press published Chinese anti-Soviet declarations in open defiance of Khrushchev.

<sup>6</sup> *Pravda*, June 17, 1962. *The Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, XIV, No. 24, July 11, 1962, pp. 3-8.

<sup>7</sup> *Kommunist*, August, 1962, pp. 3-26.

At the meetings of the executive committee of Comecon in Moscow (April, 1963) and Warsaw (May 10, 1963), the Rumanians remained uncompromising. As a sign of displeasure at the pressure put on him by East Germany and other Bloc countries, Gheorghiu-Dej absented himself from Ulbricht's seventieth birthday celebration in East Berlin on June 30, 1963; other Communist heads of state of course attended.

In late May, 1963, the Soviet government sent Nikolai Podgorny and General A. A. Epishev to Rumania to placate the Rumanians before the July 24-26 meeting of the Comecon leaders. The Rumanians remained adamant, refusing to concentrate their efforts almost entirely on the oil industry and agriculture. At the meeting, the Rumanians won a surprising victory. Faced by renewed Chinese pressure, the Soviet Union needed Rumania's political support and found it expedient to approve the expansion of Rumania's steel industry and to postpone the economic integration of the Communist bloc until 1966. This would enable Rumania to complete the Galati steel plant and then be admitted into the Comecon scheme at the same level as Czechoslovakia and Poland. The subsequent communiqué declared that Comecon would respect the principles of "equality, strict observance of sovereignty, and mutual comradely assistance," and stated that "the best possible basis for a mutual coordination of economic plans is provided by bilateral consultations between member nations."<sup>8</sup> This meant defeat for the supranational economic organization and the integration scheme.

### MISSION TO PEKING

Rumania found it advantageous not to commit itself in the Sino-Soviet dispute, adopting instead a policy of neutrality. The result was that both the Soviet Union and China sought Rumania's backing, and Rumania began to think of itself as a possible mediator. On February 14, 1964, the politburo of the central committee of the Ru-

manian Workers' party sent notes to the central committees of the Soviet and Chinese parties, urging them to end public polemics. At the same time, the Rumanian politburo proposed a meeting between high party representatives of China and Rumania to consider the problem of unity of the socialist camp and the world Communist movement. The Russians agreed to suspend the polemics if the Chinese would do the same. Three days later Mao Tse-tung invited Rumanian representatives to Peking. The Rumanian delegation, headed by Premier Ion Gheorghe Maurer, visited China and North Korea (March 3-10, 1964). The reception and talks at Peking and Pyongyang were friendly, but the Chinese refused to stop the polemics until they and the Russians reached an agreement.

The Rumanian delegation on its way home stopped in Moscow and then went to see Khrushchev in Gagra, his vacation home in the Caucasus. The Russians took the position that since the Chinese refused to stop the polemics they would publish the statement of the plenum of the central committee of the Soviet Union (February 14, 1964) on the rift. Shortly afterwards (March 31), the Chinese published new attacks on the Soviet Union, and on April 3, the Soviets carried out their threat.

Although Rumania for the most part shared the Soviet ideological position, it continued for special reasons to nurture cordial relations with China. The new Chinese ambassador, Liu Fang, a former minister of petroleum industry, presented his credentials on April 10, 1964. There was speculation that an important oil agreement was in the offing, because of the threat of competition posed by the Soviet pipeline network linking the Volga oilfields with Poland, East Germany, Hungary and Czechoslovakia. Rumanian censorship deleted attacks on Peking from the speeches of Khrushchev and Janos Kadar when the Russian leader visited Hungary in April, and refused to broadcast Khrushchev's televised report after his return. Rumania also refrained from mentioning Fröl Suslov's attack on China. In the summer of 1964,

<sup>8</sup> *Pravda*, July 28, 1963.

Rumania and China signed an agreement providing for the exchange of technical know-how.

The Rumanian leaders felt the need for an official statement of policy. During an eight-day plenum (April 15-22, 1964) the central committee adopted a resolution, published in *Scinteia* (April 26),<sup>9</sup> which was tantamount to a declaration of independence. After general comments on the transition from capitalism to socialism, the internal contradictions of the capitalist world, and the struggle of the emerging nations against capitalism, the Rumanian declaration endorsed Khrushchev's line on peaceful coexistence, the nuclear test ban treaty, general and complete disarmament, and peaceful negotiations with the West.

The declaration stressed the fact that each country should be allowed to build socialism according to its own conditions and with its own resources. It rejected unified planning and joint economic enterprises on the basis that these would undermine national independence and sovereignty. The declaration explained that the socialist states must conduct their relations on a footing of equality and desist from interfering in each other's internal affairs. Planned management of the national economy, it was pointed out, was the function of a sovereign socialist state. In other words, each Communist party had the exclusive right to work out its own national problems by "creatively applying the general truths of Marxism-Leninism." The declaration further noted that "No party has or can have a privileged place, or can impose its line or opinions on other parties." The Rumanians quoted Lenin as saying that diversities would continue among states even after the establishment of proletarian dictatorship on a world scale. They condemned the ugly epithets used against certain parties and their leaders and urged immediate consultations among all Communist parties on the problem of interparty unity and solidarity.

The April, 1964, declaration endorsed the general policy of the Soviet Union. Nonethe-

less, Rumania remained neutral in the Sino-Soviet conflict itself, and tried to prevent it from coming to a head. An exchange of official visits between Bucharest and Moscow failed to improve relations between the two capitals. Gheorghiu-Dej stayed away from the celebration of Khrushchev's seventieth birthday in Moscow, April 17, though a Rumanian delegation was present. In May and June, the Moscow and Bucharest radios sharply criticized the policies of each other's governments.

In different ways the Soviet leaders tried to intimidate Rumania. A Soviet article urging the economic integration of the lower Danube by a merger of parts of Bulgaria, Rumania and the Soviet Union under joint management elicited a sharp Rumanian response. Rumanian leaders saw in the Soviet proposal an attempt to dismember their country. On July 15, 1964, a Polish-Hungarian-Czechoslovak steel association ("Intermetal") was established to bypass Rumania, which was insisting on building its own steel industry. The Soviet Union was expected to join the association.

Since the publication in 1962 of an article by historian V. B. Ushakov, Soviet spokesmen have intentionally minimized the role of the Rumanian "progressive forces" in the liberation of their country from Nazi Germany. An article in *Pravda* (August 20, 1964) stressed the decisive role played by the Soviet Red army in freeing Rumania. In another article on the same day, Marshal Malinovsky conveyed a similar message, although he conceded that the Rumanians helped in the final stages of the struggle. But when necessary for political reasons, the Soviets are willing to modify their historical interpretation. Thus, on the occasion of the anniversary of Rumanian liberation, on August 23, 1964, Anastas Mikoyan lauded the Rumanian "progressive forces" for their part in the liberation. As for the Rumanians, they are now seeking to revise history to give themselves rather than the Soviet Red army the major credit for the liberation of the country from the Nazis.

At the celebration of Rumania's liberation

<sup>9</sup> *East Europe*, June, 1964, pp. 25-30.

in 1964, all Communist parties were represented, including those of China, Albania and Yugoslavia. Gheorghiu-Dej paid high tribute to the achievements of the Rumanian party and praised it for overthrowing the Antonescu regime, though he acknowledged the help of the Red army. He expressed Rumania's determination to expand relations with countries of all social systems, to industrialize Rumania, and to bring socialism to town and village, and he reiterated Rumania's readiness to cooperate with the Soviet Union on the basis of the Moscow declarations of 1957 and 1960.

### RUMANIAN DISENGAGEMENT

From what began as an attempt to win economic freedom,<sup>10</sup> the Rumanian Workers' party today strives toward full independence. By denouncing military blocs the Rumanian leaders may be trying to disengage their country from the Warsaw Pact just as they won freedom from Comecon's supranational economic control. The most daring sign of Rumania's independence has been the demand for the return of Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina, taken from Rumania by the Soviet Union in 1940. In July, 1961, the Rumanians secured Mao Tse-tung's endorsement for their territorial claim. More recently the Rumanians have published documents written by Karl Marx under the title, "Notes on Rumanians," which purport to justify Rumanian claims to Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina and are critical of the Russians and the Magyar treatment of Rumanians in Transylvania.

Both Hungary and Rumania claim the districts inhabited by the Szeklers or Transylvanian Magyars, which the Rumanians in 1952 organized into an "Autonomous Hungarian Region."<sup>11</sup> The national animosity between Rumania and Hungary grew more intense during World War I and after. Losing the war, Hungary had been made to surrender to Rumania substantial territory in-

habited by a mixed Magyar-Rumanian population. In August, 1940, under the Axis-dictated Vienna Award, Rumania had to relinquish northern Transylvania to Hungary. At the end of World War II, the Allies restored Transylvania to Rumania.

That the antagonism between Hungary and Rumania has not died out can be seen in the way their respective historians interpret the history of the Rumanians in Transylvania. The Hungarian historians dispute the notion that the Rumanians of that province were under a "double yoke" (social and national), and deny the historical inevitability of the dismemberment of Austria-Hungary.<sup>12</sup> *Contemporanul* and certain other Rumanian publications have in turn set out to refute these Hungarian interpretations of history.

Premier Khrushchev called a preliminary conference (for December 15, 1964) of Communist parties to discuss the problems of international communism and to prepare a world conference for the following year. What the Soviet leader wanted was to secure the endorsement of his China policy by other parties.<sup>13</sup> With this he hoped to establish Soviet authority and to excommunicate China if it refused to acquiesce. Rumania did not plan to attend. Only 12 of the 25 parties invited accepted; 6 refused and 7 did not reply. This, probably more than anything else, contributed to Khrushchev's fall.

The upheaval in the U.S.S.R. in October, 1964, spared the Rumanians a direct collision with the Russians. However, the conflict between Bucharest and Moscow continued. After some delay, the new leaders of the Soviet Union decided to go ahead with the Communist conference but rescheduled it for March 1, 1965. The Rumanian leaders again expressed opposition to the conference. Possibly voicing approval of the Chinese atomic bomb test (December 17, 1964) was one way to say no. (See also "The Month in Review," *Intl. Warsaw Pact*, in this issue.)

Rumania's qualifications for a successful economic development plan should be remembered. Rumania is the only Communist country which does not suffer from a shortage of food; it produces six million tons

<sup>10</sup> Randolph L. Braham, "Rumania: On the Separate Path," *Problems of Communism*, May-June, 1964, pp. 14-15.

<sup>11</sup> *East Europe*, August, 1964, p. 44.

<sup>12</sup> *East Europe*, September, 1964, p. 1.

of wheat annually. It is also the only Bloc country which has, in petroleum products (twelve million tons yearly), a reliable export of large magnitude. With revenues obtained from oil resources the country can obtain foreign exchange for the purchase of equipment needed in building its industries. Thanks to these economic advantages and to the favorable international situation, Rumania has been able to achieve a large degree of independence from Moscow. Apparently the presence of the Soviet Union on its frontiers is no longer frightening. Its leaders can now defy Moscow without fear of Soviet military reprisals, especially as long as defiance is kept within reasonable limits.

Rumania's grievances against Russia are longstanding. The history of unfriendly past relations between Russia and Rumania, along with bitter memories of World War II, Soviet reparations claims, the heavy-handed occupation, the meagerness of Soviet aid after the war, the old fear of the Slavs, and the tendency of the Rumanians to regard themselves as something better than an Eastern European people, help to explain Rumania's recent political behavior.

#### STEPS TO INDEPENDENCE

Rumania still needs Soviet political and economic help, but it is no longer absolutely dependent on it, thanks to important economic treaties and cultural conventions concluded with several non-Communist states. Legations in a number of countries have been raised to the level of embassies. Relations with the United States have steadily improved during the 1960's. A three-year cultural agreement (April 2, 1963), and an economic agreement (June 1, 1964) were concluded. In January, 1965, a consular convention was under consideration. The United States has agreed to set up a procedure of general licenses on the basis of which nonstrategic goods and technical data can be exported to Rumania. The Rumanian deputy premier, Gheorghe Gaston-Marin, visited Washington in June, 1964, and a Rumanian delegation

has been in Washington to study trade potentialities between the two countries. Congressional approval of the most-favored-nation treatment for Rumanian products has been discussed. In December, 1964, Rumania initiated preliminary agreements with two American companies for the building of a synthetic rubber factory and a catalytic cracking plant, which together may cost some \$50 million. The agreements, if implemented, will provide "the first direct entry by American private industry into a Communist country" since the Second World War.<sup>18</sup>

#### OTHER AGREEMENTS

Similar economic and cultural relations have been established with France and other Western countries. Premier Ion Gheorghe Maurer and Foreign Minister Corneliu Manescu visited Paris (July-August, 1964) and had cordial discussions with President Charles de Gaulle. Special missions have been sent to England and West Germany. In 1962, an agreement was reached with an Anglo-French group for the construction of a steel mill at Galati with an annual capacity of about 600,000 tons. Rumania and West Germany agreed on the repatriation of thousands of persons of German descent living in Rumania. Of particular importance was the trade agreement with India (October, 1962), which provided at least a portion of the iron ore that the Soviet Union had failed to deliver. On March 8, 1963, China and Rumania signed a trade treaty. Premier Maurer, on December 27, 1964, declared that Rumania was determined to extend its economic links with all countries, "irrespective of their social systems." This would be necessary, he said, if Rumania was to build industry.

Rumanian action in international organizations has likewise indicated independence. On a number of occasions, Rumania has voted differently from the Communist bloc in the United Nations General Assembly and other international meetings. On November 19, 1963, it voted in the General Assembly for the United States-backed resolution favoring a denuclearization zone in Latin America. Rumania has sought contact with the West-

<sup>18</sup> *The New York Times*, January 5, 1965.

ern dominated General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).

Relations between Rumania and Yugoslavia have improved steadily. In November, 1963, for the first time in seven years, Gheorghiu-Dej visited Yugoslavia and received the highest honors. The two Communist leaders endorsed the policy of coexistence and called for complete disarmament and atom-free zones in various parts of the world. They signed a convention for the construction of the Danube navigation project and huge hydroelectric power plants in the Iron Gate. In June, 1964, Tito visited Gheorge-Dej in Timisoara.

As yet, Rumania has made no major effort to liberalize its Communist system. The people continue to live in fear of police and arbitrary justice,<sup>14</sup> though apparently some thousands of political prisoners have been released from jails. Rumania has not attempted to decentralize its economy on the Yugoslav model, and has given no indication of basic changes in agriculture, which remains 90 per cent collectivized.

## QUIET REVOLUTION

Nonetheless, Rumania's "quiet revolution" is not to be underestimated. De-Russification and expanded cultural intercourse with the West have been conspicuous. Changes have been made in education, requiring greater emphasis on foreign languages in secondary schools. Russian is no longer a compulsory language in schools. English and French are more widely used as the second languages in international conferences. The Soviet radio program has been dropped and the number of Soviet films reduced. The "Soviet-Rumanian Friendship Week" received only perfunctory attention in 1964, and the activities of the "Soviet-Rumanian Friendship Society" have been markedly curtailed. The Writers' Union is seeking to liberalize party regulations concerning socialist realism and to familiarize the Rumanian reading public with Western literature. Several additional West-

ern authors have been put on the accepted reading list. More and more Western plays are shown in Rumania.

Rumania has stopped jamming foreign radio programs (including the Voice of America), and of late has abandoned sharp criticism of the United States. The exhibit of American graphic arts which opened in Constanta on October 1, 1964, was very successful. Plans have been made for distribution of the magazine *Amerika* in Rumania and *Rumania Today* in the United States, and to allow the sale of Western newspapers in Rumania. In the summer of 1964, the Rumanian government eased its visa regulations by allowing border stations to issue certain kinds of visas, and the number of crossing points was increased. The government has inaugurated discount buying for tourists and has announced more favorable exchange rates for Western currencies.

But Rumania continues to have problems. The country's agriculture is primitive and the yields are low. Rumania still suffers from the Stalinist heritage, a low standard of living, and a labor surplus caused by a growing rural population. There is a danger that Rumanian leaders may try to go too far too fast. When they demand Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina from the Soviet Union, what can stop Hungary from demanding Transylvania? At any rate, for the time being, the Rumanian stress on the concept of national sovereignty within Comecon has prevailed, Khrushchev's "grand design" has been put aside, and the decentralization of the Communist monolith continues unabated.

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<sup>14</sup> David Binder, "The Rumanian-Yugoslav 'Special Relationship,'" *East Europe*, September, 1964, pp. 2-7.

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*Although this writer believes that "Czechoslovakia seems at long last to be emerging from neo-Stalinist limbo" and offers "a lively spectacle and a refreshing atmosphere," he warns that "Unfortunately the liberal trends permeating the intellectual scene have not yet found their way into actual political practice, which remains as rigid and as totalitarian as ever."*

## Change in Czechoslovakia

By EDWARD TABORSKY  
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**W**RITING for *Current History* in May, 1963, Professor Ivo Ducháček was correct in titling his article *Czechoslovakia: A Dull Drama*. Indeed, very little of any major consequence took place in Czechoslovakia in the late 1950's and the first two years of the present decade; and up to 1963-1964 Czechoslovakia was rightly considered by Western students as among the most rigid and most conformist of Soviet Russia's European partners.

But things began to change substantially in 1963-1964. In spite of continued stubborn resistance from the Party stalwarts, the victims of the Stalinist purges of the early 1950's were rehabilitated in 1963, and exoneration was publicly extended even to those among them who had been executed. The post-Stalin liberalization trends in the realm of culture and science, which the ruling oligarchs had managed thus far to contain, began to assert themselves with unprecedented vigor. Revisionism, which had hitherto been rather dormant in Czechoslovakia, suddenly flared up on a surprisingly broad front, challenging many an aspect of the current official version of the Marxist-Leninist teaching and pressing resolutely for a frank reappraisal of a number of established doctrinal clichés and deeply-embedded Party habits.

Most recently, and most importantly, the Marxist-Leninist economic doctrine itself has come under sharp scrutiny, and the entire

system of Communist economic planning and management is being drastically refashioned along lines that contradict some of the fundamental concepts hitherto held sacrosanct in the Communist orbit.

Thus Czechoslovakia seems at long last to be emerging from neo-Stalinist limbo, trying new and less orthodox ways of solving her many problems, catching up with the more liberal members of the Communist bloc, and in some aspects even forging ahead of them. Far from being dull, the Czechoslovak scene presents today a lively spectacle and a refreshing atmosphere filled both with hopeful expectations and skeptical doubts, excitement over forthcoming changes as well as uneasiness as to their effect and, above all, an impatience to recapture the time wasted during the "personality-cult" era.

What accounts for this sudden and rather unexpected change of direction in Czechoslovakia? A number of related factors seem to have been at work. The downgrading of Stalin, Soviet rapprochement with Tito, Khrushchev's tampering with doctrine, the impact of the Polish and Hungarian revolutions of 1956, the Sino-Soviet split—all of these have played their part. But the single most telling factor has been Czechoslovakia's worsening economic situation.

Although bottlenecks and shortcomings of various kinds have plagued the Czechoslovak economy, and agriculture has been in a state

of a more or less pronounced stagnation ever since the Communists took over in 1948, until 1960 the volume of industrial production kept rising at spectacular rates. Between 1950 and 1960, its increase averaged 11 per cent per annum, while national income grew by an impressive yearly 8.5 per cent in the same period and labor productivity in industry (computed in man-years) was claimed to have risen as much as 149 per cent between 1948 and 1959.<sup>1</sup>

### THE ECONOMIC DILEMMA

However, the economic picture changed radically in the early 1960's. The growth of industrial production and national income slowed down substantially in 1961 and 1962, and an actual *decline* was registered in these indicators of economic virility in 1963, when industrial output fell by 0.7 per cent and national income plummeted a full 3.7 per cent below 1962. Increases in industrial labor productivity, on which the Communist planners counted most in their overoptimistic economic projections, began to fall off rapidly from 7.7 per cent in 1959 to 5.7 per cent in 1961 and 3.1 per cent in 1962. Agricultural production marked its worst year in 1962 when it sank to more than six per cent below the 1961 level.

While quantitative indices were decreasing, qualitative results remained as inferior as ever and economic waste seemed to rage unabated. Losses caused by the output of "rejects" kept hovering between \$150 million and \$200 million annually. Unusable inventories continued to grow and reached one-fourth of the national income by 1964. Ab-

senteeism persisted, totaling a daily rate of 220,000 persons staying away from work in 1964. State farms alone ran up a deficit of more than \$60 million in 1963.

So bleak was the overall performance that it forced the abandonment of the original targets of the Third Five-Year Plan which had to be reduced twice in the course of 1963. Targets were replaced with more modest goals for 1964 as well as 1965, contemplating rather modest increases of 3.6 per cent in 1964 and 5.5 per cent in 1965 for industrial production and 1.4 per cent and 4 per cent respectively for national income.<sup>2</sup>

Naturally, as soon as they became aware of the magnitude of their economic quandary, Party leaders strove hard to correct the situation. However, unable and unwilling to admit that anything could be basically wrong with the Communist economic system, let alone with the economic doctrine of Marxism-Leninism, all they could think of at first were notorious Communist remedies consisting mainly of a strengthening of "democratic centralism" through additional controls and super-controls.<sup>3</sup>

One year later, with the economic slump growing even worse and Czechoslovak economists becoming more and more critical of the orthodox Communist system of planning and management, Party leaders were ready to go a few steps further. In its session on January 21 and 22, 1964, the Party's central committee approved a number of measures to induce Czechoslovakia's economy to regain its lost momentum. Nonprofitable enterprises were to be closed down and others were to be modernized. A steeper differentiation of salaries and wages in favor of better qualified personnel was ordered; employees of establishments producing new and better merchandise were to be better paid. Piecework wages were to be used whenever and wherever feasible. The status of foremen was to be enhanced through premium payments. Administrative staffs of economic enterprises were to be reduced by 59,000 persons. Prices were to become more flexible. Agricultural production was to be bolstered by a recultivation of fallow land, extension of arable land

<sup>1</sup> Data in this and the following paragraphs are drawn from the following sources: *Rudé právo*, January 25, February 2, July 17 and 19, 1963, January 2 and November 24, 1964; *Práce*, August 27, 1963, May 15 and September 18, 1964; *Zemědělské noviny*, January 25, 1963; *Lidová demokracie*, February 12, 1964; *Hospodářské noviny*, No. 9 and 12, 1964. A good review of Czechoslovakia's recent economic woes may be found in Václav Holesovsky, "Czechoslovakia's Economic Quandary" in *East Europe*, November, 1964, pp. 7 ff.

<sup>2</sup> *Rudé Právo*, December 10, 1964.

<sup>3</sup> The main instruments were to be a network of people's control commissions operating jointly with a parallel hierarchy of Communist party control commissions.

and areas growing grain crops, increase in silage, reduction of harvest losses, better staffing of machine tractor stations, and increased support for cattle raising and milk output.<sup>4</sup>

While the measures adopted by the Party's central committee in January, 1964 made good economic sense and were certainly steps in the right direction, they fell nevertheless in the category of "too little too late." Party leaders prescribed palliative pills when only major surgery seemed to offer the patient a chance of recovery. The inadequacy of the proposed "solution" was clearly recognized by most of Czechoslovakia's economists. Encouraged by the unorthodox views previously advanced by some of their Yugoslav, Polish, Hungarian and Soviet colleagues, they have been battling the "cult of the plan" since the middle of 1963, pleading for radical departures from the "canonized model of planned socialist economy."<sup>5</sup> Aided by the continued sluggishness of the economic performance as bared by official announcements of the none-too-glamorous production results in the first half of 1964,<sup>6</sup> the economists finally succeeded in inducing the frustrated and faltering Party leadership to accept the inevitable. In September, 1964, the presidium of the Party's central committee adopted a new Draft of *Principles for the Perfection of the Planned Direction of the National Economy* embodying virtually all the main desiderata of the Czechoslovak economists and amounting in fact to a drastic and far-reaching reform of the entire system of economic planning and management.<sup>7</sup>

## ECONOMIC REFORM

The main features of the reform may be summarized as follows:

1. Central, so-called perspective planning will concern itself henceforth only with long-term projections for five years or longer, setting overall economic goals and perspectives, but leaving the elaboration of short-term

<sup>4</sup> For the proceedings of the central committee's session see *Rudé právo*, January 25–26, 1964.

<sup>5</sup> R. Kocanda in *Rudé právo*, January 8, 1964, and R. Selucky in *Kulturny život*, August 10, 1963.

<sup>6</sup> *Rudé právo*, August 1, 1964.

<sup>7</sup> Reprinted in *Rudé právo*, October 17, 1964.

plans to the respective branch enterprises and trusts which are in a better position to choose the methods befitting their capabilities, production experience and other such factors.

2. Only major developmental investments will come from the state budget; all other necessary investments must be financed by the enterprises themselves from their resources or by borrowing.

3. Interest will have to be paid by the enterprises for all loans and capital advances.

4. A realistic and flexible price system will gradually be introduced which is to take into consideration both production costs and the relation of supply to demand. Eventually, only prices of basic raw materials, energy and some basic necessities are to be fixed by central authorities. Maximum and sometimes minimum prices may be set for "standard products," but otherwise free prices are to result from open market conditions. Speculative manipulation of prices is to be prevented by the establishment of special price institutes designed to check on such mal-practices; overpriced merchandise is to be exposed to competition with foreign products.

5. The merits of individual enterprises and trusts will henceforth be measured by profits resulting from actual sales to customers to make enterprises more competitive, more cost-conscious and more responsive to the wishes of consumers.

6. Each enterprise must earn its own way, for it must pay, from its profits, interest on borrowed money and capital funds, repayments of loans, most of its investments and tax levies to the state. From what is left, it must pay wages and other emoluments to all its employees. After a transition period of grace to allow adaptation to the new system, subsidization of enterprises unable to earn their way will cease.

7. The wage system is to be revamped to provide for basic all-state wages determined by the quantity, quality and social importance of the work performed, plus incentive payments differentiated according to individual merit and the profits of the enterprises.

Those accustomed to Western economic thinking, living in a free enterprise system,

can hardly see anything radical in this new Czechoslovak economic model which amounts, in substance, to nothing more than an attempt to revitalize the ailing body economic of Communist Czechoslovakia by injections of certain time-honored free enterprise practices. However, by the standards of the current version of Marxism-Leninism, it seems almost revolutionary for it calls, as the Draft readily concedes, for a fundamental "reevaluation of the present [Czechoslovak] conception of the character and substance of the socialist system of economic management." Indeed, it may be said that the Czechoslovak blueprint goes farther than anything hitherto attempted in any country of the Soviet bloc and places Czechoslovakia next to Yugoslavia in the forefront of any Communist economic revisionism.

### POWERFUL OPPPOSITION

Since the realization of the reform has barely begun, this is hardly the time for any prognosis as to its chances of success. For the time being, the economic revisionists have won their case, and they seem to be determined to push the application of the new principles with dogged intransigence "lest their effectiveness be weakened by a compromise combining the old and the new elements."<sup>8</sup> But in order to succeed they will have to overcome powerful opposition from the many Party stalwarts and bureaucrats, entrenched in central agencies, all of whom are fearful of what such a radical change might mean for the regime and their own positions.

It should be noted that Party boss Antonín Novotný himself is anything but enthusiastic about some aspects of the reform. Throughout the entire economic debate, he repeatedly blamed the reformers for "one-sided," "incorrect" and "subjectivist" opinions, "Olympian arrogance," attempts to "denigrate the overall development" and the like.<sup>9</sup> And

<sup>8</sup> R. Selucky in *Literární noviny*, October 24, 1964, and Ota Sik, one of the main authors of the reform, in *Nová Mysl*, No. 10, October, 1964. See also an editorial in *Kulturní tvorba*, October 22, 1964.

<sup>9</sup> *Rudé právo*, March 18, and May 29, 1964.

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*, August 30 and December 4, 1964.

since the reluctant adoption of the reform by the Party presidium he missed no opportunity to harp on the necessity of "central direction," the "binding character" of the central plan as well as on the notorious principle of "democratic centralism" which "continues to be the basis" of the newly reformed system.<sup>10</sup>

### POSSIBLE CONSEQUENCES

The coolness of the Party bosses and their henchmen, and even their ill-concealed enmity, can be readily understood if one thinks of the possible short-term and long-term consequences of this intriguing marriage of totalitarian socialism to a selected complex of free enterprise principles, as outlined in this new Draft.

To begin with, the transition from the old system to the new will create a number of serious economic problems of which the proposers of the reform are fully aware. A strong inflationary trend is likely to develop as more enterprises start setting their own prices in a market where the supply of most consumer goods has been woefully inadequate. A tendency will certainly arise to guide the largest possible portion of profits into the employees' pockets and limit needed investments to the prescribed minima. If the goals of the reform are to be attained, workers in most instances will have to work harder or suffer a grievous loss of income, and they are not likely to suffer this silently. As inefficient plants close and others dismiss surplus personnel to raise their efficiency, a substantial measure of dislocation may ensue. The present shortage of manpower will undoubtedly be alleviated, but it may well give way to at least temporary pockets of unemployment.

However, more important in the long run, and certainly fraught with greater risks for the Party dictatorship, are certain possible political implications if the new economic system is carried out as envisioned by its authors. As stressed in the Draft proposals, and even more so in their discussion in the press, the new system will "lay much higher claims on the quality of the leading personnel;

professional qualification is, therefore, to be the decisive criterion in personnel selection.<sup>11</sup> With only 12.3 per cent of the present managers of industrial enterprises college graduates and 31.4 without formal education beyond the elementary school,<sup>12</sup> a tremendous changeover may have to take place in higher and even intermediate echelons of economic management and thousands of poorly qualified Party hacks may be demoted or eased out of the process.

The new managerial élite, whose authority would be substantially enhanced under the decentralized arrangements, might in due time become politically more important. This might very well be true also of labor leaders and their labor unions. Since a good many workers, used to sloppy work and various types of Communist-style featherbedding, are likely to be hurt by the stiffened requirements, dismissals and the need to relocate during the period of transition, large-scale resentment might become potentially dangerous, as it always does when it involves communism's pet group, the industrial working class.

Furthermore, implicit in the new system is a greater emphasis on further economic contact with the West. Realizing that the success of the reform depends to no small degree on a substantial increase in Czechoslovakia's trading with her one-time traditional partners in Central and Western Europe, Czechoslovak representatives have become involved in feverish activity along these lines. Similarly, Czechoslovak economists have been repeat-

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*, October 17, 1964; also, R. Selucky in *Mladá fronta*, November 21, 1964.

<sup>12</sup> R. Selucky in *Mladá fronta*, November 21, 1964; Jozef Lúč in *Pravda* (Bratislava), November 25, 1964; Otto Fülop, *Smena*, November 21, 1964.

<sup>13</sup> R. Selucky in *Literární noviny*, September 5, 1964, and in *Kulturní tvorba*, January 30, 1964; V. Komárek in *Hospodářské noviny*, March 13, 1964.

<sup>14</sup> J. Klíma in *Literární noviny*, January 25, 1964, O. Pavlik in *Kulturny život*, August 17, 1963, J. Tomeček in *Pravda* (Bratislava), December 9, 1963.

<sup>15</sup> R. Hoffman in *Kulturny život*, No. 42, 1963, Rasla in *Kulturny život*, November 16, 1963.

<sup>16</sup> J. Tomeček in *Pravda* (Bratislava), December 9, 1963.

<sup>17</sup> F. Andraščík in *Kulturny život*, December 7, 1963; J. Janousek's review of J. Cvetl's *Clovek a světový názor*, 1962, in *Filosoficky časopis*, No. 5, 1963, pp. 708 ff.

edly stressing the imperative necessity of acquiring first-hand knowledge of the economic *modus operandi* in the West. "Frankly speaking," wrote one of them, "I cannot imagine a socialist expert in industrial management and planning who did not become personally acquainted with methods by which significant enterprises are managed in Western Europe and the United States. . . ."<sup>13</sup> And he urged that the managers of Czechoslovak industrial and commercial establishments spend from one-half to one year in analogous enterprises in the West.

Thus, although it will probably help the country economically, the reform will also confront the Party with vexing political problems. While its impact should not be exaggerated, in the long run it will undoubtedly exert pressure toward a progressive liberalization.

The tarnished image of Communist economy and the resulting erosion of faith in the superiority of the Communist economic doctrine, the cornerstone of Marxism-Leninism, encourage doubts about the validity of other tenets of the dogma, weakened already by revelations of the abuses and "distortions" of the "personality-cult" era.

Indeed, in the latter part of 1963, the revisionists suddenly came to life in Czechoslovakia and, for the first time since the Communist takeover, began openly to challenge some of the fundamental theses of the official version of Marxism-Leninism. They rejected the "hypertrophic application" of the class criterion and labeled it a "fictitious value," a "harmful anachronism" and a "monstrous sectarian excess."<sup>14</sup> They denounced "the dogma of the immaculateness of proletarian origin" and "the sectarian-dogmatic interpretation of the leading role of the proletariat."<sup>15</sup> They bewailed communism's disregard of individual needs and its lopsided emphasis on collective interests of society.<sup>16</sup> They condemned the "scholastic clinging of dogmatists to the letter of the classics of Marxism-Leninism" and insisted on the "humanization" of Marxism.<sup>17</sup> They deplored the tendency of the Party leadership to "consider morality as something secondary,

as some old and unnecessary rubbish preserved in people's minds merely as a survival of old religious and bourgeois education."<sup>18</sup> They advanced the heretical notions that the mass organizations should exercise the right of popular control over the Party and that Party members were not always unconditionally obligated to fulfill the directives of higher Party organs.<sup>19</sup>

If Communist ideology itself could not remain immune against revisionism, neither could culture and science. Fictional literature has been most infiltrated by liberal tendencies running afoul of the prescribed Party line. More recently, revisionist ideas have begun to appear with increasing frequency in other fields of intellectual work, such as historiography, law and sociology.

Breaking at least partially out of their ideological straitjackets, repentent Czechoslovak historians emerged in 1963–1964 with a host of self-critical articles condemning such past sins as "disrespect for historical truth," "adaptation" and even outright falsification of historical documents, propagandistic distortions of historical events, unwarranted evaluation of "the historical march of the Party as an uninterrupted chain of successes," and "absurd stressing of the infallibility of the foremost workers of the Communist movement."<sup>20</sup>

In a similar vein, some of Czechoslovakia's jurists have raised their voices against the "juridical nihilism" of the "personality-cult" era, citing its excesses and malpractices, re-

jecting class bias in the application of the laws, and demanding legal and judicial improvements along liberal lines.<sup>21</sup>

Sociologists had even more cause to welcome the changing winds and line up with the liberal camp against the Party stalwarts. After all, sociology had been banned in Czechoslovakia as an undesirable "pseudo-science" soon after the Communist takeover; its revival in 1963–1964 was effected by anti-dogmatic forces. Wasting no time, the scientific secretary of the newly-formed sociological society made a bold bid for the introduction of Gallup-type public opinion polls and demanded that public opinion thus measured play a major role in the direction of society.<sup>22</sup> And his colleagues promptly denounced communism's neglect of man "as a social subject," rejected the "dogma that revolutionary changes of fundamental social conditions [such as the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat] will automatically solve even the more subtle social and psychological problems," and stressed sociology's "humanitarian" function.<sup>23</sup>

Alarmed by the magnitude and the breadth of the liberal antidiogmatic challenge, particularly by the prominent role of intellectuals belonging to the Communist party itself, the Party leadership moved to a resolute counteroffensive. In December, 1963, the Party's central committee issued a sharply-worded directive; it denounced "the untenable licentiousness" of the press, and "the shameful role" of certain revisionist magazines, ordered a tightening of Party control over all communications media and mentioned that undesirable members of editorial boards might have to be replaced by "deeply convinced Communists."<sup>24</sup> In February, 1964, the central committee's ideological commission prepared (and the Party's presidium subsequently approved) another resolution bristling with scathing criticism.<sup>25</sup>

Hard-pressed by these stern Party ukases, the central committees of the Union of Czechoslovak Writers and the Union of Czechoslovak Journalists bowed, at least outwardly, to the will of the supreme Party organ and promised to mend their ways.<sup>26</sup> But the

<sup>18</sup> O. Pavlík in *Kulturny život*, August 7, 1963.

<sup>19</sup> V. Manák in *Kulturny život*, No. 28, 1963; F. Zdobina, citing H. Slezová, in *Rudé právo*, October 3, 1963.

<sup>20</sup> J. Měchyr and L. Niklíček in *Príspěvky k dějinám KSC*, 1/1964, pp. 60 ff.; Z. Richtová in *Dějiny a současnost*, No. 7, July, 1963.

<sup>21</sup> K. Jára in *Zemědělské noviny*, January 15, 1964, M. Galuska in *Kulturní tvorba*, February 20, 1964, Z. Mlynár in *Literární noviny*, March 21, 1964, L. Kubál in *Kulturní tvorba*, April 16, 1964, V. Hatala, in *Právny obzor*, 2/1964, pp. 68 ff.

<sup>22</sup> An interview with D. Slezská in *Zemědělské noviny*, February 19, 1964.

<sup>23</sup> *Kulturní tvorba*, March 12, 1964, and an interview with M. Jodl in *Zemědělské noviny*, January 11, 1964.

<sup>24</sup> *Rudé právo*, December 20–23, 1963.

<sup>25</sup> *Ibid.*, April 3, 1964.

<sup>26</sup> *Literární noviny*, April 25, 1964, and *Rudé právo*, May 6, 1964.

editorial board of *Kulturný život*, the Slovak cultural magazine that was the chief target of Party criticism, boldly refused to choose the "comfortable, but irresponsible and immoral" way of repentence and humble apology. While stating their opposition to "bourgeois ideology," board members declared that they would rather "burn their fingers" than "sit on two chairs," and that they "renounced voluntarily only one right: the right of indifference."<sup>27</sup>

### RIGID POLITICAL PRACTICE

Unfortunately, the liberal trends permeating the intellectual scene have not yet found their way into actual political practice, which remains as rigid and as totalitarian as ever.

This is documented clearly by the latest general election held in June, 1964. Although the new electoral law, allegedly designed to "deepen socialist democracy," permits more than one candidate for each seat, only one candidate was allowed for each of the 300 seats in the national assembly. This contrived display of the "political unity of the people" was achieved by giving Communist-controlled electoral commissions final authority to decide who may or may not be placed on the ballot. Thus, wherever several names were suggested by the various groups legally authorized to do so, the respective electoral commissions were directed to "make sure" that the voters "united" on one of the proposed candidates, which the commissions managed to do in every instance.<sup>28</sup> Similar practices, such as visits by Communist agitators in individual voter's homes, open encouragement of collective balloting, and thinly-veiled exhortations to public rather than secret voting, were employed to secure the highest possible attendance at the polls and the customary near-unanimous endorsement of the candidates.<sup>29</sup>

The continued use of such a nondemocratic method of electing what the 1960

Czechoslovak constitution describes as "the supreme organ of state power" makes, of course, a sham of professed Party endeavors to enhance the assembly's role and importance. The several recent adaptations of the assembly's operational methods, such as increasing the number of committees and using them more regularly, lengthening plenary sessions, encouraging parliamentary interpellations and urging the ministers to answer them orally in the same session,<sup>30</sup> have barely scratched the surface. Moreover, the Party leadership's alleged concern for the improved representative character of the assembly is belied by its composition. None of its 300 members seem to represent the substantial reformist and antidogmatist wing of the Party, let alone the genuine thinking of the non-Communist majority. Nor can one uncover among the newly-chosen representatives any of the rehabilitated victims of Stalinist purges, except a negligible handful of those deemed completely loyal to the present Party leadership. The new assembly consists of dependable Party hacks and sycophantic fellow travelers just as did its predecessors of the "personality-cult" era.

What accounts for the sharp contrast between comparative liberalization in the fields of culture, economics, science and, to a degree, even ideology on the one hand and, on the other, continued rigidity in actual political practice? The main reason lies un-

*(Continued on page 180)*

Prior to his arrival in the United States in 1949, Edward Taborsky was Czechoslovakia's ambassador to Sweden. During World War II he served as personal aide to the late President Eduard Benes of Czechoslovakia. His earlier academic career included teaching at Charles University (Prague, Czechoslovakia), the University of Stockholm (Sweden), Ohio State University and the University of Tennessee. He is author of nine books and many articles in scholarly journals; his latest book, *Communism in Czechoslovakia: 1948-1960*, was published by Princeton University Press in 1961.

<sup>27</sup> *Kulturný život*, May 1, 1964.

<sup>28</sup> *Mladá fronta*, February 27, 1964, *Rudé právo*, March 20, April 16, and May 12, 1964, *Večerník*, February 22, 1964, *Zivot strany*, No. 7, April, 1964.

<sup>29</sup> F. Zdobina, *Rudé právo*, June 10, 1964.

<sup>30</sup> Václav Skoda in *Zivot strany*, No. 10, May, 1964, pp. 587 ff.

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## BOOK REVIEWS

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**COMMUNISM IN EUROPE: CONTINUITY, CHANGE AND THE SINO-SOVIET DISPUTE.** Vol. I. EDITED BY WILLIAM E. GRIFFITH. (Cambridge: The M.I.T. Press, 1964. 406 pages and index, \$12.50.)

Little systematic research has been published either on the great changes in European communism since Stalin's death or on the role of the various European Communist parties in the most climactic of recent developments in the Communist world—the Sino-Soviet rift. This study deals with the Yugoslav, Polish, Hungarian, and Italian Communist parties and the changes wrought in them as a consequence of the growing Moscow-Peking cleavage.

The essays, written by four eminent European journalists and historians, are carefully researched, thoughtful, and illuminating. They provide a valuable perspective on an important phase in the evolution of the Communist parties in these European countries.

A.Z.R.

**POLITICAL POWER: USA/USSR.** By ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI AND SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON. (New York: The Viking Press, 1964. 450 pages and index, \$7.50.)

In this work the authors have made a major contribution toward the comparative study of political systems. Such study of democratic systems is already highly developed; that of dictatorial systems is rapidly developing; but, except in a formal structural-institutional sense, relatively little has been done to compare democratic with dictatorial systems. But now Brzezinski and Huntington have moved to fill the need.

The authors have produced an important study, but in a seminal rather than a definitive sense. Their conclusions depend too much on speculation or informed guess to

be really conclusive; they have, however, provided their readers with keen insights and thought-provoking suggestions and have indicated lines along which further research may be profitably conducted.

G. W. Thumm  
Bates College

**SOCIALIST THOUGHT: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY.** EDITED BY ALBERT FRIED AND RONALD SANDERS. (Chicago: Aldine Publishing Company, 1964. 544 pages, \$7.50.)

The generous range of selections which this volume offers is most useful in conveying an idea of the great variety of socialism that Europe has produced since the latter eighteenth century. It will serve as a refreshing corrective for those who—perhaps unconsciously—look for the kernel of all socialism in Marx's grim economics, or Owenite communities, or Lenin's conspiratorial revolution-making, or the trade-union orientation of a Lassale or Jaurès. But, if it was their purpose to establish a kind of "mainstream socialism," this certainly does not emerge from the excerpts included.

The trouble with calling these excerpts a "documentary history," or even an approach to history, is that so much of socialism was written in terms of organizational work, intellectually unexciting debates over programs and tactics, and in the active careers of certain meteoric personalities. Even if this volume is not good history, the editors do find a focal point in the growth of appreciation of the human personality within the context of doctrines which at first threaten to reduce this personality to an uninspiring function of its environment.

Robert J. Osborn  
University of Pennsylvania

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## CURRENT DOCUMENTS

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### 1965 State of the Union Message

*On the evening of January 4, President Lyndon B. Johnson presented his 1965 "State of the Union" message to the United States Congress. Excerpts from this address follow:*

\* \* \*

We are entering the third century of the pursuit of American Union.

Two hundred years ago, in 1765, nine assembled colonies first joined together to demand freedom from arbitrary power.

For the first century we struggled to hold together the first continental union of democracy in the history of man. One hundred years ago, in 1865, following a terrible test of blood and fire, the compact of union was finally sealed.

For a second century we labored to establish a unity of purpose and interest among the many groups which make up the American community.

That struggle has often brought pain and violence. It is not yet over. But we have achieved a unity of interest among our people unmatched in the history of freedom.

And now, in 1965, we begin a new quest for union. We seek the unity of man with the world he has built—with the knowledge that can save or destroy him—with the cities which can stimulate or stifle him—with the wealth and machines which can enrich or menace his spirit.

We seek to establish a harmony between man and society which will allow each of us to enlarge the meaning of his life and all of us to elevate the quality of our civilization.

But the unity we seek cannot realize its full promise in isolation. For today the state of the Union depends, in large measure, upon the state of the world.

\* \* \*

Yet we still live in a troubled and perilous world. There is no longer a single threat. There are many. They differ in intensity and danger. They require different attitudes and different answers.

With the Soviet Union we seek peaceful understanding that can lessen the danger to freedom. . . .

If we are to live together in peace, we must come to know each other better.

I am sure the American people would welcome a chance to listen to the Soviet leaders on our tele-

vision—as I would like the Soviet people to hear our leaders.

I hope the new Soviet leaders can visit America so they can learn about this country at first hand.

In Eastern Europe restless nations are slowly beginning to assert their identity. Your Government, assisted by leaders in labor and business, is exploring ways to increase peaceful trade with these countries and the Soviet Union. I will report our conclusions to the Congress.

In Asia, Communism wears a more aggressive face.

We see that in Vietnam.

Why are we there?

We are there, first, because a friendly nation has asked us for help against Communist aggression. Ten years ago we pledged our help. Three Presidents have supported that pledge. We will not break it.

Second, our own security is tied to the peace of Asia. Twice in one generation we have had to fight against aggression in the Far East. To ignore aggression would only increase the danger of a larger war.

Our goal is peace in Southeast Asia. That will come only when aggressors leave their neighbors in peace.

What is at stake is the cause of freedom. In that cause we shall never be found wanting.

But Communism is not the only source of trouble and unrest. There are older and deeper sources—in the misery of nations and in man's irrepressible ambition for liberty and a better life.

With the free republics of Latin America I have always felt—and my country has always felt—special ties of interest and affection. It will be the purpose of this Administration to strengthen these ties. . . .

In the Atlantic community we continue to pursue our goal of 20 years—a Europe growing in strength, unity and cooperation with America. A great unfinished task is the reunification of Germany through self-determination.

This European policy is not based on any abstract design. It is based on the realities of common interests and common values, common dangers and common expectations. These realities will continue to have their way—especially in our expanding trade and our common defense.

Free Americans have shaped the policies of the United States. And because we know these realities, those policies have been, and will be, in the interest of Europe.

Free Europeans must shape the course of Europe. And, for the same reasons, that course has been, and will be, in our interest and the interest of freedom. . . .

In Africa and Asia we are witnessing the turbulent unfolding of new nations and continents.

We welcome them to the society of nations.

We are committed to help those seeking to strengthen their own independence, and to work most closely with those governments dedicated to the welfare of all their people. . . .

Finally, we renew our commitment to the continued growth and effectiveness of the United Nations. The frustrations of the United Nations are a product of the world we live in, not of the institution which gives them voice.

\* \* \*

World affairs will continue to call upon our energy and courage.

But today we can turn increased attention to the character of American life.

We are in the midst of the greatest upward surge of economic well-being in the history of any nation.

Our flourishing progress has been marked by price stability unequalled in the world. Our balance of payments deficit has declined and the soundness of our dollar is unquestioned. I pledge to keep it that way. I urge business and labor to cooperate to that end.

We worked for two centuries to climb this peak of prosperity.

But we are only at the beginning of the road to the Great Society. . . .

The Great Society asks not only how much, but how good; not only how to create wealth but how to use it; not only how fast we are going, but where we are headed.

It proposes as the first test for a nation: the quality of its people. . . .

Tonight we accept that challenge.

I propose we begin a program in education to insure every American child the fullest development of his mind and skills.

I propose we begin a massive attack on crippling and killing diseases.

I propose we launch a national effort to make the American city a better . . . place to live.

I propose we increase the beauty of America and

end the poisoning of our rivers and the air we breathe.

I propose we carry out a new program to develop regions of our country now suffering from distress and depression.

I propose we make new efforts to control and prevent crime and delinquency.

I propose we eliminate every remaining obstacle to the right and opportunity to vote. . . .

Our basic task is three fold:

¶To keep our economy growing.

¶To open for all Americans the opportunities now enjoyed by most Americans.

¶To improve the quality of life for all.

In the next six weeks I will submit special messages with detailed proposals for national action in each of these areas.

Tonight I would like briefly to explain some of my major recommendations. . . .

First, we must keep our nation prosperous. We seek full employment opportunity for every American. I will present a budget designed to move the economy forward. More money will be left in the hands of the consumer by a substantial cut in excise taxes. We will continue along the path toward a balanced budget and a balanced economy.

I confidently predict—what every economic sign now tells us—the continued flourishing of the American economy.

But we must remember that fear of a recession can contribute to the fact of a recession. The knowledge that our Government will, and can, move swiftly will strengthen the confidence of investors and business.

Congress can reinforce this confidence by insuring that its procedures permit rapid action on temporary income tax cuts. And special funds for job-creating public programs should be made available for immediate use if recession threatens.

Our continued prosperity demands continued price stability. Business, labor and the consumer all have a high stake in keeping wages and prices within the framework of the guideposts that have already served the nation so well.

Finding new markets abroad for our goods depends on the initiative of American business. But we stand ready—with credit and other help—to assist the flow of trade which will benefit the entire nation.

Our economy owes much to the efficiency of our farmers. We must continue to assure them the opportunity to earn a fair reward. I have instructed the Secretary of Agriculture to lead a major effort to find new approaches to reduce the heavy cost of our farm programs and to direct more of our effort to the small farmer who needs help most.

We can help insure continued prosperity through:

¶A regional recovery program to assist develop-

ment of stricken areas left behind by our national progress.

¶Further efforts to provide our workers with the skills demanded by modern technology, for the laboring man is an indispensable force in the American system.

¶Extension of the minimum wage to more than two million unprotected workers.

¶Improvement and modernization of the unemployment compensation system.

As pledged in our 1960 and 1964 Democratic platforms, I will propose to Congress changes in the Taft-Hartley Act including section 14-B. I will do so hoping to reduce conflicts that for several years have divided Americans in various states.

In a country that spans a continent modern transportation is vital to continued growth.

I will recommend heavier reliance on competition in transportation and a new policy for our Merchant Marine.

I will ask for funds to study high-speed rail transportation between urban centers. We will begin with test projects between Boston and Washington. On high-speed trains, passengers could travel this distance in less than four hours.

Second, we must open opportunity to all our people.

Most Americans tonight enjoy a good life. But far too many are still trapped in poverty, idleness and fear.

Let a just nation throw open to them the city of promise:

¶To the elderly, by providing hospital care under Social Security and by raising benefit payments to those struggling to maintain the dignity of their later years.

¶To the poor, through doubling the war against poverty this year.

¶To Negro Americans, through enforcement of the Civil Rights Law and elimination of barriers to the right to vote.

¶To those in other lands seeking the promise of America, through an immigration law based on the work a man can do and not where he was born or how he spells his name.

Our third goal is to improve the quality of American life.

We begin with learning.

Every child must have the best education our nation can provide. . . .

In addition to our existing programs, I will recommend a new program for schools and students with a first-year authorization of one billion, 500 million dollars. . . .

New laboratories and centers will help our schools lift their standards of excellence and explore new methods of teaching. These centers will provide special training for those who need and deserve special treatment.

Greatness requires not only an educated people but a healthy people. . . .

We already carry on a large program for research and health.

In addition, regional medical centers can provide the most advanced diagnosis and treatment for heart disease, cancer, stroke and other major diseases.

New support for medical and dental education will provide the trained men to apply our knowledge.

Community centers can help the mentally ill and improve health care for school-age children from poor families, including services for the mentally retarded.

An educated and healthy people require surroundings in harmony with their hopes. . . .

In our urban areas the central problem today is to protect and restore man's satisfaction in belonging to a community where he can find security and significance. . . .

New and existing programs will be open to those cities which work together to develop unified long-range policies for metropolitan areas.

We must also make important changes in our housing programs if we are to pursue these same basic goals.

A department of housing and urban development will be needed to spearhead this effort in our cities.

Every citizen has the right to feel secure in his home and on the streets of his community.

To help control crime, we will recommend programs:

¶To train local enforcement officers.

¶To put the best techniques of modern science at their disposal.

¶To discover the causes of crime and better ways to prevent it.

I will soon assemble a panel of outstanding experts to search out answers to the national problems of crime and delinquency.

For over three centuries the beauty of America has sustained our spirit and enlarged our vision. We must act now to protect this heritage. . . .

A new and substantial effort must be made to landscape highways and provide places of relaxation and recreation wherever our roads run.

Within our cities imaginative programs are needed to landscape streets and transform open areas into places of beauty and recreation.

We will seek legal power to prevent pollution of our air and water before it happens. We will step up our effort to control harmful wastes, giving first priority to the cleanup of our most contaminated rivers. We will increase research to learn more about control of pollution. . . .

To help promote and honor creative achievement.

*(Continued on page 182)*

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## YUGOSLAVIA

(Continued from page 153)

hovic'). Second, the Party remains centralized, hierarchical, élitist. Expectations of a democratization of Party political life, especially with respect to the right of a dissenting minority to carry on its criticism and discussion of Party policy, proved premature. The congress rejected such proposals of the "liberal" faction which were aired at the sixth plenum of the Party's central committee nine months earlier, in March, 1964. Instead the leadership emphasized the Leninist character of the Party, with its restrictions on criticism and on open opposition to established Party policy. Third, the congress called for more active recruitment among young workers and for renewed efforts to combat "bureaucratism" and persisting "local nationalisms." (There are approximately one million members of the L.Y.C., only one-third of whom are workers.)

### WHITHER YUGOSLAVIA?

Yugoslavia has been described as a country with one capital, two alphabets, three languages, four religions, five nationalities, and six republics.<sup>1</sup> Its society has an attractive vitality. The people are straightforward and friendly to foreigners. They welcome foreign guests in their homes with a warmth and hospitality that make an American feel more at home than in most places in Europe. Yugoslavia is a Communist country, but its Communist party chooses, in the words of a former American ambassador, "To let people be people"; it does not want to create a "new Yugoslav man."

In a real sense, the objectives and methods of the regime have been accepted by the country. Such opposition as exists is frag-

<sup>1</sup> The capital is Belgrade; the two alphabets are the Cyrillic and the Latin; the three languages are Serbo-Croatian, Slovenian, and Macedonian; the four religions: Muslim, Protestant, Roman Catholic, and Greek Orthodox; the five nationalities: Croatian, Macedonian, Montenegrin, Serbian, Slovenian; and the six republics: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, and Slovenia.

mented, politically inert, unable to agree on any issue having an emotional claim on popular sentiment, and incapable of reversing the direction of postwar social and economic change. During the past decade and a half, Yugoslavia has experienced a startling transformation. From a Stalinist prototype of "socialism" it has moved toward the establishment of institutions and procedures committed to democratic processes.

There is good reason to believe that the Yugoslav leadership is sincere in its efforts to take another major step along its "road to socialism": a road along which governmental power is diffused throughout the system with the intent to strengthen institutions functioning at the local level. But there is also no doubt that it intends to accomplish these advances in individual and material well-being within a system that ensures the concentration of ultimate political decision-making authority in the hands of the Communist party.

Can a society function effectively and productively under a decentralizing system which permits ultimate political power to remain highly centralized? Yugoslavia is groping its way toward increasingly nonauthoritarian solutions to its complex problems; the operation of the new constitution will be a measure of its success.

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## POLAND

(Continued from page 160)

the P.Z.P.R. probably in order to advance their careers.

Party organizations in government offices, and other institutions, do not play their proper role in making the Polish administrative apparatus more efficient, according to the statement of position adopted by the fifteenth central committee plenum.<sup>40</sup> Within their own primary Party organizations (cells), the principle of democratic centralism is being violated. Another basic weakness, in the rural areas, is illustrated by the admission that

<sup>40</sup> See XV plenum KC PZPR: *Tezy* (Warsaw: Ksiazka i Wiedza, 1964), pp. 130-147.

over 13,000 of the 40,000 villages have no basic Party units. Full-time paid apparatus workers number only 7,180 for the entire country.<sup>41</sup>

Nor does the social composition of the P.Z.P.R. even approximate what the leadership desires, namely an absolute majority of the urban proletariat in its so-called united workers' movement. The position statement had acknowledged this weakness and indicated that a number of organizations and Party authorities "do not show the appropriate feeling of responsibility toward a correct regulation of the P.Z.P.R. social composition." Official statistics<sup>42</sup> disclose that the intelligentsia (44 per cent) leads the industrial workers (40 per cent), who are trailed by the peasants (11 per cent) and others, meaning pensioners, housewives, and artisans (5 per cent).

In conclusion, it should be mentioned that the P.Z.P.R. political bureau has been expanded in numbers to fifteen persons, including three candidate members (see Table III). This latter category was discontinued when Gomulka returned to office on October 21, 1956, and only now has been reinstated. Of the six new Politburocrats, elected in June and November, 1964, not one suffered during the Stalinist period (1949–1956) in Poland. On the contrary, all could be identified in varying degrees with the "personality cult." They participated in the mass repressions against the populace and held Party or government posts of responsibility during those years. In fact, Gomulka had dropped only one of them (Eugeniusz Szyr) from his cabinet-level position, although the man's expertise in economic affairs continued to be used even during his temporary eclipse.

The recent expansion of the Politburo appears to represent a consistent and obvious parallelism with developments initiated by Gomulka on the governmental side as far back as 1959, when the number of deputy premiers

was increased. That change has signified a tightening of policy in agriculture, education, military security, and economic planning.<sup>43</sup> The promotions within the Party hierarchy during the second half of 1964 can be interpreted similarly, in view of the fact that the P.Z.P.R. controls policy behind the façade of a traditional Western-type governmental apparatus. At a time, when some liberalization is being permitted by certain other Communist regimes of Eastern Europe, Gomulka pushes toward greater conformity.

## CZECHOSLOVAKIA

(Continued from page 174)

doubtedly in the rigid and unchanging character of the Czechoslovak Communist leadership.

It is true that a number of top-ranking Stalinists were at long last demoted in 1963. Nonetheless, the demoted Stalinists have not been replaced by men of discernibly more liberal views.

The amazing durability of the ruling Czechoslovak oligarchs has once again been demonstrated by the unanimous reelection of the Party's first secretary, Antonín Novotný, as rigid a Communist and as typical an *aparatchik* as one can imagine, to another term as president of Czechoslovakia.

Finally, a few words should be said about the position of Czechoslovakia within the "Socialist World System," as the Communists call the Communist-controlled part of the world. As is true elsewhere in Communist East Europe, Czechoslovakia's dependence on, and subservience to, Moscow has been somewhat lessened in the last two years. The iron curtain has been lifted a little bit for outgoing traffic, allowing more Czechoslovakians to visit "bourgeois countries"; and it has been virtually thrust open for ingoing traffic as Czechoslovakia has stepped up her efforts to get a larger share of Western tourist business. The regime has also become recently less adamant in barring the entry of Western culture and has even embarked, though with considerable reluctance, on a

<sup>41</sup> Kliszko in *IV Zjazd PZPR*, p. 237.

<sup>42</sup> Gomulka's speech in enclosure to *Trybuna Ludu* (June 16, 1964).

<sup>43</sup> See R. F. Staar, "Poland Steps Backward," *The New Leader*, XLII, No. 47 (December 21, 1959), pp. 12–14.

modest program of cultural exchange with capitalist countries.<sup>31</sup> As stated earlier, it has endeavored vigorously to increase Czechoslovakia's trade with the capitalist West.

However, in spite of small openings toward the West, Communist Czechoslovakia continues to be among the most obedient and most submissive members of the Soviet orbit, deferring faithfully to the Soviet line in all significant matters of Communist policy and strategy, whether it be the Soviet quarrel with China, the Congo problem, or another issue. While much of this loyalty stems from the identity of views and mutuality of interests of the two Communist regimes, an even more decisive determinant of Soviet-Czechoslovak mentor-pupil relations has been the continued need for Soviet backing without which the political survival of the present Communist rulers of Czechoslovakia would be in doubt.

<sup>31</sup> A typical recent example is the conclusion of a protocol on cultural cooperation with France in October, 1964. See *Svobodné slovo*, October 8, 1964.

## U. S. POLICY

(Continued from page 134)

policy with regard to possible disengagement in Central Europe has been influenced for quite some time by consideration for West Germany, the strongest and possibly most faithful United States ally in Europe. For obvious reasons, West Germany is opposed to any relaxation in East-West relations, since any "deal" between the United States and the Soviet Union would, in practice, mean the acceptance of the *status quo*, which for the Federal Republic implies not only acceptance of the division of Germany but also recognition of the Oder-Neisse Line and the incorporation of the eastern German territories into Poland.<sup>18</sup> No self-respecting German politician is likely to accept this for some time. In a sense, it is up to the West Germans to establish some kind of *modus vivendi* with Eastern Europe.<sup>19</sup>

If the United States were to attempt dis-

engagement alone, i.e., without West German agreement, it would be faced with the certainty of alienating its strongest ally without being absolutely certain that the various East European regimes would immediately take advantage of the relaxation to assert their independence from Moscow. In these circumstances, perhaps other approaches should be tried which might accomplish the same thing.

One of them might conceivably be a recognition of the Oder-Neisse line as the permanent frontier between Poland and the future all-German state. It is rather obvious that United States refusal to grant such recognition is probably the strongest link tying Poland to the Soviet Union. So long as that recognition is withheld and so long as West Germany refuses to face reality, the Poles, and to some extent the Czechs, have little choice but to stick close to the Soviet Union as the sole guarantor of their territorial integrity.

Since recognition of the Oder-Neisse line would have the same effect on Germany as disengagement, the United States is not in a position to undertake this at present. At the same time the United States should make it clear that it applauds the official West German promise not to recapture the lost territories by force and should encourage Germany to improve relations with Eastern Europe with a view to arriving at some type of settlement.<sup>20</sup> Similarly, the United States should maintain its present attitude with regard to East Germany and, in this way, increase the isolation of the Ulbricht regime in Eastern Europe. By making this isolation more conspicuous the United States would add to a further weakening of East Germany.

<sup>18</sup> For a recent account of the German attitudes toward disengagement, see A. Dalma, "The Risks of a Détente Policy to Central Europe," in A. Wolfers, ed., *Changing East-West Relations and the Unity of the West*, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1964). See also Kennan, *op. cit.*, pp. 45-49.

<sup>19</sup> As a first step it has been suggested that West Germany modify the so-called Hallstein Doctrine which prevents establishment of diplomatic relations with Eastern Europe. Z. Brzezinski, "Threat and Opportunity in the Communist Schism," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 41, No. 3, April, 1963, p. 521.

<sup>20</sup> See Secretary Rusk's interview on German television. *Department of State Bulletin*, No. 1309, July 27, 1964, p. 107.

Another possibility would be to continue the gradual abandonment of the highly controversial MLF idea, making it clear that we do not intend to equip West Germany with nuclear weapons under any circumstances. There is little doubt that there is a genuine fear of Germany in at least some East European countries and that strengthening German military potential reinforces the links between the Soviet Union and her East European allies.<sup>21</sup>

Aside from attempting to get out from under the German veto of our policy *vis-a-vis* Eastern Europe, the United States should explore other directions. We could, for example, support the growing regional economic integration of some East European countries (e.g., Poland and Czechoslovakia) in order to put them in a better position to resist Soviet economic pressure and to make them less dependent on Soviet deliveries of raw materials and other commodities.

Perhaps the Common Market countries could be persuaded to arrange for some special relationship with Eastern Europe so that the inevitable reduction in trade with the Russians would be as painless as possible.<sup>22</sup> We could emphasize our belief that Eastern Europe was, is, and always will be an integral part of Europe.<sup>23</sup>

In our dealings with Eastern Europe there is another factor which seems likely to complicate our relations more and more. It now appears that another of our allies, France, is trying to wrest the initiative from our hands. For some time General Charles de Gaulle, President of France, has been making overtures to Eastern Europe, stressing his concept of "Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals."

<sup>21</sup> For a discussion of Soviet bloc attitudes toward MLF, see Z. Brzezinski, "Moscow and the MLF: Hostility and Ambivalence," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 43, No. 1, October, 1964.

<sup>22</sup> In the same vein the United States supported Poland's application for permission to participate in the "Kennedy round" negotiations at Geneva. *The New York Times*, May 6, 1964.

<sup>23</sup> This has been the most recent trend in official pronouncements concerning Eastern Europe. Cf. G. McGhee, "Eastern Europe: A Region in Ferment," *Department of State Bulletin*, No. 1325, November 16, 1964. Mr. McGhee is the U.S. Ambassador to West Germany.

This French initiative could prove to be successful in the long run, particularly in relation to de Gaulle's insistence on an indivisible Europe. If West European countries were to follow this French line we might find ourselves alone with West Germany, still adhering to policies already abandoned by everybody else.

While the change in the United States attitude toward Eastern Europe has been rather striking since World War II, its present policy is essentially static and short-run. If the United States is truly interested in what happens in Eastern Europe and in detaching the area from Soviet control, it must move on fronts other than the traditional bridges of aid, trade and cultural exchange, even at the cost of antagonizing temporarily our closest allies. The risks are great but the stakes are high.

## STATE OF THE UNION

(Continued from page 178)

ments, I will propose a national foundation of the arts.

To develop knowledge which will enrich our lives and ensure our progress, I will recommend programs to encourage basic science, particularly in the universities—and to bring closer the day when the oceans will supply our growing need for fresh water.

For Government to serve these goals it must be modern in structure, efficient in action and ready for any emergency.

I am currently reviewing the structure of the Executive Branch. I hope to reshape and reorganize it to meet more effectively the tasks of today.

Wherever waste is found, I will eliminate it.

Last year we saved almost 3.5 billion dollars by eliminating waste.

I intend to do better this year.

And I will soon report to you on our progress and on new economies we plan to make.

Even the best of Government is subject to the worst of hazards.

I will propose laws to ensure the necessary continuity of leadership should the President become disabled or die.

In addition, I will propose reforms in the Electoral College—leaving undisturbed the vote by states—but making sure no elector can substitute his will for that of the people.

\* \* \*

# THE MONTH IN REVIEW

*A CURRENT HISTORY Chronology covering the most important events of January, 1965, to provide a day-by-day summary of world affairs.*

## INTERNATIONAL

### Arab League

Jan. 12—Ending a 4-day meeting in Cairo, 13 Arab premiers issue a communiqué announcing a common policy against countries recognizing Israel in the future or assisting "Israel's aggressive military efforts." The communiqué also discloses agreement on plans for preventing Israel's diversion of the Jordan River's waters.

### Disarmament

Jan. 19—The Atomic Energy Commission announces that a large Soviet underground explosion last week released radioactive debris beyond Soviet territory; the 1963 test ban treaty permits underground tests if radioactivity is not released beyond national borders.

Jan. 25—The Soviet Ambassador to the U.S. tells U.S. Secretary of State Dean Rusk that the Soviet Union did not violate the test ban treaty in its recent underground test. He declares that any radioactivity released was "insignificant."

### European Economic Community (Common Market)

Jan. 14—The E.E.C. discloses a 2-stage plan, approved yesterday by its Executive Commission, for eliminating all industrial trade tariffs within the E.E.C. by July 1, 1967.

### United Nations

Jan. 7—President Sukarno of Indonesia declares that "since Malaysia has become a Security Council member, I declare that Indonesia has walked out of the United Nations."

Jan. 13—U.N. Secretary-General U Thant asks U.S. representative Adlai Stevenson

and Soviet representative Nikolai Fedorenko to meet with him separately to discuss the crisis over payments of arrears.

Jan. 18—The U.N. General Assembly reconvenes. Assembly President Alex Quaison-Sackey urges U.N. members to give voluntary donations to the U.N., to resume normal voting procedures, and to avoid a showdown over payment of arrears.

Jan. 21—The Latin American bloc at the U.N. refuses to withdraw its opposition candidate for the chairmanship of the General Assembly's Political Committee, as requested by President Quaison-Sackey. Under a plan drawn up by Quaison-Sackey and U Thant, the unanimous election of 17 Assembly vice-presidents and 7 committee chairmen would be included in a settlement of the U.N. arrears crisis.

In a formal letter presented to U Thant, the Indonesian government resigns from the U.N.

### Warsaw Pact

Jan. 19—in Warsaw, members of the Political Advisory Committee of the Communist bloc's Warsaw Pact open talks. Soviet Premier Aleksei Kosygin and Communist party First Secretary Leonid I. Brezhnev are present.

Jan. 20—The talks end.

Jan. 22—A communiqué is released, declaring that the Warsaw Pact members will act to defend themselves if a nuclear force under Nato is established.

### World Council of Churches

Jan. 19—The Council's central committee approves a plan setting up an 8-man group to discuss with the Vatican problems of interfaith unity.

## ARGENTINA

Jan. 5—Students disrupt a Peronist rally in Buenos Aires and berate Peronist leaders for failing to keep their promise to bring ex-dictator Juan D. Peron home from exile in 1964.

## BRITISH COMMONWEALTH OF NATIONS, THE

### Canada

Jan. 25—It is announced that Canada has sold 27 million bushels of wheat valued at \$54 million to Communist China.

### Great Britain

Jan. 4—It is reported by sources in London that last month Britain used all of a \$1 billion credit and part of a \$3 billion loan to bolster the price of sterling.

Jan. 5—The Foreign Office announces that Sir Patrick Dean has been appointed ambassador to the U.S., replacing Lord Harlech.

Jan. 12—It is reported that Britain has agreed to remove most of her 1,500 troops from El Adem, Libya, and will also recall British troops from the area around Tripoli.

Jan. 14—Some 10,000 aircraft workers demonstrate in London against dropping production of the TSR-2, a jet bomber plane which (reportedly) will be replaced by the American F-111.

Jan. 15—It is announced that Prime Minister Harold Wilson will visit the U.S., the U.N. and Canada in February.

The Foreign Office announces that Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko will visit British leaders in March.

Jan. 18—The government announces that in December, the trade gap was cut by one-half with exports up and imports declining.

Jan. 20—Minister of Aviation Roy Jenkins tells the Commons that Britain will honor its commitment to develop a supersonic airliner, the *Concorde*, in cooperation with France.

Jan. 21—In a by-election last night, Foreign Secretary Patrick Gordon Walker is defeated by his Conservative party opponent in Leyton. Minister of Technology Frank

Cousins is victorious in the by-election in Nuneaton.

Jan. 22—Gordon Walker resigns after his third unsuccessful attempt to win a required seat in Parliament. Minister for Education and Science Michael Stewart becomes foreign secretary. Anthony Crosland, economic secretary to the Treasury, is named education and science minister.

Jan. 24—Sir Winston Churchill, prime minister during World War II and again in the 1950's, dies at the age of 90.

Jan. 30—Representatives of 110 nations attend the state funeral for Sir Winston Churchill.

Jan. 31—R. A. Butler, former foreign secretary and member of the Conservative party, is given a life peerage by Queen Elizabeth; he retires from politics to become a master at Trinity College, Cambridge.

### India

Jan. 7—The government announces that starting in February, rationing of rice, wheat and sugar will be introduced in New Delhi.

Jan. 25—in the state of Madras, students demonstrate against the adoption of Hindi as the official language of India, effective tomorrow.

Jan. 26—A 22-year old Indian in the city of Madras immolates himself to protest the adoption of Hindi.

Jan. 27—in Madras city, another Indian burns himself to death in the language conflict.

### Malaysia, Federation of

Jan. 4—An Indonesian landing party is seized in Malaysian waters. Prince Abdul Rahman, the Prime Minister, declares after an emergency cabinet meeting that Malaysia will fight Indonesian forces "under the rule of hot pursuit," if necessary.

Jan. 8—14 Indonesians land in Malaya; several are captured by Malaysian forces. British Army Minister Fred Mulley warns that Indonesian aggression will not go unchallenged.

Jan. 15—Army Minister Mulley ends a 3-day

trip to North Borneo, the site of a British troop buildup.

Jan. 20—It is disclosed that the British government has ordered its troops to follow Indonesian invaders in "hot pursuit" if absolutely necessary.

## Nigeria

Jan. 4—In a radio broadcast, President Nnamdi Azikiwe announces that he will ask Prime Minister Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa to form a new government. The Prime Minister's National Alliance was victorious in the December 30 election boycotted by southern supporters of the United Progressive Grand Alliance. New elections are promised in districts that were heavily boycotted.

Jan. 7—Prime Minister Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa names a new cabinet. It will be reorganized after elections are completed.

## Pakistan

Jan. 2—Unofficial but nearly complete returns disclose that Field Marshal Mohammad Ayub Khan has been elected president for a 5-year term. His opponent, Miss Fatima Jinnah, supported by 5 different groups, is defeated almost 2 to 1.

Jan. 4—Following a victory parade for President Ayub in Karachi, violence erupts between Ayub and Jinnah supporters. Some 23 persons are dead and hundreds are injured.

## BURUNDI

Jan. 15—Premier Pierre Ngendandumwe is assassinated.

Jan. 21—It is announced that a Watusi clerk employed at the U.S. Embassy in Burundi has confessed to the Premier's murder.

## CHINA, PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF (Communist)

Jan. 3—At a plenary meeting of the National People's Congress, Liu Shao-chi, Chief-of-State, and other government officials are reelected. Liu reappoints Premier Chou En-lai.

Jan. 28—Visiting Indonesian Foreign Minister Subandrio and Communist Chinese Foreign Minister Chen Yi sign a joint statement: China supports Indonesia against Malaysia in return for which Indonesia endorses Communist hostility toward Western intervention in Indochina.

## CONGO, REPUBLIC OF THE (Leopoldville)

Jan. 2—The Ministry of the Interior issues a communiqué announcing that legislative elections have been postponed from the first 2 weeks of February to the last 2 weeks of March.

Jan. 10—It is reported that informed sources in Stanleyville have told of the execution of some 500 persons since Stanleyville was recaptured by government troops in late November, 1964.

Jan. 13—Premier Moise Tshombe cancels his trip to Belgium following the arrival there of Cyrille Adoula, ex-premier, who has recently called for Tshombe's removal. A delegation will be sent to discuss specific financial matters.

Jan. 14—It is reported that Belgian Foreign Minister Paul-Henri Spaak has told Tshombe that Adoula came to Brussels uninvited.

Jan. 23—Radio reports disclose that a rebel force from the former French Congo has taken Nkolo.

Jan. 25—It is reported that Premier Tshombe has signed a decree outlawing an opposition weekly publication, *L'Action*.

Jan. 26—Tshombe announces that he will leave for talks in Belgium tomorrow.

## CUBA

Jan. 2—In a military parade celebrating the 6th anniversary of Premier Fidel Castro's government, new Soviet military planes and missiles are displayed.

## FRANCE

(See *British Commonwealth, Great Britain*)

Jan. 7—The Bank of France issues a communiqué announcing that shortly it will ask the U.S. to convert 150 million U.S.

dollars into gold.

Jan. 11—Rumanian Foreign Minister Corneliu Manescu, in Paris, signs a 5-year cultural exchange agreement with France. He reveals that France and Rumania will sign an economic pact.

Minister of Information Alain Peyrefitte returns from a 3-day trip to the U.S.S.R.; he has negotiated an agreement with Moscow to exchange radio and television programs.

Jan. 12—Janos Peter and Maurice Couve de Murville, the Hungarian and French foreign ministers respectively, confer in Paris.

Jan. 19—West German Chancellor Ludwig Erhard confers with President Charles de Gaulle at Rambouillet (de Gaulle's chateau).

Jan. 21—It is reported by a "source" in Paris that de Gaulle has promised to support a meeting of the Big Four foreign ministers on German reunification.

## **GERMANY, FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF (West)**

Jan. 7—*The New York Times* reports that in talks between Foreign Minister Gerhard Schröder and U.S. Ambassador George C. McGhee, Schröder outlined the West German plan for direct negotiation with East Germany on reunification.

Jan. 20—Chancellor Ludwig Erhard leaves for home after 2 days of talks in France with President de Gaulle. (See also *France*.)

Jan. 21—The *Bundesbank* (central bank) raises its discount rate from 3 to 3.5 per cent.

Jan. 22—The President of the *Bundesbank*, Karl Blessing, declares that West Germany may face a recession unless investments, and public and private spending are cut.

## **INDONESIA**

(See also *Intl*, *U.N.* and *British Commonwealth, Malaysia*)

Jan. 12—The Indonesian government declares that the British troop buildup in Malaysia is a preparation "for a major

military offensive" against Indonesia.

## **IRAN**

Jan. 21—Premier Hassan Ali Mansour is shot. His attacker is Mohammed Bokharali, a part-time student.

Jan. 26—Premier Mansour dies of bullet wounds.

Jan. 27—Shah Mohammed Riza Pahlevi names Finance Minister Amir Abbas Hoveida to serve as Premier.

## **IRELAND**

Jan. 14—Irish Republic Prime Minister Sean Lemass visits Northern Ireland's Prime Minister Terence M. O'Neill. It is the first meeting between Irish prime ministers since partition, over 40 years ago.

## **ISRAEL**

(See also *Intl*, *Arab League* and *Lebanon*)

Jan. 5—in an interview broadcast in Berlin, Israeli Premier Levi Eshkol urges that West Germany act to terminate the employment of West German rocket scientists by the U.A.R.

## **JAPAN**

Jan. 8—The Bank of Japan reduces its discount rate from 6.57 to 6.205 per cent.

Jan. 10—Premier Eisaku Sato departs for a visit to the U.S. (See also *U.S. Foreign Policy*.)

## **KUWAIT**

Jan. 3—The Prime Minister, Sheik Sabah al-Salim al-Sabah, names a new cabinet.

Jan. 5—The new cabinet is sworn in.

## **LAOS**

Jan. 13—The U.S. Defense Department announces that 2 Air Force jet planes have been shot down over central Laos.

Jan. 14—it is reported that yesterday U.S. jets destroyed a large and important bridge along the Ho Chi Minh trail. There is no confirmation of the attack by the U.S. government.

Jan. 16—*The New York Times* reports that according to "well-qualified sources,"

Communist China has built up its air defenses in the Communist-held sections of Vietnam, Laos and South China. Last week heavy anti-aircraft fire felled 2 U.S. jets.

Jan. 24—Six explosions at the military airport in Vientiane demolish 9 T-28 bomber-fighter planes and a reconnaissance plane. The airport is completely wrecked. The explosions are believed to have been accidental. There are no casualties.

Jan. 31—in Vientiane, army officers seize a radio station; they announce a *coup d'état* and plans to strengthen the army. Colonel Bounleut Sykosy leads mutinous troops against the Royal Lao army.

### LEBANON

Jan. 22—Parliament approves a plan to build a pumping station on the Wazzani River to divert the Jordan River waters from Israel. Parliament also empowers the government of Premier Hussein Oueini to call in Arab troops from other nations if necessary.

### PHILIPPINES, THE

Jan. 26—Some 5,000 Filipinos demonstrate before the U.S. embassy to demand that Philippine courts be given jurisdiction over U.S. soldiers involved in incidents with Filipinos on and off base.

### POLAND

Jan. 8—The Soviet Union announces that following 4 days of talks, ending yesterday, the Soviet Union and Poland signed an agreement providing for increased trade and for coordinating their economic development plans for 1966-1970.

### SPAIN

Jan. 23—it is reported that at a meeting yesterday, Generalissimo Francisco Franco and his cabinet approved the establishment of unofficial cultural and economic ties with Communist East Europe.

### SYRIA

Jan. 3—The Damascus radio announces that

the Presidency Council (highest executive body) has issued decrees ordering the nationalization, in whole or part, of the 107 principal industries.

### U.S.S.R.

(See also *Intl, Warsaw Pact and Poland*)  
Jan. 3—*Tass* (Soviet press agency) publishes a summary of a message sent by Premier Aleksei Kosygin to Chinese Communist Premier Chou En-lai, in which the Soviet Union supports the Chinese proposal for a world conference on disarmament.

Jan. 6—The British and Soviet governments sign a 5-year pact to exchange agricultural information.

Jan. 8—*The New York Times* reports that ex-Premier Nikita S. Khrushchev is living in his country house 24 miles outside of Moscow; he receives a monthly pension of \$330.

Jan. 9—The U.S. Ambassador, Foy D. Kohler, returns to Moscow from Washington talks. He declares that he would "not be surprised" if Soviet leaders were to meet with U.S. President Johnson.

*Tass* (Soviet press agency) announces that, beginning next week and through March 1, the Soviet Union will fire carrier rockets into the Pacific Ocean in a test series.

Jan. 11—an official announcement from London discloses that Premier Kosygin will visit Great Britain in the spring and that British Prime Minister Harold Wilson will visit Moscow later in the year.

Jan. 13—*Trud* (trade union newspaper) publishes a decision by the Council of National Economy to place 400 consumer-goods factories under a system of production reflecting demand. The changeover, commencing April 1, will be gradual.

Jan. 26—the Soviet government orders Richard Stolz, First Secretary at the U.S. embassy, to leave; he is accused of espionage.

Jan. 30—Frol Koslov, political figure under Khrushchev, dies.

Jan. 31—*Tass* announces that a Soviet delegation, headed by Premier Kosygin, will

visit North Vietnam "shortly."

### UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC, THE

- Jan. 20—President Gamal Abdel Nasser accepts the nomination to run for a third term; the election, in which he will run unopposed, will be held in March, 1965.
- Jan. 31—It is reported that the U.A.R. has requested the Congolese government to close its embassy in Cairo.

### UNITED STATES, THE

#### Economy

- Jan. 1—White House Press Secretary George Reedy announces that President Lyndon B. Johnson asked Gardner Ackley, chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers, to study the recent selective increases in the price of steel "and report to him."
- Jan. 7—The Labor Department reports that the unemployment rate in Dec., 1964, dropped to 4.9 per cent of the labor force.
- Jan. 14—The Commerce Department reports that in 1964 the Gross National Product reached \$622 billion, an increase of \$38 billion over 1963.
- Jan. 26—In a news conference, the chairman of the U.S. Steel Corporation, Roger Blough, declares that "the average price of steel during the past six years" has changed very little.
- Jan. 27—The Federal Reserve Board announces that in 1964 the U.S. gold loss equaled \$125 million, the lowest in 6 years.
- Jan. 28—in his economic report to Congress, Johnson predicts that the economy will remain healthy, but that the expected addition of a large teenage labor force will prevent a reduction in the unemployment rate. He proposes that the 25 per cent gold support requirement for U.S. currency be reduced. He promises to maintain the "gold value of the dollar at \$35 an ounce."

#### Foreign Policy

- (See also *Intl. Disarmament* and *U.N.*)
- Jan. 9—U.S. officials report that a State Department investigation of the shooting down of a U.S. private plane by the U.A.R. has revealed that the U.S. plane ignored

warnings to land.

Jan. 11—Japanese Premier Eisaku Sato arrives in the U.S. for a 2-day meeting with President Johnson.

Jan. 12—Premier Sato and Johnson confer for 90 minutes. In a speech and news conference afterwards, Sato declares that the Vietnam crisis cannot be solved by the West's "rational approach." He observes that Japan is well suited to act as a bridge between East and West. (See also *Vietnam*.)

Jan. 13—at the close of the Johnson-Sato talks, the White House issues a joint communiqué stating that Japan and the U.S. will consult closely on the situation in China.

Jan. 15—Canadian Prime Minister Lester B. Pearson arrives at the LBJ ranch in Texas.

Jan. 16—Pearson and Johnson sign an agreement eliminating tariffs on automobiles and auto parts at the manufacturers' level. Retailers and individuals will continue to pay duties.

At an informal news conference at his ranch, Johnson reaffirms U.S. support for a multilateral nuclear force (M.L.F.) within the Nato alliance.

Jan. 18—in a defense message to Congress, Johnson asserts that U.S. action in Laos is justified because "the problem of Laos is the refusal of the Communist forces to honor the Geneva accords."

In a statement prepared by the U.S. State Department, air missions against the Communists are called justifiable although the statement does not confirm that the U.S. is involved in bombing attacks such as the one on January 13 of a key bridge near Ban Ban. (See also *Laos*.)

Jan. 30—the State Department announces that the U.S. and the Soviet Union have agreed on increased cultural exchanges.

#### Government

- Jan. 1—it is announced that President Johnson has named Maurice M. Bernbaum, Ambassador to Ecuador, as Ambassador to Venezuela. Ambassador to Uruguay Wymberley De Coerr is named Ambassa-

dor to Ecuador.

Jan. 2—The Democratic members of the House of Representatives, meeting in party caucus, vote to relieve 2 Democrats of their seniority rights in their House committees. The two men, John B. Williams of Miss. and Albert W. Watson of S. Caro., supported the Republican ticket in the November, 1964, presidential election. Carl Albert of Okla. is chosen majority leader.

Jan. 4—At a caucus of the Republican members of the House of Representatives, Representative Charles A. Halleck of Ind. is defeated as minority leader by Gerald R. Ford Jr. of Mich.

The 89th Congress of the U.S. convenes. In the House, members approve rules changes, 224-201, to prevent the Rules Committee from blocking legislation for more than 21 days. John W. McCormack of Mass. is elected Speaker of the House.

In the Democratic caucus in the Senate, Russell B. Long of La. is elected majority whip; Mike Mansfield of Mont. is reelected majority leader. Republican Senators in party caucus reelect Everett M. Dirksen of Ill. as minority leader and Thomas Kuchel of Calif. as minority whip.

At a 9:00 p.m. session of the Congress, President Johnson delivers his State of the Union message. (For excerpts see pp. 176 ff. of this issue.)

Jan. 6—At the official count of the Electoral College, Congress in joint session certifies the election of President Lyndon Johnson and Vice-President Hubert Humphrey.

Jan. 7—in a special message to Congress, Johnson outlines a national health care program; first priority is given to medical care for the aged financed through the Social Security system.

In a federal indictment, 3 Russians and 1 former member of the U.S. Air Force, Robert Glenn Thompson, are accused of espionage.

Jan. 8—The Treasury Department issues a statement denying that France's decision to purchase gold or the speculation in gold on the London market will adversely affect

"the basic supply and demand situation that has prevailed in the gold and foreign exchange markets in recent months." (See also *France*.)

Jan. 12—In a special education message to Congress, President Johnson asks for a \$1.5 billion package to improve U.S. schools, including the establishment of "supplementary education centers" to be shared by public and private non-profit schools.

Jan. 13—President Johnson asks Congress for legislation to eliminate immigration quotas based on country of origin over a 5-year period. Instead, visas will be granted from a general pool with first preference given to those with special education or skills.

Jan. 14—In a foreign aid message, Johnson requests that Congress approve a \$3.38 billion foreign aid authorization for fiscal 1966, which begins July 1; \$2.21 billion will be used for economic aid and \$1.17 billion is earmarked for military assistance.

Jan. 15—John T. Connor receives Senate confirmation of his appointment as Secretary of Commerce. Connor has promised to place in trust \$1.6 million worth of stock in Merck and Co., which he served as president. The Senate also confirms Ralph Dungan as Ambassador to Chile and William Sullivan as Ambassador to Laos.

Johnson asks Congress to increase the budget of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, authorizing it to spend \$55 million during the next 4 years.

Jan. 17—President Johnson announces 88 new antipoverty projects at a cost of \$101.9 million.

Jan. 20—President Johnson and Vice-President Hubert Humphrey are sworn into office.

Jan. 22—in hearings before the Senate subcommittee on veterans affairs, 15 U.S. Senators protest the Administration's plan to close 14 V.A. hospitals.

Jan. 23—Early this morning, President Johnson enters the U.S. Naval Hospital at Bethesda, Md., for treatment of a respiratory infection. Mrs. Johnson later admits herself as a patient.

Jan. 25—President Johnson sends Congress a \$99.7 billion administrative budget plan, for the fiscal year beginning July 1. In this budget plan, social security, highways and medical care for the aged are to be financed in special ways and are not included. With the inclusion of these programs, total federal spending, or the cash budget, is estimated at \$127.4 billion. Defense spending is cut \$2.3 billion to a total of \$49 billion. Increased social security benefits are planned, along with a higher social security tax rate.

Jan. 26—President and Mrs. Johnson return to the White House from the Bethesda Naval Hospital.

The House adds an amendment to an appropriation bill for the Commodity Credit Corporation calling for a halt in foreign aid to the U.A.R. Some \$37 million in commodities, still due the U.A.R. under a 1962 agreement, would be affected.

Jan. 27—Senator J. W. Fulbright (Dem.-Ark.), chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, reveals that he will not serve as floor leader for the Administration's \$3.38 billion foreign aid bill.

The White House announces that Johnson and Humphrey have reached agreement on procedures for the Vice-President to follow in the event of presidential disability. It is patterned on the Kennedy-Johnson disability agreement of Aug., 1961.

Jan. 28—Acting Attorney General Nicholas deB. Katzenbach is named Attorney General by President Johnson.

In a message to Congress, Johnson proposes a constitutional amendment to provide for presidential disability and the resultant vice-presidential vacancy. He also asks for a reform of the Electoral College to prevent an elector from voting his own will.

## Labor

Jan. 8—Members of the International Longshoremen's Association in the Port of New York reject, by a 8,508-7,561 vote, a new

4-year contract containing an 80-cent-an-hour package increase. If the N.Y. local union strikes tomorrow, 60,000 longshoremen from Maine to Texas will join them.

Jan. 11—Longshoremen from Maine to Texas strike.

Jan. 16—The Railway Labor Executives Association (composed of the chiefs of the 22 railway unions) announces that it supports nationalization of the country's railroads.

Jan. 21—Longshoremen in the Port of New York vote to accept the contract they rejected earlier this month. However, their strike in N.Y. will continue until longshoremen in other ports have voted.

Jan. 25—A U.S. Court of Appeals refuses to rule on a lower court's temporary injunction against a strike by 3 railway shopcraft unions until it decides whether the 3 unions have the right to bargain for their members.

Jan. 27—Longshoremen in Baltimore, Md., refuse to accept a new contract patterned after that negotiated in N.Y.

Jan. 28—The N.Y. Shipping Association asks President Johnson to intervene in the N.Y. dock strike.

Jan. 30—The nation's railroads and 5 non-operating railroad unions reach agreement on the question of job security; the job of an employee with over 2 years of service can be abolished only if the employee dies, quits or retires.

## Military

Jan. 6—in a test flight, the wings of the F-111 (formerly the controversial TFX) are successfully folded back to 72 degrees.

Jan. 9—The Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy makes public testimony gathered during its investigation of the sinking of the nuclear submarine, *Thresher*, on April 10, 1963. The records show that poor workmanship, faulty piping in the ship's salt water system and poor design did not "insure safe operation."

Jan. 18—in a special message to Congress on the defense posture of the U.S., President Johnson discloses that a new nuclear

ballistic missile, the Poseidon, is being developed for use by nuclear submarines. The Poseidon will be twice as powerful and twice as accurate as the Polaris missile.

Jan. 19—Under the Gemini program, an unmanned spaceship is launched into a suborbital test flight. The head of the Air Force's Space Systems Division reports that "this flight confirms the fact that the Titan II launch vehicle is ready to put two men into space. . . ."

Navy Secretary Paul H. Nitze announces that the Brooklyn Navy Yard will close on June 30, 1966.

## **Politics**

Jan. 12—At a news conference in Phoenix, Ariz., with Barry Goldwater (Republican presidential candidate), William E. Miller (Republican vice-presidential candidate), Dean Burch (Republican National Chairman) and Ray C. Bliss (Ohio Republican chairman), it is announced that Bliss is to replace Burch as the Republican National Chairman.

Jan. 22—Barry Goldwater addresses a luncheon for Republican National Committee members, meeting in Chicago.

In Chicago, Dean Burch announces his resignation as Republican National Chairman. The Republican National Committee unanimously elects Ray Bliss to the post as of April 1.

## **Segregation**

Jan. 11—21 Negro athletes refuse to play in the American Football League's all-star game in New Orleans because of discrimination there. The game is shifted to Houston.

Jan. 15—A federal grand jury issues indictments in the slaying of 3 civil rights workers in Miss., in June, 1964. Federal Judge William Harold Cox orders the indictments kept secret until arrests are made.

The Justice Department files suit in Ala. charging that the new voter registration tests in Ala. are unduly harsh.

Jan. 16—U.S. marshals arrest the Neshoba

(Miss.) county sheriff, his chief deputy and 16 other men for illegally depriving the 3 slain civil rights workers of their civil rights.

Jan. 18—in Selma, Ala., Martin Luther King is punched and kicked by a white man when he registers in the Hotel Albert.

Jan. 20—The Georgia State Board of Education votes to sign a pledge promising to comply with the Civil Rights Act of 1964, thus ending the state's policy of segregated schools.

The Rev. Milton A. Galamison, leading a boycott of New York City's Public School 617 for the second day, is arrested. He charges that P.S. 617, a school for disruptive children, provides an inferior education. Most of the students are Negroes or Puerto Ricans.

Jan. 22—in Selma, Ala., 105 Negro public school teachers stand in line in a voter-registration demonstration. They are driven away by Sheriff James Clark and 5 deputies, who use clubs.

Jan. 23—A Federal District Judge in Mobile, Ala., orders Sheriff Clark to refrain from harassing people attempting legitimately to register or those assisting them.

Jan. 25—A 226-lb. Negro woman, Annie Lee Cooper, in line to register to vote in Selma, punches Sheriff Clark in the face. Three deputies wrestle her to the ground and the sheriff clubs her. She is arrested.

Jan. 27—Sheriff Lawrence Rainey, Horace Doyle Barnette (reported to have confessed) and 15 others plead not guilty to the murder of the 3 civil rights workers in Miss. James E. Jordan of Georgia, the 18th defendant, will be tried in Atlanta.

In Atlanta, 1,500 Negroes and whites attend a dinner in honor of Martin Luther King Jr.

## **Supreme Court**

Jan. 18—The Supreme Court resumes after a 30-day recess.

The Supreme Court reverses the conviction of Rev. B. Elton Cox for breach of peace and 2 other offenses connected with a civil rights demonstration in Louisi-

ana in 1961, on the grounds that Cox's freedom of speech and assembly had been abridged.

### VATICAN, THE

Jan. 5—It is announced that the fourth and closing session of Vatican II will convene on September 14, 1965.

Jan. 25—Pope Paul VI names 27 new cardinals, including 1 from the U.S. and 3 from Communist countries. The Sacred College of Cardinals now lists 103 members; numbering over 100 for the first time.

### VIETNAM, SOUTH

Jan. 2—The Vietnamese government suffers heavy losses of men and equipment at Binh Gia. Vietcong (pro-Communist) rebels withdraw and fighting subsides after 6 days.

Jan. 4—Thich Tam Chau, chairman of the Unified Buddhist Church's Institute for Secular Affairs, calls the government illegal because of the dissolution of the High National Council last month.

Jan. 9—A communiqué settling the struggle for power between political and military factions is signed by Phan Khac Suu, Chief of State, Premier Tran Van Huong, and Lieutenant General Nguyen Khanh, Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces. Khanh represents the clique of young generals who forced the dissolution of the High National Council. The agreement provides for power remaining in the hands of Huong's civilian government.

Jan. 11—Buddhist demonstrations against the Huong government are staged in 3 cities, Hué, Quangtri, and Danang.

Jan. 15—It is reported that the U.S. has agreed to give increased aid to South Vietnam to allow for an additional 100,000 men in the Vietnamese army.

Jan. 17—in Hué and Dalat, Buddhists and students participate in antigovernment demonstrations. In Dalat, 4 students are shot.

Jan. 18—Premier Huong appoints 4 generals to the cabinet. The information and finance ministers are replaced because they had been objects of Buddhist hostility.

Jan. 19—General Nguyen Cao Ky, air force commander, informs Phan Khac Suu that he will not accept the post of Minister of Youth. He is one of 4 military leaders named to the cabinet.

Jan. 20—General Ky agrees to join the government after being assured he will be able to retain the post of air force commander. Five Buddhist monks begin a hunger strike to last until Premier Huong resigns.

Jan. 23—It is reported that last night Buddhists attacked the U.S. Information Service Library in Saigon. The rioting, continuing into today, erupted during a Buddhist march on the U.S. embassy to urge withdrawal of U.S. support for Huong.

In Hué, some 5,000 demonstrators attack the U.S. Information Service Library. The recall of U.S. Ambassador Maxwell D. Taylor is demanded.

Jan. 24—Buddhist leaders call a 48-hour strike against the U.S. in Hué and Quangtri, during which time no Americans are to be served in stores or restaurants.

Jan. 27—The Armed Forces Council announces that Vietnamese generals have seized power, overthrowing Premier Tran Van Huong. General Khanh is named to solve the political crisis created by the Buddhists.

Buddhist leaders call off demonstrations.

Jan. 28—A caretaker government under Acting Premier Nguyen Xuan Oanh is installed.

Jan. 29—U.S. Ambassador Maxwell Taylor confers with General Khanh. A power struggle is reportedly developing between Buddhist and military leaders.

### YEMEN

Jan. 5—The Sana radio announces that Premier Hamoud al-Jaifi has resigned; he is replaced by Vice-President Hassan al-Amri. President Abdullah al-Salal, just returned from a visit to the U.A.R., declares a state of emergency.

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